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ABSTRACT
Several high-profile academic articles and reports claim to have
identified important gaps in current merger enforcement rules,
particularly with respect to tech and pharma acquisitions involving
nascent and potential competitors—so-called “killer acquisitions”
and “kill zones.” As a result of these perceived deficiencies, scholars
and enforcers have called for tougher rules, including the introduction
of lower merger filing thresholds and substantive changes, such as the
inversion of the burden of proof when authorities review mergers and
acquisitions in the digital platform industry. Meanwhile, and
seemingly in response to the increased political and advocacy
pressures around the issue, U.S. antitrust enforcers have recently
undertaken several enforcement actions directly targeting such
acquisitions.
As this paper discusses, however, these proposals tend to
overlook the important tradeoffs that would ensue from attempts to
decrease the number of false positives under existing merger rules and
thresholds. While merger enforcement ought to be mindful of these
possible theories of harm, the theories and evidence are not nearly as
robust as many proponents suggest. Most importantly, there is
insufficient basis to conclude that the costs of permitting the behavior
they identify is greater than the costs would be of increasing
enforcement to prohibit it.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The antitrust policy world has fallen out of love with corporate
mergers. After decades of relatively laissez faire enforcement, spurred in
part by the emergence of Chicago School economics,1 a growing number
of policymakers and scholars are calling for tougher rules to curb corporate
acquisitions. But these appeals are premature. There is currently little
evidence to suggest that mergers systematically harm consumer welfare.
More importantly, scholars fail to identify alternative institutional
arrangements that would capture the anticompetitive mergers that evade
prosecution without disproportionate false positives and administrative
costs. Their proposals thus fail to meet the requirements of the error-cost
framework.
There are multiple reasons for the antitrust community’s about-face.
These include concerns about rising market concentration,2 labor market

1

See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Recent developments in economics that challenge
Chicago school views, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 645, 655 (1989) (“Over the past fifteen
years, the courts and enforcement agencies have created Robert Bork’s antitrust
paradise. Antitrust has adopted the Chicago School’s efficiency analysis and the
Chicago School’s conclusions about the effects of business practices.”). Note that, in
many ways, the Chicago and late-Harvard views are somewhat similar when it comes
to mergers, both schools of thought might thus have influenced this loosening of
merger policy. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis,
127 U. Penn. L. Rev. 925, 937-938 (1979) (“The change in thinking that has been
brought about by the Chicago school is nowhere more evident than in the area of
vertical integration. Kaysen and Turner, writing in 1959, advocated for- bidding any
vertical merger in which the acquiring firm had twenty percent or more of its market.
Areeda and Turner, writing in 1978, express very little concern with anticompetitive
effects from vertical integration. In fact, as between a rule of per se illegality for
vertical integration by monopolists and a rule of per se legality, their preference is for
the latter.”).
2
See, e.g., Germán Gutiérrez & Thomas Philippon, Declining Competition and
Investment in the U.S. 1 (NBER, Working Paper No. 23583, 2017) (“The U.S. business
sector has under-invested relative to Tobin’s Q since the early 2000’s. We argue that
declining competition is partly responsible for this phenomenon.”). Contra, Esteban
Rossi-Hansberg, Pierre-Daniel Sarte & Nicholas Trachter, Diverging Trends in
National and Local Concentration 1 (NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Working
Paper No. 25066, 2018) (“Using US NETS data, we present evidence that the positive
trend observed in national product-market concentration between 1990 and 2014
becomes a negative trend when we focus on measures of local concentration. We
document diverging trends for several geographic definitions of local markets. SIC 8
industries with diverging trends are pervasive across sectors. In these industries, top
firms have contributed to the amplification of both trends. When a top firm opens a
plant, local concentration declines and remains lower for at least 7 years. Our findings,
therefore, reconcile the increasing national role of large firms with falling local
concentration, and a likely more competitive local environment.”).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss4/5

4

Manne et al.: Technology Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control

2021]

TECHNOLOGY MERGERS AND CORPORATE CONTROL

1051

monopsony power,3 and large corporations undermining the very fabric of
western democracy.4 But, of these numerous (mis)apprehensions, one has
received the lion’s share of scholarly and political attention. A growing
number of voices argue that existing merger rules fail to apprehend
competitively significant mergers that either fall below existing merger
filing thresholds or affect innovation in ways that are, allegedly, ignored
by current rules.5 FTC Commissioner Rohit Chopra, for instance, asserted
recently that too many transactions avoid antitrust scrutiny by falling
through the cracks of Hart-Scott-Rodino Improvements Act of 1976
(“HSR”) premerger notification thresholds.6 As a result, Chopra claims,
“[t]he FTC ends up missing a large number of anticompetitive mergers
every year.”7
These fears are particularly acute in the pharmaceutical and tech
industries where several high-profile academic articles and reports claim
to have identified important gaps in current merger enforcement rules,
particularly with respect to acquisitions involving nascent and potential
competitors.8 Some of these gaps are purported to arise in situations that

3
See, e.g., José Azar, Ioana Marinescu, Marshall Steinbaum & Bledi Taska,
Concentration in U.S. labor markets: Evidence from online vacancy data, 66 LABOUR
ECON. (NBER, Working Papers No. 101886, 2020) (“These indicators suggest that
employer concentration is a meaningful measure of employer power in labor markets,
that there is a high degree of employer power in labor markets, and also that it varies
widely across occupations and geography.”).
4
See, e.g., TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED
AGE 9 (2018) (“We have managed to recreate both the economics and politics of a
century ago—the first Gilded Age—and remain in grave danger of repeating more of
the signature errors of the twentieth century. As that era has taught us, extreme
economic concentration yields gross inequality and material suffering, feeding an
appetite for nationalistic and extremist leadership. Yet, as if blind to the greatest
lessons of the last century, we are going down the same path. If we learned one thing
from the Gilded Age, it should have been this: The road to fascism and dictatorship is
paved with failures of economic policy to serve the needs of the general public.”).
5
Infra, Section VI.
6
Rohit Chopra, Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra, 85 FED. REG. 231,
77052 (2020) (“Adequate premerger reporting is a helpful tool used to halt
anticompetitive transactions before too much damage is done. However, the
usefulness of the HSR Act only goes so far. This is because many deals can quietly
close without any notification and reporting, since only transactions above a certain
size are reportable.”).
7
Id.
8
See Collen Cunningham et al., Killer Acquisitions, 129 J. POL. ECON. 649, 671
(2021); Sai Krishna Kamepalli, Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Kill Zone 49 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 27146, 2020); DIGITAL COMPETITION
EXPERT PANEL, UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION 46 (Mar. 2019),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachm
ent_data/file/785547/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8PFE-VHED]; Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the
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would normally appear to be procompetitive:
Established incumbents in spaces like tech, digital payments, internet,
pharma and more have embarked on bids to acquire features,
businesses and functionalities to shortcut the time and effort they
would otherwise require for organic expansion. We have traditionally
looked at these cases benignly, but it is now right to be much more
cautious.9

As a result of these perceived deficiencies scholars and enforcers
have called for tougher rules, such as the introduction of lower merger
filing thresholds and substantive changes. These substantive changes
notably include inverting the burden of proof when authorities review
mergers and acquisitions in the digital platform industry.10 Meanwhile,
and seemingly in response to the increased political and advocacy
pressures around the issue, U.S. antitrust enforcers have recently
undertaken several enforcement actions directly targeting such
acquisitions.11

State, Stigler Committee on Digital Platforms, Final Report 234 (2019),
https://www.publicknowledge.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Stigler-Committeeon-Digital-Platforms-Final-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJV9-PHLD]; Australian
Competition & Consumer Commission, Digital Platforms Inquiry, Final Report 76
(2019), https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Digital%20platforms%20inquiry%20%20final%20report.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7QT-6UD4]; see also Jacques Crémer, et
al., Competition Policy For The Digital Era Final Report 120 (2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UHX3-TR53] [hereinafter “Crémer Report”].
9
Cristina Caffarra, et al., “How Tech Rolls”: Potential Competition and
“Reverse” Killer Acquisitions, 2 ANTITRUST CHRON. 1, 1 (2020),
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/how-tech-rolls-potentialcompetition-and-reverse-killer-acquisitions/ [https://perma.cc/A5Z9-NS8U].
10
As far as jurisdictional thresholds are concerned, see, e.g., Crémer Report,
supra note 8, at 10 (“Many of these acquisitions may escape the Commission’s
jurisdiction because they take place when the start-ups do not yet generate sufficient
turnover to meet the thresholds set out in the EUMR. This is because many digital
startups attempt first to build a successful product and attract a large user base while
sacrificing short-term profits; therefore, the competitive potential of such start-ups
may not be reflected in their turnover. To fill this gap, some Member States have
introduced alternative thresholds based on the value of the transaction, but their
practical effects still have to be verified.”). As far as inverting the burden of proof is
concerned, see id. at 11 (“The test proposed here would imply a heightened degree of
control of acquisitions of small start-ups by dominant platforms and/or ecosystems, to
be analysed as a possible strategy against partial user defection from the ecosystem.
Where an acquisition is plausibly part of such a strategy, the notifying parties should
bear the burden of showing that the adverse effects on competition are offset by
merger-specific efficiencies.”).
11
See FTC Press Release, FTC Sues to Block Procter & Gamble’s Acquisition
of Billie, Inc. (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
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As this paper discusses, these proposals tend to overlook the
important tradeoffs that would ensue from attempts to decrease the number
of false positives under existing merger rules and thresholds. While
merger enforcement ought to be mindful of these possible theories of
harm, the theories and evidence are not nearly as robust as many
proponents suggest. Most importantly, there is insufficient basis to
conclude that the costs of permitting the behavior they identify is greater
than the costs would be of increasing enforcement to prohibit it. 12
Our work draws from two key strands of economic literature that are
routinely overlooked (or summarily dismissed) by critics of the status quo.
For a start, as Frank Easterbrook argued in his pioneering work on The
Limits of Antitrust, antitrust enforcement is anything but costless.13 In the
case of merger enforcement, not only is it expensive for agencies to detect
anticompetitive deals but, more importantly, overbearing rules may deter
beneficial merger activity that creates value for consumers. Indeed, not
only are most mergers welfare-enhancing, but barriers to merger activity
have been shown to significantly, and negatively, affect early company
investment.14
releases/2020/12/ftc-sues-block-procter-gambles-acquisition-billie-inc
[https://perma.cc/5SW6-JJS3]; DOJ Press Release, Justice Department Sues to Block
Visa’s
Proposed
Acquisition
of
Plaid
(Nov.
5,
2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-block-visas-proposedacquisition-plaid [https://perma.cc/7J9U-3SF5]; FTC Press Release, FTC Files Suit to
Block Edgewell Personal Care Company’s Acquisition of Harry’s, Inc. (Feb. 3, 2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/02/ftc-files-suit-blockedgewell-personal-care-companys-acquisition [https://perma.cc/T4JH-X7ET]; FTC
Press Release, FTC Challenges Illumina’s Proposed Acquisition of PacBio (Dec. 17,
2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/12/ftc-challengesilluminas-proposed-acquisition-pacbio [https://perma.cc/A8M7-37DB]; DOJ Press
Release, Justice Department Sues to Block Sabre’s Acquisition of Farelogix (Aug. 20,
2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-block-sabresacquisition-farelogix [https://perma.cc/3ZYY-BTXQ].
12
See, e.g., Prepared Remarks of Commissioner Noah Joshua Phillips,
Reasonably Capable? Applying Section 2 to Acquisitions of Nascent Competitors,
Antitrust in the Technology Sector: Policy Perspectives and Insights From the
Enforcers
Conference
(Apr.
29,
2021),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1589524/reasonably_
capable_-_acquisitions_of_nascent_competitors_4-29-2021_final_for_posting.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GR7D-JDTW] (“Some would-be reformers view M&A as
fundamentally predatory and wish to “level the playing” field for smaller, less
competitive, or more sympathetic businesses by throwing as much sand in the gears
as possible. But their Harrison Bergeron vision of competition, handicapping
successful businesses, will not so much level the field as tilt the scales dramatically in
favor of the government, handing tremendous power to regulators, sapping American
competitiveness, and hitting Americans in their pocketbooks.”).
13
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1984).
14
For vertical mergers the welfare-enhancing effects are well-established. See,
e.g., Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm
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Boundaries: The Evidence, 45 J. ECON. LIT. 629, 677 (2007) (“In spite of the lack of
unified theory, over all a fairly clear empirical picture emerges. The data appear to be
telling us that efficiency considerations overwhelm anticompetitive motives in most
contexts. Furthermore, even when we limit attention to natural monopolies or tight
oligopolies, the evidence of anticompetitive harm is not strong.”). See also, Global
Antitrust Institute, Comment Letter on Federal Trade Commission’s Hearings on
Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, Vertical Merger, Geo.
Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 18-27, 8–9 (2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3245940 [https://perma.cc/YY8R-HG6U] (“In sum, these
papers from 2009-2018 continue to support the conclusions from Lafontaine & Slade
(2007) and Cooper et al. (2005) that consumers mostly benefit from vertical
integration. While vertical integration can certainly foreclose rivals in theory, there is
only limited empirical evidence supporting that finding in real markets. The results
continue to suggest that the modern antitrust approach to vertical mergers 9 should
reflect the empirical reality that vertical relationships are generally procompetitive.”).
Along similar lines, empirical research casts doubt on the notion that antitrust merger
enforcement (in marginal cases) raises consumer welfare. The effects of horizontal
mergers are, empirically, less well documented. See, e.g., Robert W. Crandall &
Clifford Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the
Evidence, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 20 (2003) (“We can only conclude that efforts by
antitrust authorities to block particular mergers or affect a merger’s outcome by
allowing it only if certain conditions are met under a consent decree have not been
found to increase consumer welfare in any systematic way, and in some instances the
intervention may even have reduced consumer welfare.”). While there is some
evidence that horizontal mergers can reduce consumer welfare, at least in the short
run, see, e.g., Gregory J. Werden, et al., The Effects of Mergers on Price and Output:
Two Case Studies from the Airline Industry, 12 MGMT. DECIS. ECON. 341 (1991), the
long-run effects appear to be strongly positive. See, e.g., Dario Focarelli & Fabio
Panetta, Are Mergers Beneficial to Consumers? Evidence from the Market for Bank
Deposits, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1152, 1152 (2003) (“We find strong evidence that,
although consolidation does generate adverse price changes, these are temporary. In
the long run, efficiency gains dominate over the market power effect, leading to more
favorable prices for consumers.”). See generally Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their
Causes and Consequences, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 21 (1988). Some related literature
similarly finds that horizontal merger enforcement has harmed consumers. See B.
Espen Eckbo & Peggy Wier, Antimerger Policy Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act: A
Reexamination of the Market Power Hypothesis, 28 J.L. & ECON. 119, 121 (1985) (“In
sum, our results do not support the contention that enforcement of Section 7 has served
the public interest. While it is possible that the government’s merger policy has
deterred some anticompetitive mergers, the results indicate that it has also protected
rival producers from facing increased competition due to efficient mergers.”); B.
Espen Eckbo, Mergers and the Value of Antitrust Deterrence, 47 J. FINANCE 1005,
1027–28 (1992) (rejecting “the market concentration doctrine on samples of both U.S.
and Canadian mergers. By implication, the results also reject the effective deterrence
hypothesis. The evidence is, however, consistent with the alternative hypothesis that
the horizontal mergers in either of the two countries were expected to generate
productive efficiencies”). Regarding the effect of mergers on investment, see, e.g.,
Gordon M. Phillips & Alexei Zhdanov, Venture Capital Investments and Merger and
Acquisition Activity Around the World, NBER, Working Paper No. 24082 (Nov.
2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3082265 [https://perma.cc/Y7XP-AZU9] (“We
examine the relation between venture capital (VC) investments and mergers and
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Second, critics are mistaking the nature of causality. Scholars
routinely surmise that incumbents use mergers to shield themselves from
competition. Acquisitions are thus seen as a means of eliminating
competition. But this overlooks an important alternative. It is at least
plausible that incumbents’ superior managerial or other capabilities (i.e.,
what made them successful in the first place) make them the ideal
purchasers for entrepreneurs and startup investors who are looking to sell.
This dynamic is likely to be amplified where the acquirer and acquiree
operate in overlapping lines of business. In other words, competitive
advantage, and the ability to profitably acquire other firms, might be
caused by business acumen rather than anticompetitive behavior.
Additionally, significant and high-profile M&A activity involving wouldbe competitors may thus be the procompetitive byproduct of a wellmanaged business, rather than anticompetitive efforts to stifle competition.
Critics systematically overlook this possibility. Indeed, Henry Manne’s
seminal work on Mergers and Market for Corporate Control15 – the first
to argue that mergers are a means of applying superior management
practices to new assets – is almost never cited by contemporary researchers
in this space. Our paper attempts to set the record straight.
With this in mind, our paper proceeds as follows. Section I argues
that calls to reform merger enforcement rules and procedures should be
analyzed under the error-cost framework. Accordingly, the challenge for
policymakers is not merely to minimize type II errors (i.e., false
acquittals), which have been a key area of focus for recent scholarship, but
also type I errors (i.e., false convictions) and enforcement costs. This is
particularly important in the field of merger enforcement, where
authorities need to analyze vast numbers of transactions in extremely short
periods of time.
Section II focuses on claims that the presence of large tech platforms
in a given market chills the investments of rivals. The section argues that
these alleged harms are largely hypothetical, but that addressing them
acquisitions (M&A) activity around the world. We find evidence of a strong positive
association between VC investments and lagged M&A activity, consistent with the
hypothesis that an active M&A market provides viable exit opportunities for VC
companies and therefore incentivizes them to engage in more deals.”). And increased
M&A activity in the pharmaceutical sector has not led to decreases in product
approvals; rather, quite the opposite has happened. See, e.g., Barak Richman, et al.,
Pharmaceutical M&A Activity: Effects on Prices, Innovation, and Competition, 48
LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 787, 799 (2017) (“Our review of data measuring pharmaceutical
innovation, however, tells a different story. First, even as merger activity in the United
States increased over the past ten years, there has been a steady upward trend of FDA
approvals of new molecular entities (“NMEs”) and new biological products (“BLAs”).
Hence, the industry has been highly successful in bringing new products to the
market.”).
15
See generally Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate
Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
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would entail far-reaching reforms. Indeed, because incumbents can,
allegedly, use vertical integration and mergers to deter rivals’ investments,
potential solutions would effectively prevent large incumbents from
operating in adjacent markets—thus preventing new entry, potential
synergies, economies of scale, and network effects. This is a hefty price
to pay for harms that are anything but established.
Section III discusses claims that antitrust authorities should pay more
attention to mergers that may eliminate firms’ potential competitors—i.e.,
firms that do not currently compete with the acquirer, but that may do so
in the future. We argue that this would inappropriately shift the focus of
antitrust investigations towards hypothetical harms, thus forcing enforcers
to undertake enforcement action based on unknowable factors.
Section IV focuses on the question of “killer acquisitions” whereby
incumbents allegedly purchase rivals in order to discontinue their
competing innovations (e.g., R&D pipelines that overlap with those of the
incumbent). Although there is some evidence that these mergers occur in
the pharmaceutical industry – but no evidence that they occur in the tech
sector – it is also clear that they are exceedingly rare. Given this, and the
fact that no promising heuristics have been found to identify these mergers
ex-ante, it is unlikely that authorities could prosecute them in a costeffective manner.
Section V puts forward a series of case studies that show the
numerous difficulties that would arise from attempts to prosecute the
harms identified in the previous sections. The case studies focus on
Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram, Google’s purchase of Android, as
well as mergers in the mechanical ventilator market.
Section VI argues that the policy changes that have been suggested
to address mergers highlighted as potentially problematic would entail a
series of social costs that would undermine their usefulness. This is
notably the case of ex-post merger reviews, lowered transaction filing
thresholds, and attempts to shift the burden of proof in certain merger
proceedings.
Overall, this analysis leads us to conclude that, while scholars have
raised valid concerns, they have not suggested alternative institutional
arrangements to address them that would lead to better overall outcomes.
All legal enforcement systems are imperfect, and it is not enough to justify
changes to the system that some imperfections can be identified.16 Indeed,
it could be that antitrust doctrine currently condones practices that harm

16
See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L.
ECON. 1, 22 (1969) (“The view that now pervades much public policy economics
implicitly presents the relevant choice as between an ideal norm and an existing
“imperfect” institutional arrangement. This nirvana approach differs considerably
from a comparative institution approach in which the relevant choice is between
alternative real institutional arrangements.”).
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innovation, but that there is no cost-effective way to reliably identify and
deter this harmful conduct. For instance, as we discuss below, a recent
paper estimates that between 5.3% and 7.4% of pharmaceutical mergers
are “killer acquisitions.”17 But even if that is accurate, it suggests no
tractable basis on which those acquisitions can be differentiated ex ante
from the 92.6% to 94.7% that are presumptively competitively neutral or
procompetitive. A reformed system that overly deters these acquisitions
in order to capture more of the problematic ones is not necessarily an
improvement. Further, while many of the arguments suggesting that the
current system is imperfect are well-taken, claims of systemic problems
are not always as robust as proponents suggest. This further weakens the
case for policy reform because any potential gains from such reforms are
likely far less certain than they are often claimed to be.

II. ANTITRUST AND THE ERROR-COST FRAMEWORK
Every year, firms around the world spend trillions of dollars on
corporate mergers, acquisitions, and R&D investments.18 Most of the
time, these are benign, often leading to cost reductions, synergies, new or
improved products, and lower prices for consumers.19 For smaller firms,
the possibility of being acquired can be vital to making a product worth
developing.
There are also instances, however, when M&A activity enables firms
to increase their market power and reduce output. Therein lies the
fundamental challenge for antitrust authorities: among these myriad
transactions, investments, and business decisions, is it possible to
effectively sort the wheat from the chaff in a way that leads to net
improvements in efficiency and competition, and ultimately consumer
welfare? In more concrete terms the question is: are there rules and
standards that enforcers can use to filter out anticompetitive practices
17
Cunningham et al., supra note 8, at 692 (“Given these assumptions and
estimates, what would the fraction ν of pure killer acquisitions among transactions
with overlap have to be to result in the lower development of acquisitions with overlap
(13.4%)? Specifically, we solve the equation 13.4% = ν × 0 + (1 − ν) × 17.5% for ν
which yields ν = 23.4%. Therefore, we estimate that 5.3% (= ν × 22.7%) of all
acquisitions, or about 46 (= 5.3% × 856) acquisitions every year, are killer
acquisitions. If instead we assume the non-killer acquisitions to have the same
development likelihood as non-acquired projects (19.9%), we estimate that 7.4% of
acquisitions, or 63 per year, are killer acquisitions.”).
18
See Value of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) Worldwide From 1985 to
2020, STATISTA (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/267369/volumeof-mergers-and-acquisitions-worldwide/ [https://perma.cc/SM2B-555C]; see Gross
Domestic Spending on R&D, OECD (last visited Apr. 29, 2021),
https://data.oecd.org/rd/gross-domestic-spending-on-r-d.htm
[https://perma.cc/TVK4-DJUB].
19
See supra note 14.
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while allowing beneficial ones to follow their course? And if so, can this
be done in a timely and cost-effective manner?20

A. The Use of Filters in Antitrust
This filtering question appears to be a herculean task, but has, in fact,
been considerably streamlined, and vastly improved, by the emergence of
the error-cost framework, itself a byproduct of pioneering advances in
microeconomics and industrial organization.21 The error-cost framework
is designed to enable authorities to focus their limited resources on that
conduct most likely to have anticompetitive effects.22 In practice, this is
done by applying several successive filters that separate potentially
anticompetitive practices from ones that are likely innocuous.23
Depending on this initial classification, practices are then submitted to
varying levels of scrutiny ranging from per se prohibitions to presumptive
legality.24
Of the thousands of M&A transactions that take place each year
around the world, antitrust authorities must be notified of only a few, and
fewer still are subject to in-depth reviews.25 For instance, in both the U.S.
and the EU, only deals that meet certain transaction values and/or revenue
thresholds require merger notifications.26 Accordingly, U.S. antitrust
authorities receive somewhere in the vicinity of 2000 merger filings per

20

Running the antitrust system is itself a cost to society.
See, e.g., Olivier E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The
Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 32 (1968); see also, Easterbrook, supra
note 13, at 3; Henry G. Manne, supra note 15; see generally William M Landes &
Richard A Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1980).
22
Id.
23
Id. at 17 (“The task, then, is to create simple rules that will filter the category
of probably-beneficial practices out of the legal system, leaving to assessment under
the Rule of Reason only those with significant risks of competitive injury.”).
24
Id. at 15 (“They should adopt some simple presumptions that structure
antitrust inquiry. Strong presumptions would guide businesses in planning their affairs
by making it possible for counsel to state that some things do not create risks of
liability. They would reduce the costs of litigation by designating as dispositive
particular topics capable of resolution.”).
25
See Number of Merger and Acquisition Transactions Worldwide from 1985
to
2021,
STATISTA
(May
14,
2021),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/267368/number-of-mergers-and-acquisitionsworldwide-since-2005/ [https://perma.cc/W5D2-5BR2].
26
See 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1976); see also, FTC Premerger Notification Office
Staff, HSR Thresholds Adjustments and Reportability for 2020, FTC COMPETITION
MATTERS (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competitionmatters/2020/01/hsr-threshold-adjustments-reportability-2020
[https://perma.cc/T95C-5K9B]; see also Council Regulation 139/2004, 2004 O.J. (L
24) 1, 22 (EC).
21
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year, while the European Commission usually receives a few hundred.27
Typically less than 5% of these mergers are ultimately subjected to indepth reviews.28 These cases are selected by applying yet another set of
filters that include: looking at the relationship between the merging firms
(horizontal, vertical, conglomerate); calculating market shares and
concentration ratios; and checking whether transactions fall within several
recognized theories of harm.29
Similar filtering mechanisms apply to other forms of conduct.30 For
instance, incumbent firms routinely decide to enter adjacent markets or
adopt strategies that might incidentally reduce competition in markets
where they are already present.31 As with mergers, authorities and courts
apply a series of filters/presumptions to home in on those practices most
likely to cause anticompetitive harm.32 Firms with low market shares are
deemed less likely to possess market power (and thus less likely to harm
competition); vertical agreements are widely seen as being less
problematic than horizontal ones; and vertical integration is widely
regarded as procompetitive absent other accompanying factors.33

27

See F.T.C. & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Hart-Scott-Rodino Annual Report Fiscal
Year 2020, Appendix A, (2021); see also European Commission, Merger Statistics, 21
September
1990
to
31
December
2020
(2021),
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SSU9WT3L].
28
See F.T.C. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, id; see also European Commission, id.
29
See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & F.T.C., Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F5YJ-GXP3]; U.S. Dep’t of Justice & F.T.C., Vertical Merger
Guidelines
(2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/usdepartment-justice-federal-trade-commission-vertical-mergerguidelines/vertical_merger_guidelines_6-30-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/UY8L-JJKC];
Commission Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the
Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 2008 O.J.
(C 265) 6, 25.
30
See F.T.C. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property 15 (Jan. 12, 2017).
31
See id.
32
See id. (“The existence of a horizontal relationship between a licensor and its
licensees does not, in itself, indicate that the arrangement is anticompetitive.
Identification of such relationships is merely an aid in determining whether there may
be anticompetitive effects arising from a licensing arrangement.”); see also European
Commission, Communication from the Commission—Guidance on the Commission’s
enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary
conduct by dominant undertakings, O.J. C. 45, 7–20 (Feb. 24, 2009).
33
See F.T.C. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 29; see also Commission
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2010 O.J. (C 130) 1, 46, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010XC0519(04)&from=EN
[https://perma.cc/F9JE-A38N].
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This system is certainly not perfect and filtering cases in this manner
inevitably lets some anticompetitive practices fall through the cracks.34
Indeed, the error-cost framework is premised on the recognition of this
eventuality.35 Nevertheless, the strengths of this paradigm arguably
outweigh its weaknesses. “If presumptions let some socially undesirable
practices escape, the cost is bearable. . . . One cannot have the savings of
decision by rule without accepting the costs of mistakes.”36
Today’s antitrust apparatus is administrable,37 somewhat
predictable,38 and, in the case of merger enforcement, it ensures that deals
are reviewed in a relatively timely manner.39 The contours of this system
have profound ramifications for substantive antitrust policy. Potential
reforms need to account for the tradeoffs inherent to this vision of antitrust
enforcement (between false positives and false negatives, between
timeliness and thoroughness, and so on). Accordingly, the relevant policy
question is not whether existing provisions allow certain categories of
potentially harmful conduct to go unchallenged. Instead, policymakers
should ask whether there is a better set of filters and heuristics that would
enable authorities and courts to prevent previously unchallenged
anticompetitive conduct without overburdening the system or
disproportionately increasing false positives. In short, antitrust enforcers
must avoid the so-called “nirvana fallacy” of believing that all errors can
be eliminated, and existing policies should thus always be weighed against
alternative institutional arrangements (as opposed to merely identifying
instances where they lead to false negatives).40

B. Calls for a Reform of Merger Enforcement Rules and Thresholds
A growing body of economic literature has identified potential
inadequacies in both the U.S. and EU merger control regimes, as well as
the antitrust rules that govern the business practices of digital platforms

34

Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 13.
Id.
36
Id. at 15.
37
It requires only limited government resources to function, compared to, for
example, a system that reviews every merger in detail.
38
Companies can self-assess whether their mergers are likely to be struck down
by authorities and adapt their investment decisions accordingly.
39
Even in-depth merger investigations are typically concluded within months,
rather than years.
40
See Demsetz, supra note 16, at 1 (“The view that now pervades much public
policy economics implicitly presents the relevant choice as between an ideal norm and
an existing “imperfect” institutional arrangement. This nirvana approach differs
considerably from a comparative institution approach in which the relevant choice is
between alternative real institutional arrangements.”).
35
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(notably vertical integration and tying).41 These critiques focus on ways
in which incumbents might prevent nascent or potential rivals from
introducing innovative new products and services that could disrupt their
existing businesses.42 In short, this recent economic literature purports to
show how incumbents might use their dominant market positions to reduce
innovation.43
For instance, recent empirical research purports to show that mergers
of pharmaceutical companies with overlapping R&D pipelines result in
higher project termination rates, thus reducing innovation and, ultimately,
price competition.44 These are referred to as “killer acquisitions.”45 Others
have argued that killer acquisitions also occur in the tech sector, although
the empirical evidence offered to support this second claim is much
weaker, because it does not differentiate between legitimate, efficient
discontinuations of acquired products and the elimination of potential
competitors.46
Acquisitions of nascent and potential competitors
undertaken with the intention of reducing competition have also been
described as “killer acquisitions,” even if the acquisitions do not involve
products being discontinued.47
Along similar lines, it is sometimes argued that large tech firms create
41

See generally Cunningham et al., supra note 8; Zingales et al., supra note 8,
at 85; Kevin A Bryan & Erik Hovenkamp, Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions,
56 REV. INDUS. ORG. 615, 617 (2020); Mark A. Lemley & Andrew McCreary, Exit
Strategy 81 (Stanford L. and Econ. Working Paper No. 542, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3506919
[https://perma.cc/V8LE-NR9W].
42
See, e.g., Bryan & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions,
supra note 41, at 616; Cunningham et al., supra note 8, at 650; Lemley & McCreary,
supra note 41, at 81; Zingales et al., supra note 8, at 11–12.
43
See, e.g., Bryan & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions,
supra note 41, at 616; Cunningham et al., supra note 8, at 650; Lemley & McCreary,
supra note 41, at 81; Zingales et al., supra note 8, at 11–12.
44
Cunningham et al., supra note 8, at 652.
45
See id. at 650 (“We argue that an incumbent firm may acquire an innovative
target and terminate the development of the target’s innovations to preempt future
competition. We call such acquisitions ‘killer acquisitions,’ as they eliminate
potentially promising, yet likely competing, innovation.”).
46
See, e.g., Axel Gautier & Joe Lamesch, Mergers in the Digital Economy,
INFO. ECON. & POL’Y (2000) (“There are three reasons to discontinue a product post
acquisition: the product is not as successful as expected, the acquisition was not
motivated by the product itself but by the target’s assets or R&D effort, or by the
elimination of a potential competitive threat. While our data does not enable us to
screen between these explanations, the present analysis shows that most of the startups
are killed in their infancy.”).
47
John M. Yun, Potential Competition, Nascent Competitors, and Killer
Acquisitions, 18 THE GLOB. ANTITRUST INST. REP. ON THE DIGIT. ECON. 652, 652–53
(2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3733716
[https://perma.cc/NLJ6-EF9M].
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so-called “kill zones” around their core businesses.48 Some scholars assert
that incumbent digital platforms might seek to foreclose rivals in adjacent
markets by “copying” their products, or by using proprietary datasets that
tilt the scales in their favor.49
All of these practices are said to harm innovation by deterring
competitors from investing in innovations that compete with incumbents.50
And the overarching theme of the above research is that existing antitrust
doctrine is ill-equipped to handle these practices, or, at the very least, that
antitrust law should be enforced more vigorously in these settings.
But while the above research identifies important and potentially
harmful conduct that cannot be dismissed out of hand, it is important to
recognize its inherent limitations when it comes to informing normative
policy decisions. Indeed, there is a vast difference between identifying
categories of conduct that sometimes harm consumers, and being able to
isolate individual instances of anticompetitive behavior.51 The above is
merely a restatement of the error-cost framework, which highlights that
the existence of false negatives is not a sufficient condition for increased
intervention:

48

See Zingales et al. supra note 8, at 40.
See, e.g., Kevin Caves & Hal Singer, When the Econometrician Shrugged:
Identifying and Plugging Gaps in the Consumer-Welfare Standard, 26 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 395, 396 (2018) (“Or imagine the platform was appropriating or ‘cloning’ app
functionality into its basic service. The only potential harm in this instance would be
that independent edge providers would be encouraged to exit or discouraged from
entering in future periods. In theory, edge providers might be discouraged to compete
in the app space given what they perceive to be a slanted playing field.”).
50
See, e.g., Cunningham, et al., supra note 8, at 694.
51
And even then, it is important to distinguish conduct that harms consumers
overall from conduct that merely harms certain parameters of competition while
improving others. In other words, antitrust law should prohibit conduct when the
category it belongs to is generally harmful to consumers and/or when harmful
occurrences of that conduct can readily be distinguished. See, e.g., Eric Fruits, et al.,
Static and Dynamic Effects of Mergers: A Review of the Empirical Evidence in the
Wireless Telecommunications Industry, GLOBAL FORUM ON COMPETITION, OECD
DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFF.
(Dec. 6,
2020)
18,
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/GF(2019)13/en/pdf
[https://perma.cc/23RD-44VW] (“Studies that do not consider these [non-price]
effects are incomplete for purposes of evaluating the mergers’ consumer welfare
effects, and [are] all-too-easily used by advocates to misleadingly predict negative
consumer outcomes. This is not necessarily a criticism of the studies themselves,
which generally do not make comprehensive policy conclusions. The reality is that it
is exceptionally difficult to comprehensively study even price effects, such that a wellconducted study of price effects alone is a valuable contribution to the literature.
Nevertheless, in the context of evaluating prospective transactions, the results of such
studies must be discounted to account for their exclusion of non-price effects.”).
49
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The fact—if it can be proved—that there were some false negatives
does not imply that there has been underenforcement with respect to
the optimal level of enforcement. In other words, in the digital space
the argument can be made that an optimal merger policy on average
leads to ex-post “underenforcement”. Moreover, even if the level of
enforcement has been lower than optimal, one must be careful not to
swing to the opposite side, especially in high-tech industries. The
chilling effect on innovation could be significant.52

Instead, it must always be the case that a change to the standards of
government intervention to prevent more of these false negatives with its
inherent tradeoffs, ultimately increases social welfare overall.53
Take the example of Google. The company has acquired at least 270
companies over the last two decades.54 It has been argued that some of
Google’s acquisitions, including those of YouTube, Waze and
DoubleClick, may have been anticompetitive.55 However, the real test for
regulators is whether they could reliably identify which of Google’s 270
acquisitions are actually anticompetitive and do so under a decision rule
that causes less harm to consumers from false positives than is caused by
the current false negatives.56 If the anticompetitive mergers are such a tiny
percentage of total mergers, and if identifying them a priori is difficult,
then a precautionary principle strategy that results in many false positives
would likely not merit the benefits from blocking one or two
anticompetitive mergers.
Indeed, but for Google and Facebook’s investments in YouTube and
Instagram it is far from clear that a mere “video-hosting service” or
“photo-sharing app” would have grown into the robust competitor that
advocates assume. Apart from the potential synergies arising from the
combination of these products with the acquiring companies’ other
products,57 corporate control by the acquiring company may lead to these
firms being better managed. This concept of M&A as creating a “market
for corporate control” adds an important new dimension to the
understanding of the tradeoffs involved in merger control.58
52
Luís Cabral, Merger Policy in Digital Industries, CEPR Discussion Paper
No.
DP14785
(May
2020)
at
12,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3612854
[https://perma.cc/4M55-R38W].
53
See Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG.
714, 741 (2018).
54
See id. at 740.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
For example, YouTube’s search and recommendations engines being
developed by Google, the world’s leading Internet search company, or Instagram’s ad
platform being integrated with Facebook’s.
58
See Henry G. Manne, supra note 15, at 117–119.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2022

17

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 4 [2022], Art. 5

1064

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

These anticompetitive theories of harm can be separated into three
broad categories: (1) large incumbents have become so dominant in their
primary markets that venture capitalists decline to fund startups that
compete head-on, reducing potential competition; (2) large incumbents
acquire potential competitors or non-competitor startups so as to reduce
the competition along several dimensions, and (3) that incumbents
purchase competitors to shut down their overlapping innovation pipelines
(i.e., killer acquisitions).
With this in mind, applying the error-cost framework should lead
policymakers to carefully consider the following questions when
evaluating the merits and policy implications of economic research in this
space:
1.

Do the papers advancing these theories identify categories of
conduct that, on average, harm consumer welfare?

2.

If not, do the papers identify additional factors that would enable
authorities to infer the existence of anticompetitive effects in
individual cases?

3.

If so, would it be feasible for authorities to add these factors to
their analysis (in terms of time and resources)?

4.

Finally, would prohibiting these practices at an individual or
category level prevent efficiencies that would otherwise outweigh
these anticompetitive harms? And could these efficiencies be
analyzed on a case-by-case basis?

In addition to these error-cost-related questions, it is also necessary
to question whether the results of these studies are relevant outside of the
specific markets that they examine, and whether they give sufficient
weight to countervailing procompetitive justifications. In the sections that
follow we explain why several of these academic theories fall short on
these dimensions.

III. IS THERE A “KILL-ZONE” IN TECH MARKETS?
One of the most significant allegations that has been leveled against
large tech firms is that their very presence in a market may hinder
investments, entry, and innovation.59 Several observers have expressed
concern that large incumbents in the technology industry are behaving
anticompetitively by serving as an innovation bottleneck.60

59
60

See Zingales et al., supra note 8, at 33.
Id. at 40.
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The strongest expression of this kill-zone idea, at least in the
economic literature, stems from a working paper by Sai Krishna
Kamepalli, Raghuram Rajan, and Luigi Zingales.61 The paper makes two
important claims, one theoretical and one empirical.62 From a theoretical
standpoint, the authors argue that the prospect of an acquisition by a
dominant platform deters consumers from joining rival platforms, and that
this in turn hampers the growth of these rivals.63 The authors then test a
similar hypothesis empirically.64 They find that acquisitions by a
dominant platform (i.e., Google or Facebook) decreases investment levels
and venture capital deals in markets that are “similar” to that of the target
firm.65
As we explain below, however, both findings are premised upon
significant assumptions about the way in which competition develops in
the digital space, and these assumptions are of questionable reliability.
Moreover, the authors neglect the costs and risks of the policy reforms that
they suggest to address these issues, which may be significant. As we
discuss, similar problems plague the rest of the limited literature advancing
this argument. It is noteworthy that the influence of these ideas in the
policy realm is vastly outsized relative to the strength and quality of the
research that underlies it.

A. Assessing the Evidence on Start-up Investment
We begin by assessing whether the evidence that anticompetitive
conduct, especially in mergers, is impeding the ability of new firms to
enter and compete with incumbents. This is the primary underlying theory
of harm suggesting the need for invigorated enforcement to prevent such
“kill zones.”66 A close look at the evidence suggests, whatever the strength
of these concerns in theory, they are not observed in practice.
First, the supposed “kill-zone” effect does not appear to have led to
aggregate reductions in entrepreneurial activity, even if it may in principle
lead to displacements.67 On the contrary, by most conventional measures,
entrepreneurial activity in the tech sector has grown healthily in the
presence of increasing M&A activity by large incumbents.68 Indeed, these
may be related.

61

Id.
Id. at 40.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
See id.
67
See id.
68
See generally Tech Startup M&As, 2018 Report, MIND
62

CRUNCHBASE
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Startups generally have two methods for achieving liquidity for their
shareholders: IPOs or acquisitions. 69 According to the latest data from
Orrick and Crunchbase, between 2010 and 2018 there were 21,844
acquisitions of tech startups for a total deal value of $1.193 trillion. 70 By
comparison, according to data compiled by Jay R. Ritter, a professor at the
University of Florida, there were 331 tech IPOs for a total market
capitalization of $649.6 billion over the same period.71 As venture
capitalist Scott Kupor said in his testimony before the FTC, “these large
players play a significant role as acquirers of venture-backed startup
companies, which is an important part of the overall health of the venture
ecosystem.”72
Moreover, acquisitions by large incumbents are known to provide a
crucial channel for liquidity in the venture capital and startup
communities. While at one time the source of the “liquidity events”
required to yield sufficient returns to fuel venture capital was evenly
divided between IPOs and mergers, today that ratio has moved to roughly
20 and 80 percent, respectively.73 As investor and serial entrepreneur
Leonard Speiser said recently, “if the DOJ starts going after tech
companies for making acquisitions, venture investors will be much less
likely to invest in new startups, thereby reducing competition in a far more
harmful way.”74

https://s3.amazonaws.com/cdn.orrick.com/files/MTBCrunchbaseTechStartupMAs20
18.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GNW-T5Z9]; see also Gary Dushnitsky & D Daniel Sokol,
Mergers, Antitrust, and the Interplay of Entrepreneurial Activity and the Investments
That Fund It, AVAILABLE AT SSRN, 7 (2021) (“First, we have seen growth in the
number of liquidity events over the past fifteen years, partially reflecting the overall
increase in investment activity during the time period. Moreover, the number of
Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) significantly outnumbers that of IPOs each year. In
any given year, there are at least fivefold more M&A events than there are IPOs. While
less frequent, IPOs tend to take place at higher valuations, with the average IPO
valuation hovering below $0.5B through most of the period and peaking above $2B
more recently. Average M&A activity involves much lower valuations.”).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Jay R. Ritter, Technology Stock IPOs, UNIV. OF FLA. (June 21, 2021),
https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/IPOs-Tech.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9W6KZWGD].
72
Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century,
Multi-Sided Platforms in Action, FTC, at 53:58 (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/audio-video/audio/multi-sided-platforms-action
[https://perma.cc/SM74-QB5J].
73
Id. at 187–88; see also, Dushnitsky & Sokol, supra note 68, at 8. The authors’
data also suggest a 20-80 split between IPOs and M&A, respectively.
74
Leonard Speiser (@leonardspeiser), TWITTER (Jun. 11, 2019, 4:59 PM),
https://twitter.com/leonardspeiser/status/1138566502250999809
[https://perma.cc/2BW4-KEH4].
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Thus, regulatory intervention that reduces the likelihood of reaching
a profitable exit could reduce the incentive for venture capitalists to invest
in startups and may inhibit new business formation. A research paper by
Gordon Phillips and Alexei Zhdanov analyzed data on venture capital
investments and mergers and acquisitions activity in forty-eight countries
to study this relationship rigorously:
Our evidence shows increases in VC [i.e., venture capital] activity
after pro-takeover laws. VC activity grows by about 40-50% more
from pre-law periods to post-law periods in countries that enact protakeover laws versus those that do not. . . . This evidence provides
support for our hypothesis that M&A and VC markets are connected
and improvements in M&A legislation spill over to VC markets by
creating more viable exit opportunities for VC firms. 75

The authors conclude by noting that M&A activity encourages
venture capital investments, entrepreneurship and growth, “[a]s many
start-ups rely on VC funding and venture capitalists rely on acquisitions
for subsequent exits.”76
Similarly, a large scale empirical study by Tiago Prado and Johannes
Bauer shows that startup acquisitions by big tech companies led to
significant short-term increases in venture capital activity. 77 Their
findings explicitly undercut those of Zingales and his co-authors, thus
rejecting the existence of “kill-zones” in tech markets.
Moreover, while venture capital may be relatively small in total size
– $130.9 billion in 201878 – the market punches above its weight in terms
of its effect on the broader economy. According to the National Venture
Capital Association, “venture capital investments amounted to less than
0.2% of U.S. GDP in 2010,” but “revenues from venture-backed

75

Phillips & Zhdanov, supra note 14, at 3.
Id. at 29.
77
Tiago Prado & Johannes Bauer, Effects of Big Tech Acquisitions on Start-up
Funding and Innovation 5 (Quello Center Working Paper No. 04-21, 2021) (“The twoway fixed effects estimation revealed that the global, total number of VC deals in an
industry segment increased by 20.2% on average in the four quarters following a big
tech start-up acquisition. By constraining our analysis to acquisitions that targeted
start-up companies based in the United States, we found an average increase of 21.1%
in the total number of VC deals, and of 30.7% in the total amount of VC funding in
the four quarters following a big tech start-up acquisition. By using the difference-indifferences dynamic estimation setup for investigating the existence of causal effects,
we found an average increase of 4.9% in the total number of VC deals worldwide in
the quarter of the acquisition in the industry segment that received the acquisition.”).
78
Press Release, Pitchbook, US Venture Capital Investment Reached $130.9
Billion
in
2018,
Surpassing
Dot-Com
Era
(Jan.
10,
2019)
(https://pitchbook.com/media/press-releases/us-venture-capital-investment-reached1309-billion-in-2018-surpassing-dot-com-era [https://perma.cc/3AWJ-EPUH]).
76
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companies accounted for 21% of U.S. GDP and 11% of private sector
employment.”79 In recent years, about 60% of all IPOs were VC-backed
companies.80 A research paper from Stanford University found that
venture capital backed public companies account for 44% of the research
and development spending of U.S. public companies (even though they
only represent a fifth of the market capitalization).81
Changing competition standards with the intention of reducing the
number of tech acquisitions would therefore risk disabling the mechanism
that currently provides roughly two-thirds of the liquidity for startups and
one-fifth of GDP. Perhaps some other set of market conditions might
provide a more optimal set of incentives for entrepreneurs but advocates
of changes have yet to compellingly demonstrate why their preferred
vision for the economy is superior to the status quo. Further, large
platforms may further boost startup creation by enabling the targeted
advertising that many startups need to acquire customers.82
Moreover, even the so-called “kill zones” may actually be highly
innovative and procompetitive. As even the Crémer Report opines:
There may indeed be cases in the digital realm where a dominant
acquirer buys up innovative targets but later shuts down the relevant
innovation. This is, however, not the typical scenario. Frequently, the
project of the bought-up start-up is integrated into the “ecosystem” of
the acquirer or into one of their existing products. Such acquisitions
are different from killer acquisitions as the integration of innovative
complementary services often has a plausible efficiency rationale. In
these cases, the theory of harm becomes more complex.83

Thus, although some of the innovative developments that originate
from outside of a dominant firm are brought within that firm, it is not done
so to kill those innovations but to integrate them into existing service
offerings. There are certainly benefits and costs to this approach—one
benefit being that a firm with large scope, scale, and amount of capital can
help introduce new innovations to a ready consumer base. But, no matter
what, it’s simply a mistake to say that acquisitions kill innovation; at worst,
they transform the way the production of innovation is undertaken. For
instance, it is common for entrepreneurs to explicitly include acquisition
79
Brief for National Venture Capital Association as Amicus Curiae supporting
the Appellants at 3, Rapid Litig. Mgmt. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042 (2016).
80
Ritter, supra note 71, at Table 4.
81
Will Gornall & Ilya A. Strebulaev, The Economic Impact of Venture Capital:
Evidence from Public Companies 1 (Stan. Univ. Graduate Sch. of Bus., Working
Paper No. 3362, 2015), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/workingpapers/economic-impact-venture-capital-evidence-public-companies
[https://perma.cc/ZXZ2-JS5G].
82
See Kupor, supra note 2, at 185–86.
83
Crémer Report, supra note 8, at 117–18.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss4/5

22

Manne et al.: Technology Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control

2021]

TECHNOLOGY MERGERS AND CORPORATE CONTROL

1069

by an incumbent as part of their “exit” strategy when they are discussing
their business plan with potential investors.84 Insofar as startups may
avoid directly competing with the core product offerings of large
incumbents, they also consider how their technology might fit into an
incumbent’s broader platform or ecosystem (and therefore make their
companies ripe for acquisition).85 One startup co-founder described how
some startups “identify what’s missing in someone’s portfolio and they
build a company around it,” noting that “[m]any startups build their
companies around an exit strategy.”86 There are even comprehensive
guides available online for founders who want to better understand the
acquisition strategies of the most acquisitive tech giants.87 The upshot is
that big tech acquisitions provide significant incentives to launch startup
companies, and their overall effect on tech innovation is thus much more
complex than a static snapshot might suggest.

B. The “Kill-Zones” Theory and Evidence
Returning to Zingales et al.’s paper, let us start with the authors’
theoretical model.88 The model’s underlying that the prospect of
acquisition by a big tech platform dissuades so-called “techies” from
trying new digital services (because they believe the technology will
ultimately be incorporated into an incumbent’s ecosystem) and that this
prevents new platforms from gaining traction.89

84

Id. at 111.
See id.
86
Val Stepanova, Startup Acquisitions: What’s Grace Got To Do With It?,
CRUNCHBASE (Jun. 18, 2018), https://about.crunchbase.com/blog/startupacquisitions-exit-strategy/ [https://perma.cc/TX5V-WRWA].
87
See, e.g., Conner Forrest, The M&A strategies of 10 tech giants: A founder's
guide to selling your startup, TECHREPUBLIC (May 29, 2015),
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/the-m-a-strategies-of-the-top-10-techcompanies/ [https://perma.cc/B33A-2T42].
88
Sai Krishna Kamepalli, Raghuram Rajan, and Luigi Zingales, Kill Zone,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/26/kill-zone/
[https://perma.cc/F8EU6B7T].
89
Id. (“Consider the decision of techies [i.e., early adopters]. They care
primarily about the fundamental technical quality of the platform. However, they also
engage deeply in any technology, so they have high switching costs (of learning every
minor aspect of any platform they adopt). If techies expect two platforms to merge,
they will be reluctant to pay the switching costs and adopt the new platform early on,
unless the new platform significantly outperforms the incumbent one. After all, they
know that if the entering platform’s technology is a net improvement over the existing
technology, it will be adopted by the incumbent after merger, with new features
melded with old features so that the techies’ adjustment costs are minimized. Thus,
the prospect of a merger will dissuade many techies from trying the new technology.
85
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This hinges upon the central assumption that early adopters of new
platforms – called “techies” in the authors’ parlance – face high switching
costs because of their desire to learn these platforms in detail.90 But it
seems facially contradictory to claim both that “techies” have the highest
switching costs and that they switch the most. Unfortunately, this key
behavioral assumption drives the results of the theoretical model, and the
paper presents no evidence to support its presence in real-world settings.
Similarly, the authors assume that “techies” would incur lower
adoption costs if they remained on the incumbent platform and waited for
the rival platform to be acquired (at which point they could adopt the rival
service at lower cost).91 However, they do not provide any real-world
examples to support this assumption and anecdotal evidence seems to cut
in the opposite direction. Take the example of Facebook’s acquisition of
Instagram.92 Under the authors’ model, existing Facebook users would
have faced lower adoption costs if they decided to join Instagram after its
acquisition by Facebook, rather than adopting it before the merger.93
Nothing in the history of that merger suggests that this is accurate,
however.94 Indeed, the cost of learning to use Instagram does not appear
to have been affected by the merger. To this day, the two services mostly
remain separate (e.g., they are accessed by separate apps with entirely
distinct user interfaces).95 Skeptics may counter that, after the merger,
existing Facebook users could login to Instagram simply using their
Facebook credentials.96 However, this idea is hampered by, at least, two
flaws. First, this is possible for many other apps that are in no way related
to Facebook: Spotify, Fortnite and TikTok, to cite but a few.97 Second,
By staying with the incumbent, however, they reduce the stand-alone value of the
entering platform.”).
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
See generally Facebook to Acquire Instagram, FACEBOOK (Apr. 9, 2012),
https://about.fb.com/news/2012/04/facebook-to-acquire-instagram/
[https://perma.cc/AQ6M-J265].
93
Zingales et al., supra note 8, at 3.
94
See generally Facebook to Acquire Instagram, supra note 92.
95
See, e.g., Julia Chan, Top Apps Worldwide for July 2020 by Downloads,
SENSORTOWER (Aug. 5, 2020), https://sensortower.com/blog/top-apps-worldwidejuly-2020-by-downloads [https://perma.cc/YR9T-DEWM] (showing the apps are two
separate services and remain distinct as evidenced by their separate download rates).
96
See INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/accounts/emailsignup/?hl=en
[https://perma.cc/68KU-CUQP] (last visited Apr. 28, 2021) (user may login or sign
up with Facebook credentials).
97
See SPOTIFY, https://www.spotify.com/us/signup/ [https://perma.cc/YH32JEX4] (last visited Ap. 28, 2021) (user may login or sign up with Facebook
credentials);
see
also,
EPIC
GAMES,
https://www.epicgames.com/id/register/customized?loginSubheading=Connexion&r
egSubheading=Inscription&productName=fortnite&lang=fr&redirectUrl=https%3A
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even if this were not possible, the costs imposed upon users are
negligible.98 Contrary to the authors’ assumption that their switching costs
are higher, this is especially true for the “techies” whose activities drive
the proposed model.99 In short, the authors present no evidence to support
this critical (and counterintuitive) assumption.
Because of these unrealistic assumptions, the authors’ theoretical
conclusions appear of little relevance to the underlying reality of the
platform industry. Indeed, there is little to suggest that techies join new
platforms at a sub-optimal rate and thus fail to generate positive
externalities for later adopters.100
This discrepancy between the model and reality is not surprising.
Throughout economic history, scholarly portrayals of externalities have
repeatedly been at odds with the realities of underlying markets.101 For
instance, Arthur Cecil Pigou famously predicted that externalities
precluded the creation of privately-operated lighthouses.102 However, as
Ronald Coase pointed out, the British lighthouse system at the time was
private.103 Along similar lines, it was argued that externalities prevented
the emergence of markets for bee pollination, as bees can fly where they
desire and so private investors would be unable to ensure a return.104 This
too was debunked.105 Elinor Ostrom famously showed that economic
agents often – although not always – found ways to solve the tragedy of

%2F%2Fwww.epicgames.com%2Ffortnite%2Ffr%2Fhome&client_id=cd2b7c19c97
34a2ab98dc251868d7724&noHostRedirect=true
[https://perma.cc/7BQG-KEFS]
(last visited Ap. 28, 2021) (user may login or sign up with Facebook credentials); TIK
TOK, https://www.tiktok.com/en/ [https://perma.cc/V7ML-K4XM] (last visited Ap.
28, 2021) (user may login or sign up with Facebook credentials). This was not possible
for Instagram at the time of the Facebook merger, but it could well have become so at
a later point in time. See Dan Frommer, Here’s How To Use Instagram, BUS. INSIDER
(Nov. 1, 2010, 11:01 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/instagram-201011?IR=T#type-in-the-usual-information-choose-a-user-photo-etc-2
[https://perma.cc/5E3G-CS7M].
98
Zingales et al., supra note 8, at 3 (emphasis added).
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
See, e.g., ARTHUR C. PIGOU, ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, 183–84 (4th ed.
1938).
102
See id.
103
See Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J. L. & ECON. 357,
360 (1974).
104
See J. E. Meade, External Economies and Diseconomies in a Competitive
Situation, 62 ECON. J. 54, 56 (1952).
105
Steven N. S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16
J. L. & ECON. 11, 13 (1973) (“[I]t will be shown that the observed pricing and
contractual arrangements governing nectar and pollination services are consistent with
efficient allocation of resources.”).
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the commons.106 Finally, in the mid-to-late 1980s, it was argued that
network effects – not superior quality – explained the victory of the
QWERTY keyboard layout over the DVORAK alternative. This too was
thoroughly debunked.107 In short, there is a long intellectual history of
theoretical externality claims not holding up in practice. Sai Krishna
Kamepalli, Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales’ working paper offers
little to suggest that their theoretical model avoids this trap.108
The empirical analysis put forward in the paper is also unreliable for
policymaking purposes. The authors conclude that:
We collect data on the number of deals and dollar amounts invested by
the venture capitalist in specific sectors, after major acquisitions by
Facebook and Google are announced. We find that normalized VC
investments in start-ups in the same space as the company acquired by
Google and Facebook drop by over 40% and the number of deals falls
by over 20% in the three years following an acquisition. In
comparison, a similar calculation for other acquisitions in the software
industry suggests that normalized VC investments in start-ups in the
same space as the company acquired goes up (not down) by over 40
percent, while the number of deals goes up slightly in the three years
following an acquisition.109

Unfortunately, these results are derived from the analysis of only nine
transactions.110 Although this does not necessarily invalidate the results,
it does suggest that they should be interpreted with some degree of
circumspection by policymakers.
Similarly, the empirical data upon which the paper relies may be
prone to selection bias. The authors arbitrarily limit their analysis to
Facebook and Google acquisitions that exceeded a $500 million
threshold.111 As the authors themselves concede, however, markets go
through product cycles where venture capital investments peak and then
decline as the market matures.112 This raises an important question: is it

106

The tragedy of the commons can be defined as a situation where the lack of
property rights encourages economic agents to overconsume common pool resources.
See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 2–7 (1990).
107
See generally Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the
Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 59 (1990).
108
See generally Zingales et al., supra note 8.
109
Zingales et al., supra note 8, at 4–5 (emphasis added).
110
Id. at 38–39.
111
Id. at 23 (“We select all the software companies purchased by Facebook and
Google for more than $500M. There are 9 acquisitions that satisfies these criteria: 7
by Google and 2 by Facebook.”).
112
Id. at 27 (“The pre-trend decline in the relative number of deals is not
surprising. In early stages, the VC investment rounds are more frequent (Gompers,
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conceivable that a merger’s size is a proxy for market maturity? If so, one
would want to know the size of mergers in both the control and treated
groups. Unfortunately, the article merely reported that the nine mergers
in the treatment group were worth between $625 million and $19 billion.113
But even if one were to assume that the authors’ theoretical and
empirical findings are correct, the paper still does not make a strong case
to reform existing antitrust rules. That is, the paper does not provide
evidence that existing antitrust regimes fail to achieve an optimal errorcost balance.
The main problem is that the paper has indeterminate welfare
implications. Indeed, as the authors note, the declines in investment in
spaces adjacent to the incumbent platforms occurred during a time of
rapidly rising venture capital investment (both in terms of the number of
deals and dollars invested). It is entirely plausible that venture capital
merely shifted to other sectors, as opposed to being reduced. From a
consumer welfare perspective, such a shift may be irrelevant. And if the
incumbent platforms successfully integrated the technology of acquired
companies, then consumers benefit from seeing the innovation deployed
at scale, as well as whatever innovations may come from the displaced
investment.
This is a similar dynamic to one of the results in another paper by
Wen and Zhu, which studies the effect of Google developing a native app
for Android that competes with a segment of third-party developers.114
The study finds that developers shift efforts to unaffected markets rather
than completely exiting software development:
[A]fter Google’s entry threat increases, affected developers reduce
innovation and raise the prices for the affected apps. Once Google
enters, the developers reduce innovation and increase prices further.
However, app developers’ incentives to innovate are not completely
suppressed; rather, they shift innovation to unaffected and new apps.

1995). As firms mature, rounds become less frequent: hence a decline in the raw
number of deals.”).
113
Id. at 39.
114
See Wen Wen & Feng Zhu, Threat of Platform‐Owner Entry and
Complementor Responses: Evidence from the Mobile App Market, 40 STRAT. MGMT.
J. 1138, 1142 (2019) (“[W]e find that relative to unaffected developers’ apps in the
same category, app developers vulnerable to Google’s entry threat reduce innovation
on affected apps by 5.1% and increase these apps’ prices by 1.8%. They do not,
however, abandon the platform; rather, when the entry is imminent, they shift
innovation efforts to unaffected markets, manifested in a 4% increase in updates on
existing apps and a 3% to 10% increase in the introduction of new apps. Consistent
with our hypothesis, developers that have popular products being affected by an entry
threat react differently from other affected developers: they increase innovation by
7.8% for affected apps and 15% for unaffected apps.”).
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Given many apps already offering similar features, Google’s entry
may reduce social inefficiency.115

In other words, a variety of effects, often running in different
directions, attend Google’s decision to incorporate a feature into Android
that was previously handled by third-party app providers.116
Thus, when considering a larger view of welfare effects, consumers
may be better off in another way: potential innovation. Firms that
successfully build and sell apps for Android develop generalized skills and
techniques for their operation, such that they can reuse their expertise to
build apps in subsequent app niches. In this sense, developers are
incentivized not only to build apps, but to continually discover future
niches that meet consumer demand, resulting in a higher total level of
innovative behavior. As the authors necessarily conclude, “[i]t would be
premature to draw any policy conclusion on antitrust enforcement based
solely on our model and our limited evidence.”117

IV. MERGERS AND POTENTIAL COMPETITION
Scholars have also posited more direct effects from acquisitions of
startups or nascent companies by incumbents in technology markets.118 In
general, these effects boil down to competition effects and innovation
effects:
Nascent competitor acquisitions have two distinct but related theories
of harm. The first theory of harm is the potential loss of future
competition between the nascent competitor and the acquirer. The
second theory of harm is the potential loss of innovation. A nascent
competitor acquisition may produce harmful innovation effects by
reducing investment in the nascent competitor’s innovation,
potentially delaying the innovation or causing it to fail.119

As suggested, the two theories are related and not perfectly
separable.120 But, in general, with respect to the competition concerns of

115

Id. at 1138 (emphasis added).
Id.
117
See Zingales et al, supra note 8, at 5.
118
See Jay Ezrielev, An Economic Framework for Assessment of Innovation
Effects of Nascent Competitor Acquisitions 1 (Mar. 22, 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3810486
[https://perma.cc/J794-2R5A].
119
Id. at 2.
120
To the extent possible we discuss these “competition” theories of harm in
this section. See infra Section III. We discuss the “innovation” theories of harm in the
next. See infra Section IV.
116
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nascent company acquisitions, scholars have made two primary claims.121
One claim is that antitrust authorities should pay more attention, and apply
stricter standards, to mergers that may prevent competition between the
incumbent acquirer and the nascent, potential competitor.122 Similarly,
some scholars have voiced fears that competition between leader and
laggard incumbents may cause the former to purchase promising
complementary startups that would otherwise enable the laggard to catch
up, thus decreasing the extent of competition that would have occurred
between incumbents if the laggard had been able to make the
acquisition.123
While these effects are surely possible in theory, it is another matter
whether either the risk (or the effect) is large enough to warrant heightened
concern and whether the ability to differentiate beneficial from detrimental
acquisitions is large enough to ensure against costly errors. There is little
reason to think either of these is the case:
“Nascent competitor” acquisitions tend to add useful new features to
products consumers already love, eliminate little or no current
competition, supply the acquired firm’s users with far greater support
and innovation, and provide a valuable exit ramp for investors,
encouraging future investments in innovation. Consumer harm is at
best speculative. And most importantly, critics have identified no
instances in which meaningful competition has been lost or consumers
harmed.124

And, as this section explains, seeking to address the putative issues
created by such transactions would place tremendous – and probably
insurmountable – informational burdens upon antitrust authorities.

121

See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Nascent Competitors, 168 U. PA. L.
REV. 1879, 1879 (2020).
122
Id. (“A nascent competitor is a firm whose prospective innovation represents
a serious threat to an incumbent. Protecting such competition is a critical mission for
antitrust law, given the outsized role of unproven outsiders as innovators and the
uniquely potent threat they often pose to powerful entrenched firms. In this Article,
we identify nascent competition as a distinct analytical category and outline a program
of antitrust enforcement to protect it. We make the case for enforcement even where
the ultimate competitive significance of the target is uncertain, and explain why a
contrary view is mistaken as a matter of policy and precedent.”).
123
See Bryan & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions, supra
note 41, at 615; Kevin A Bryan & Erik Hovenkamp, Startup Acquisitions, Error Costs,
and Antitrust Policy, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 331, 331 (2020).
124
Jonathan Jacobson and Christopher Mufarrige, Acquisitions of “Nascent”
Competitors, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 1 (Aug. 2020).
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A. Acquisitions of Potential Competitors
A first theory of harm is the idea that incumbents might acquire rivals
that do not yet compete head-on with them in order to reduce the
competitive pressure they will face in the future.125 For instance, in his
paper, Potential Competition and Antitrust Analysis: Monopoly Profits
Exceed Duopoly Profits, Steven Salop argues that:
Acquisitions of potential or nascent competitors by a dominant firm
raise inherent anticompetitive concerns.
By eliminating the
procompetitive impact of the entry, an acquisition can allow the
dominant firm to continue to exercise monopoly power and earn
monopoly profits. The dominant firm also can neutralize the potential
innovation competition that the entrant would provide.126

This intuition is further elaborated and distinguished from the killer
acquisitions literature by Cristina Caffarra, Gregory Crawford, and
Tommaso Valletti:
What seems to be more frequent are cases where the acquisition may
effectively extinguish the standalone effort of the buyer to expand in a
particular space because the target immediately provides it with those
capabilities. . . .
. . . [T]hese acquisitions are often evaluated internally in terms of ‘buy
vs build.’ Which is to say that there is often an alternative path to
expanding into a particular space through the acquisition: with
sprawling capabilities, competences, and limitless internal funding,
buyers are often already on the way to building a functionality
themselves. 127

Along similar lines, Michael Katz has argued that competition
authorities should pay closer attention to mergers that involve potential
competitors than is currently the case:

125

See generally Steven C. Salop, Potential Competition and Antitrust
Analysis: Monopoly Profits Exceed Duopoly Profits 6 (Geo. Univ. L. Ctr., Working
Paper,
2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3839631
[https://perma.cc/9DBF-36QD].
126
Id. at 6; see also Shapiro, supra note 53, at 739–40 (“One promising way to
tighten up on merger enforcement would be to apply tougher standards to mergers that
may lessen competition in the future, even if they do not lessen competition right
away. In the language of antitrust, these cases involve a loss of potential competition.
One common fact pattern that can involve a loss of future competition occurs when a
large incumbent firm acquires a highly capable firm operating in an adjacent space.”).
127
Caffarra et al., supra note 9, at 6.
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The entrant’s need to acquire complementary assets and attain a strong
growth path may allow an incumbent to identify and acquire a
potential rival before it has entered into direct competition with the
incumbent, or while the entrant still has a very small share of the
market in which the incumbent competes.128

Finally, Massimo Motta and Martin Peitz conclude that mergers are
anticompetitive whenever startups could pursue the acquired project in the
counterfactual setting.129
While all of these papers have undeniable academic merit, from a
policy standpoint they suffer from important blind spots that significantly
limit their usefulness in designing antitrust merger policy.

1. Restrictive Assumptions
First and foremost, the above theories rest upon several restrictive
assumptions that are not certain to occur in real-world settings—in fact,
some of these assumptions are antithetical to common portrayals of
competition in both the pharmaceutical and tech industries. To understand
this objection it is useful to take a step back and examine the assumptions
underpinning fears that mergers will reduce potential competition.
All of the above theories rest on a central premise: in a given market,
monopoly profits generally exceed joint duopoly profits.130 This allegedly
makes it profitable, and mutually advantageous, for an incumbent to
protect its monopoly position by preemptively acquiring potential rivals:
[B]ecause monopoly profits exceed competitive profits, the deck is
stacked against them. The dominant firm’s incentive to spend is
greater than the entrant’s because the dominant firm is spending to
protect its monopoly profits while the entrant is spending to achieve
the lesser, competitive duopoly profits.131

This assumption has four important corollaries that are mostly
overlooked in the literature, however, and that tend to undermine the
claimed policy implications.
First, anticompetitive mergers are, by definition, possible (under the
above theories; see below for a potential exception to this principle) only
128
Michael L Katz, Big-tech Mergers: Innovation, Competition for the Market,
and the Acquisition of Emerging Competitors, 54 INF. ECON. & POL’Y 9 (2020).
129
Massimo Motta & Martin Peitz, Big Tech Mergers, INF. ECON. & POL’Y 4
(2020) (“To understand the likely effects of any given acquisition, it is crucial to
identify the likely counterfactual to that acquisition. Indeed, it is straightforward that
whenever the startup has the ability to pursue its project, the merger will be
anticompetitive.”).
130
See Salop, supra note 125, at 22.
131
Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
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when the acquired rival could effectively challenge the incumbent.132 But
these are, of course, only potential challengers; there is no guarantee that
any one of them could or would mount a viable competitive threat.133
While potential competitors are important constraints on existing markets,
they do not generally offer the same degree of constraint as actual
competitors.134 As such, any analysis of the implications of a merger
involving a potential competitor would have to incorporate the probability
of competition.135
High-quality analysis of the effects of potential competition are few
and far between, but, according to at least one literature review, a potential
competitor may have between one-eighth to one-third the effect on
competition as an actual competitor.136 And the strength of this
competitive constraint also depends on the firms’ perceptions: If both the
incumbent and the rival heavily discount the probability of entry, then
potential competition is unlikely to affect their behavior.137
Second, and less obviously, it must be the case that the rival can hope
to share only duopoly profits, as opposed to completely overthrowing the
incumbent (or taking a significantly larger share of the market than the
incumbent).138 When this is not the case—for instance because
competition is “for the market”—then monopoly maintenance fails to
explain a rival’s decision to sell. Indeed, there is no asymmetry between
the incumbent and the rival. The monopolist cannot profitably pay more
to acquire a rival than the revenue the latter could expect to earn by

132

Id. at 6.
See id.
134
Id.
135
See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, In the Matter
of Nielsen Holdings N.V. and Arbitron Inc., FTC File No. 131-0058 (Sep. 20, 2013),
at n.3 (“Nevertheless, competitive effects in actual potential competition cases still are
more difficult, on balance, to assess than typical merger cases because the agency must
predict whether a party is likely to enter the relevant market absent the merger. It is
because of this uncertainty and the potential for conjecture that the courts and agencies
have cabined the actual potential competition doctrine by, for instance, applying a
heightened standard of proof for showing a firm likely would enter the market absent
the merger.”) (citing B.A.T. Indus., 104 F.T.C. 852, 926-28 (1984) (applying a “clear
proof” standard)).
136
See Mergers That Eliminate Potential Competition, RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAWS 111 (Einer Elhauge, ed. 2012) (“All twelve
studies [of airline markets] find that potential competition results in lower prices by
incumbent carriers, in ten cases by statistically significant amounts. Except as noted
below, the amounts range between one quarter of one percent to about two percent,
and in all cases are less than the amount of the price decline from one additional actual
competitor, specifically, from one eighth to one third as large.”).
137
Id.
138
Salop, supra note 125, at 27.
133
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remaining independent. In other words, monopoly maintenance alone will
not give rise to advantageous deals.139
Following this same logic, acquisitions to preempt competition are
even more improbable if both the incumbent and the rival believe that they
are most likely to dominate the market so that ex-post market shares would
be heavily skewed in their favor.140 In short, the above theories have little
or no significance when the rival and incumbent do not expect to share the
market if they competed head on.
Scholars tend to assume that these factors are present in most digital
and pharmaceutical mergers, but that assumption ignores several
counterarguments.141 For instance, it is worth noting that, because of
network externalities, competition for the market is widely considered to
be the norm in precisely the digital markets that the above theories focus
on.142 And if this is true, then there is no counterfactual scenario where
incumbents and rivals could share duopoly profits, and these
anticompetitive theories of harm thus falter. This casts significant doubts
on these theories’ usefulness for policymaking purposes.
Likewise, several acquisitions involve firms that cannot reasonably
be expected to compete with incumbents, and vice versa. In other words,
there is no guarantee that dominant firms in one market can always
outcompete rivals in adjacent spaces—otherwise, we would all be using
Microsoft’s Internet browser and search engine and Google+ would be the
world’s leading social network.143 The upshot is that authorities cannot
(and should not) assume that, in the counterfactual setting, incumbents
would necessarily enter and prosper in adjacent markets.
Similarly, these theories assume that acquisitions of potential
competitors by dominant firms should never be approved absent extreme
circumstances. The reason, primarily, is the assumed presence of other
routes to accomplish the merger’s ends, such as acquisition of the acquiree

This is merely a corollary of Salop’s own model. Id.
Again, this is a corollary of Salop’s model. In this setting, it is no longer a
given that the profits the incumbent could earn from anticompetitive acquisition
exceed those that the rival could earn from competing.
141
Salop, supra note 125, at 24.
142
See, e.g., Crémer Report, supra note 8, at 5 (“In markets where network
externalities and returns to scale are strong, and especially in the absence of multihoming, protocol and data interoperability, or differentiation, there might be room in
the market for only a limited number of platforms. The consequences for competition
policy are twofold. First, to provide incentives to supply goods and services on
reasonable conditions and to innovate, it is essential to protect competition ‘for’ the
market.”); see also DIGITAL COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL, supra note 8, at 4 (“In many
cases, digital markets are subject to ‘tipping’ in which a winner will take most of the
market.”).
143
Dirk Auer & Geoffrey Manne, Antitrust Dystopia and Antitrust Nostalgia,
GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
139
140
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by other potential acquirers, acquisition by the dominant incumbent of
other potential acquirees, or development by the dominant incumbent of
its own equivalent capabilities.144
Under current U.S. law, such a potential competitor acquisition
requires showing “(i) that [the potential competitor] has available feasible
means for entering the . . . market other than by [the challenged
acquisition]; and (ii) that those means offer a substantial likelihood of
ultimately producing deconcentration of that market or other significant
procompetitive effects.”145
According to Salop, however, “[f]or
acquisitions by dominant platforms, […] this bar is set far too high.
Instead, the law should apply an anticompetitive presumption with a high
rebuttal burden to such acquisitions of nascent of potential competitors.”146
But this is a purely structural view, focused entirely on the extent of
concentration in a given market, not the possibility that any given acquirer
might be able to extract greater value than any other. Yet it is not clear
that there is any basis for this assumption. Although it is convenient in
theoretical modeling to assume that similarly situated firms have
equivalent capacities to realize profits, in reality firms vary greatly in their
capabilities, and their investment and other business decisions are
dependent on the firm’s managers’ expectations about their idiosyncratic
abilities to recognize profit opportunities and take advantage of them—in
short, they rest on the firm managers’ ability to be entrepreneurial.147
Potential and actual competitors alike are unlikely to presume to operate
with the same entrepreneurial capacity in any given circumstance as
existing market leaders. Once again, this is why neglect of the market for

144
Of the six reasons given by Salop for adopting a presumption against
dominant firm/nascent competitor acquisitions, all but the “monopoly profits are
greater than duopoly profits” reason are of this sort. See Salop, supra note 125, at 12–
16.
145
United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 633 (1974).
Subsequent cases have refined this standard to require proof that “1. the relevant
market is oligopolistic; 2. absent the acquisition, the acquiring firm would have
entered the market in the near future either de novo or through acquisition of a little
company; and 3. such entry by the acquiring firm carried a substantial likelihood of
ultimately producing deconcentration of the market or other significant
procompetitive effects.” Alberta Gas Chemicals Ltd. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 826 F.2d 1235, 1254–55 (3d Cir. 1987) (Becker, J., dissenting) (quoting Tenneco,
Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346, 352 (2d Cir. 1982)).
146
Salop, supra note 125, at 12.
147
See, e.g., David J. Teece, A Capability Theory of the Firm: An Economics
and (Strategic) Management Perspective, 53 N.Z. ECON. PAPERS 1, 5 (2017)
(“Economists see the industry supply curve as nothing other than the sum of individual
firm supply curves. This construct is convenient, especially when coupled with an
assumption of firm-level homogeneity . . . . [However, i]n adopting this path,
economists read out of the theory of the firm not only an affirmative role for the
manager but also any role for entrepreneurship.” (citation omitted)).
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corporate control and a myopic focus on product markets can be
misleading.
Third, Salop’s model also assumes that future entry is not possible
after an entrant has been acquired—that a monopolist must buy a potential
duopolist only once to protect its monopoly profits. 148 But this is, at best,
a special case, not a generalizable presumption. Except where, perhaps,
extremely strong intellectual property rights preclude other firms from
replicating the functions of the first potential duopolist, there is little
reason to expect that removal of a single potential competitor is
tantamount to removal of potential competition overall. If every time a
potential competitor is purchased a new one can enter with similar
capabilities and technology, the calculus changes considerably. It
certainly may no longer be the case that monopoly profits, minus the
purchases of every potential competitor, exceed duopoly profits.
This may mean that this kind of behavior encourages the
overproduction of potential competitors, in fact.149 Because there are
excess monopoly profits to be obtained by being acquired, would-be
potential competitors should be more profitable in these scenarios than
their expected profitability from duopoly competition would make them.
This may reinforce the previous dynamic, where defensive acquisitions by
monopolists draw more entrants into the market and may lead to more
aggregate innovation if new entrants create more innovation.
By the same token, this would change the calculus, increasing the
expected profits of the new entrant from duopoly profits to duopoly profits
plus a share of the delta between duopoly and monopoly profits—and,
correspondingly, reduce the incumbent’s expected profits from
“monopoly profits” to “monopoly profits minus this delta.” Once again,
there is simply no basis to assume that the incumbent’s expectations
outweigh the new entrants’.
Fourth, the above models also tend to ignore, or at least underplay,
the likelihood of efficiencies stemming from mergers involving potential
competitors. For instance, Salop argues that:
The dominant firm may be able to achieve the benefits with its own
investment. Moreover, this alternative route does not simply apply to
acquisitions of nascent direct competitors, but also to the acquisition
of complementary or vertically adjacent nascent or potential
competitors. If the acquisition target has a key product feature, the
acquiring firm generally would create its own version absent the
merger. The only merger-specific efficiency then might be the
dominant firm more quickly rolling out the feature, not the product
148

See Salop, supra note 125, at 6.
See, e.g., Jean Tirole, Competition and the Industrial Challenge for the
Digital Age 10 (Toulouse Sch. of Econ., Working Paper, 2020) (“[T]he entrant makes
money out of the threat to compete with the incumbent and ‘ransoms’ the latter.”).
149
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improvement generally. Of course, this is a much smaller efficiency
benefit. It also leaves out the fact that the nascent competitor might
have rolled out the feature with an alternative partner, or that the
dominant firm could have licensed the feature instead.150

While this is certainly possible, we simply do not know how often
Salop’s objection is correct (i.e., acquisition by an incumbent provides
only small, incremental efficiencies), versus how often the target company
would not find an alternative buyer and would go out of business absent
the transaction, or the acquirer would not develop its own version of a
product/service. As we explain in Section V, through a series of case
studies, the latter is far more likely than critics tend to assume.
Finally, an acquired firm may be more valuable to the incumbent
competitor (and its value may be better known to the incumbent
competitor) than the firm could ever be on its own or owned by another
firm because of the incumbent’s superior managerial capabilities.151
“What is special about many acquisitions is that the ‘giant’ is not simply
‘killing’ a potential rival but rather acquiring a technology that
complements the incumbent’s assets.

2. Consumer Welfare
Related to the previous points, potential competition does not always
increase consumer welfare.152 Indeed, while the presence of potential
competitors might increase price competition, it can also have supply side
effects that cut in the opposite direction. For example, as Nobel laureate
Joseph Stiglitz observes, a monopolist threatened by potential competition
may invest in socially wasteful R&D efforts, entry-deterrence
mechanisms, and it may operate at lower than optimal scale in anticipation
of future competitive entry.153 In other words, the analysis of R&D

150

Salop, supra note 125, at 15–16 (footnotes omitted).
Henry G. Manne, supra note 15, at 118. (“Managers of a competing firm,
unlike free-wheeling individual participants in the market for corporate control,
almost automatically know a great deal of the kind of information crucial to a takeover decision.”).
152
See, e.g., Joseph E Stiglitz, Potential Competition May Reduce Welfare, 71
AM. ECON. REV. 184, 184–89 (1981).
153
Id. at 184–85; see also, Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz, Uncertainty,
Industrial Structure, and the Speed of R&D, 11 BELL J. ECON. 1, 1 (1980) (“This paper
studies the nature and consequences of competition in R&D and the relationship
between this form of competition and competition in the product market, by focusing
on comparisons of speed of research, number of independent research laboratories,
and level of risk undertaken. Among the results: competition in the current product
market reduces the level of innovation (relative to monopoly); competition in R&D
increases the level of innovation, possibly beyond the socially optimal level. Under
151
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competition differs significantly from standard price competition, so much
so that structural presumptions are no longer an appropriate touchstone for
antitrust enforcement.154

3. Workability
There are also pragmatic objections to the above theories. The
reforms proposed by these scholars would compel antitrust authorities and
courts to make increasingly speculative assessments concerning the
counterfactual setting of proposed acquisitions. Counterfactual analysis is
the bedrock of antitrust merger enforcement.155 However, this exercise
becomes exponentially more complicated as enforcers are asked (i) to look
further into future, and (ii) to forecast the trajectories or firms that are more
distantly related.
In simple terms, it is far easier to determine whether a merger
between McDonalds and Burger King would lead to increased hamburger
prices in the short run than it is to determine whether a gaming platform –
like Steam or the Epic Games Store – might someday compete with video
or music subscription platforms, such as Netflix or Spotify.156

certain conditions, it pays a monopolist to preempt potential competitors, thereby
enabling the monopoly
to persist. Market equilibrium may entail excessively fast research with insufficient risk-taking.”); see also Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz, Industrial
Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity, 90 ECON J. 266, 289 (1980) (“There
may be excessive duplication of research effort in a market economy in the sense that
industry-wide R & D expenditure exceeds the socially optimal level even though costreduction is lower. In particular, an industry may be characterized by a very low
degree of concentration (i.e., a large number of firms) and at the same time engage in
a great deal of social waste.”); see Claude d’Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin,
Cooperative and Noncooperative R & D in Duopoly with Spillovers, 78 AM. ECON.
REV. 1133, 1136 (1988) (arguing that the presence of R&D spillovers may affect the
socially optimal degree of competition in innovation markets: “For large spillovers,
such that β > 0.5, the amount of research which is the closest to the social optimum is
the one achieved by firms’ cooperating in both output and research, and the most
distant, the one obtained by noncooperative behavior.”).
154
Stiglitz, id., at 185.
155
See, e.g., John M. Yun, Are We Dropping the Crystal Ball? Understanding
Nascent & Potential Competition in Antitrust, 104 MARQ. L. REV. 613, 637 (2021).
156
Nielsen Holdings N.V., FTC No. 131-0058, 2013 WL 5348551, at 21 (Sept.
20, 2013) (Wright, Comm’r dissenting) (footnote omitted). (“[I]t is inherently more
difficult in future market cases to define properly the relevant product market, to
identify likely buyers and sellers, to estimate cross-elasticities of demand or
understand on a more qualitative level potential product substitutability, and to
ascertain the set of potential entrants and their likely incentives. Although all merger
review necessarily is forward looking, it is an exceedingly difficult task to predict the
competitive effects of a transaction where there is insufficient evidence to reliably
answer these basic questions upon which proper merger analysis is based.”).
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Accordingly, it is not that the above models are necessarily wrong,
but rather that applying them to practical cases would require antitrust
enforcers to estimate mostly unknowable factors.
Unfortunately, these difficulties might ultimately prove
insurmountable, especially if authorities are asked to operate below
current merger filing thresholds, as many of the above papers suggest
doing. For instance, many of the firms purchased by large tech companies
have not yet brought a single product to market: indeed, this was the case
when Google purchased Android.157 In turn, this makes it harder to predict
whether the acquired firm might have grown into a competitor absent the
merger.158
Proponents often attempt to mask these difficulties by citing the
example of past mergers where the underlying products/services
ultimately became competitors—Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram is
routinely cited.159 However, using previous cases to argue that current
enforcement leads to false negatives (i.e., authorities allow mergers
between companies whose products became substitutes after the merger)
is inherently prone to hindsight bias.
Take the examples provided by Carl Shapiro in his 2018 paper,
“Prominent examples include Google’s acquisition of YouTube in 2006
and DoubleClick in 2007, Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram in 2012
and of the virtual reality firm Oculus CR in 2014, and Microsoft’s
acquisition of LinkedIn in 2016.”160 In the case of Facebook, the social

157
See, e.g., John Callaham, Google Made Its Best Acquisition Nearly 16 Years
Ago: Can You Guess What It Was?, ANDROID AUTH. (May 21, 2021),
https://www.androidauthority.com/google-android-acquisition-884194/
[https://perma.cc/7VLY-5K47] (“Google asked to meet the co-founders of Android in
January 2005 to see if they could help the company. In a second meeting later that
year, the Android co-founders showed off a prototype of their mobile OS to Google’s
Larry Page and Sergey Brin. It was apparently good enough because Google quickly
offered to acquire Android. How much did Google buy Android for? The official
documents state it was a mere $50 million.”).
158
This problem is often glossed over by proponents of tougher enforcement.
See, e.g., Hemphill & Wu, supra note 121, at 1881 (“Blocking or deterring too many
acquisitions would be undesirable. However, the significance of this concern should
not be exaggerated, for our proposed approach is very far from a general ban on the
acquisition of unproven companies. We would discourage, at most, acquisition by the
firm or firms most threatened by a nascent rival. Profitable acquisitions by others
would be left alone, as would the acquisition of merely complementary or other
nonthreatening firms.”). The key problem is that in many, perhaps even most, cases it
will be extremely challenging for authorities to determine whether an incumbent is
threatened by a given “nascent competitor.” Id.
159
See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 53, at 740.
160
Id.
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media company has made at least ninety-two acquisitions since 2007.161
In the case of Google, the company has acquired more than 270 companies
over the last two decades.162 Of these hundreds of acquisitions, Shapiro
identifies four that were potentially anticompetitive.163
However, the fact that these services would become competitors was
far from clear at the time the acquisitions. It was not obvious in 2006 that
video streaming would ultimately compete with search engines in the
market for online advertising. Indeed, it was only a year later that Google
started placing ads on YouTube.164 Moreover, at the time of the merger,
it was not clear that YouTube was even a commercially viable service, let
alone that the video streaming market would become the huge success that
it is today, with YouTube as the leading service.165 The New York Time’s
coverage of the deal neatly illustrates this uncertainty.166 Some famous
industry observers even scoffed at the deal. Mark Cuban notably wrote a
piece titled “I still think Google is crazy.”167
161

Tim Wu & Stuart A. Thompson, Opinion, The Roots of Big Tech Run
Disturbingly
Deep,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
7,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/07/opinion/google-facebook-mergersacquisitions-antitrust.html [https://perma.cc/VY2X-KRDX].
162
Id.
163
Shapiro, supra note 53, at 740.
164
See, e.g., Nicholas Jackson, Infographic: The History of Video Advertising
on
YouTube,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Aug.
3,
2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/08/infographic-the-history-ofvideo-advertising-on-youtube/242836/ [https://perma.cc/R9KQ-PB48].
165
Kevin Allison & Aline Van Duyn, Google To Buy YouTube for $1.65bn,
FIN. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2006), https://www.ft.com/content/5818fb64-579b-11db-be9f0000779e2340 [https://perma.cc/7AHP-VCCR] (“In spite of YouTube’s popularity
there have been questions about the sustainability of the company in light of the large
amount of illegally copied material viewed on the site and limited advertising revenues
to date.”).
166
Andrew Ross Sorkin & Jeremy W. Peters, Google to Acquire YouTube for
$1.65
Billion,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
9,
2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/09/business/09cnd-deal.html
[https://perma.cc/24Q9-NDAA] (“The deal will also greatly benefit YouTube, which
would have Google’s vast resources to help it navigate some sticky legal issues.
Copyrighted videos often find their way onto YouTube’s pages despite efforts by the
site to prevent it. YouTube could also benefit from a Google alliance as it tries to
develop new software to prevent copyright infringement. These copyright issues have
led some in the technology industry to compare YouTube to Napster, the song filesharing service that eventually had to shut down after a protracted legal fight with the
recording industry.”).
167
Mark Cuban, I Still Think Google Is Crazy :), BLOG MAVERICK (Oct. 9,
2006),
https://blogmaverick.com/2006/10/09/i-still-think-google-is-crazy/
[https://perma.cc/F8QZ-Z2EY] (“It will be interesting to see what happens next and
what happens in the copyright world. I still think Google Lawyers will be a busy, busy
bunch. I don’t think you can sue Google into oblivion, but as others have mentioned,
if Google gets nailed one single time for copyright violation, there are going to be
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Moreover, the market for online advertising (which is where the
merger might, arguably, have reduced competition) was merely an
afterthought at the time of the deal. For instance, an article in the Guardian
surmised that:
YouTube is yet to develop a way to attract significant revenue. One
possibility is that users could be required to sit through brief
advertisements before viewing certain clips. Mr. Hurley was noncommittal on this, merely saying the companies would be exploring
“lots of options.”168

Along similar lines, if Google and Facebook hadn’t invested in
YouTube and Instagram, it is far from clear that a mere “video-hosting
service” or “photo-sharing app” would have grown into the competitor that
advocates assume. For instance, coverage at the time of the YouTube
acquisition sometimes stressed how the Google acquisition might
contribute tremendously towards YouTube’s success:
Mr. Hurley predicted that Google’s financial resources would help to
build a business model able to attract media companies keen to
publicise licensed clips and to avoid a possible mountain of copyright
litigation. “We’ll have the resources to build systems so that copyright
holders can benefit from the site,” he said.169

A counterexample would be the history of Snapchat. Facebook tried
to acquire Snapchat for $3 billion in 2013, but Snapchat CEO Evan Spiegel
rebuffed Mark Zuckerberg and decided to remain an independent company
(and eventually IPO).170 As a public company, Snapchat has been

more shareholder lawsuits than Doans has pills to go with the pile on copyright suits
that follow. Think maybe how Google discloses what they perceive the copyright risk
to be in the SEC filings might be an interesting read?”); see Allison & Van Duyn,
supra note 165 (“In spite of YouTube’s popularity there have been questions about
the sustainability of the company in light of the large amount of illegally copied
material viewed on the site and limited advertising revenues to date.”).
168
Andrew Clark, Google Nets YouTube in $1.65bn Takeover, GUARDIAN (Oct.
10
2006),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2006/oct/10/searchengines.citynews
[https://perma.cc/2PSE-VV5Z]; see also Michael Arrington, Google Has Acquired
YouTube,
TECHCRUNCH
(Oct.
9,
2006,
3:25
PM),
https://techcrunch.com/2006/10/09/google-has-acquired-youtube/
[https://perma.cc/MG8G-AMA6].
169
Clark, supra note 168.
170
See Evelyn M. Rusli & Douglas MacMillan, Snapchat Spurned $3 Billion
Acquisition Offer from Facebook, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13, 2013, 1:44 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-DGB-30794 [https://perma.cc/D5UG-GRSS]; see
also Jeff Bercovici, Facebook Tried to Buy Snapchat for $3B in Cash. Here’s Why,
FORBES
(Nov.
13,
2013,
2:57
PM),
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moderately successful—with a market capitalization around $38 billion at
time of writing—but it has not successfully unseated Facebook ($800
billion market cap) or Google ($1.1 trillion market cap) in the digital
advertising market.171

4. Error Costs
Of course, the real test for regulators is not just identifying possibly
anticompetitive mergers but being able to do so in a cost-effective manner.
For example, one might ask whether regulators could successfully have
identified the two allegedly anticompetitive mergers out of Google’s 270
acquisitions and, under an error cost analysis,172 done less harm to
consumers with false positives than false negatives. If anticompetitive
mergers are a tiny percentage of total mergers – and identifying them a
priori is difficult – then a precautionary principle strategy that results in
many false positives for enforcement would likely not merit the benefits
from blocking one or two anticompetitive mergers.
The intuition behind our argument is simple: the desirability of
implementing a given legal test is not just a function of (i) the test’s
accuracy, (ii) the cost of administering it, and (iii) the respective costs of
false positives and false negatives. It also critically depends upon the
prevalence of the conduct that adjudicators are attempting to tackle.
Consider two hypothetical settings. Imagine that 10,000 tech
mergers occur each year and that, of these, either 1,000 or 2,500 are
anticompetitive with the remainder as procompetitive or competitively
neutral. Suppose further that authorities can either attempt to identify
anticompetitive mergers with 75% accuracy, or perform no test at all (i.e.,
let all mergers go through unchallenged).
If there are 1,000
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2013/11/13/facebook-wouldve-boughtsnapchat-for-3-billion-in-cash-heres-why/?sh=4dff19943dea [https://perma.cc/95KSD3QT].
170
Caitlin Huston, Snap’s Market Cap Surpasses Twitter, Hershey,
MARKETWATCH
(Mar.
3,
2017,
8:40
AM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/snaps-market-cap-has-surpassed-twitterhershey-2017-03-02 [https://perma.cc/SH89-Q6MP]; Anita Balakrishnan, Snap
Closes up 44% After Rollicking IPO, CNBC (Mar. 2, 2017, 4:09 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/02/snapchat-snap-open-trading-price-stock-ipo-firstday.html [https://perma.cc/M76F-R9VU].
171
Caitlin Huston, Snap’s Market Cap Surpasses Twitter, Hershey,
MARKETWATCH
(Mar.
3,
2017,
8:40
AM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/snaps-market-cap-has-surpassed-twitterhershey-2017-03-02 [https://perma.cc/96RT-4VVZ]; Anita Balakrishnan, Snap
Closes up 44% After Rollicking IPO, CNBC (Mar. 2, 2017, 4:09 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/02/snapchat-snap-open-trading-price-stock-ipo-firstday.html [https://perma.cc/7CPP-VAFE].
172
See Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 16.
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anticompetitive mergers, applying the test would result in 7,500 correct
decisions and 2,500 incorrect ones (2,250 false positives and 250 false
negatives). And “doing nothing” would lead to 9,000 correct decisions
and 1,000 false negatives. But suppose the number of anticompetitive
deals increased to 2,500. Applying the test would then lead to the same
number of incorrect decisions as not applying it (1,875 false positives and
625 false negatives, versus 2,500 false negatives). And the advantage
would tilt towards applying the test if anticompetitive mergers were even
more widespread.
This hypothetical example holds a simple lesson for policymakers:
the rarer the conduct that they are attempting to identify, the more accurate
their identification method must be, and the more costly false negatives
must be relative to false positives. Which leads us to a third critical factor
that that is often overlooked in the economic literature, namely the
question of merger-specific efficiencies. The issue here is twofold. First,
while many of the above papers attempt to quantify the harms that might
stem from increased market power (due to a merger), they routinely
assume away the possibility of efficiencies. Second, even when they do
accept the importance of efficiencies, scholars tend to overlook the fact
that they are notoriously difficult to identify and quantify173—even (or
perhaps especially) for the merging parties.174
The inability to effectively identify and measure merger-related
efficiencies has ramifications as far as the optimal antitrust policy is
concerned. Indeed, just as hypothetical future harms weigh in favor of
tougher antitrust enforcement, so hypothetical efficiencies cut in the
opposite direction.
Perhaps more problematically, moves to focus on potential
competition are deeply intertwined with the idea that the burden of proof
should be shifted in tech merger proceedings. Defendants would thus bear
the responsibility of proving that their merger generates efficiencies for
consumers. As a report published by the Stigler Center at Chicago Booth
puts it:

See, e.g., Katz, supra note 128, at 5. (“The assumption that the merged firm
has to choose one or the other technology is consistent with my focus on effects that
arise when mergers do not generate productive efficiencies.”); see also, Motta & Peitz,
supra note 129, at 14. (“[W]e think that both the question of where to place the burden of proof, and what the standard of proof is, need some rethinking. […] We submit
that a fortiori merger policy would benefit from a re-versal of the burden of proof in
case one of the merging parties has an entrenched dominant position, as it is the case
for some of the big tech firms. The merging parties would then need to provide
evidence that either the merger does not raise any significant competitive issue . . . or
that expected efficiency gains . . . are sufficiently strong to justify the acquisition.”).
174
See id. at 11; Geoffrey A. Manne, Error Costs in Digital Markets, in GLOBAL
ANTITRUST INSTITUTE REPORT ON THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 33, 36–37 (Joshua D.
Wright & Douglas J. Ginsburg eds., 2020).
173
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These specific merger regulations should require merging firms to
demonstrate that the combination will affirmatively promote
competition. This shifting of the burden of proof from the government
(to prove harm) to the parties (to prove benefit) will assist the DA by
placing the job of demonstrating efficiencies on the parties, who have
a greater ability to know what they are.175

Likewise, Steven Salop surmises that:
The analysis contained in these points leads to the conclusion that there
should be an intrusive legal standard: when the dominant firm (or
leading firm in a highly concentrated market) proposes to acquire a
unique potential entrant (or one of only a small number), the law
should apply a strong anticompetitive presumption with a high rebuttal
burden placed on the acquiring firm.176

As we explain below, such a move would prove highly
unfortunate.177 Moving the focus of investigations towards hypothetical
harms and benefits effectively shifts antitrust analysis away from tangible
factors, such as actual overlaps between merging parties, industry barriers
to entry and the current state of competition in an industry. In turn, this
dramatically increases the discretion afforded to adjudicators. Under these
proposals, antitrust authorities have a discretionary veto over every single
tech merger—no matter how small or insignificant. The error-cost
consequences of such a shift would be considerable. “[P]lacing the burden
of proof on the merging parties would correspond to an enormous shift in
approval rates, and the (limited) beneﬁt of cancelling a few anticompetitive mergers would come at a (very high) cost of reduced
eﬃciency gains and innovation incentives.”178

B. Acquiring Out-Of-Market Innovators
While the previous section has focused on claims that incumbents
might acquire their future competitors, scholars have also voiced concerns
about acquisitions that involve neither actual nor potential competitors.
The thrust of these arguments stems from research by Kevin Bryan and
Erik Hovenkamp.179 The authors find that one of two incumbents
175

MKT. STRUCTURE AND ANTITRUST SUBCOMM., THE UNIV. OF CHI. BOOTH
SCH.
OF
BUS.,
DRAFT
REPORT
89–90
(2019),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/market-structure-report%20-15may-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HE2-MR2K]; see also Motta & Peitz, supra note
129, at 14.
176
Salop, supra note 125, at 16.
177
See infra Section VI.C.
178
Cabral, supra note 52, at 10.
179
See Bryan & Hovencamp, supra note 41, at 615, 616.
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acquiring a startup’s complementary technology could harm competition
between them—even if the startup does not compete with either
incumbent.180 The underlying intuition is that the leading incumbent
might purchase the technology in order to cement its dominant position vis
à vis the laggard.181 This arguably reduces competition compared to one
of two counterfactuals: one where the laggard purchases the startup, and
another where the startup licenses its technology to both incumbents.182
Indeed, both counterfactual outcomes lead to lower differentiation
between the incumbents, thus boosting competition between them.183
According to the authors, antitrust law overlooks these potential harms,
thereby negatively affecting the diffusion, rate and direction of startup
innovation.184 In short, they argue society is better off when dominant
platforms do not acquire startups because those firms could either be
acquired by rivals or license their technology to the entire market.185
Yet stating the problem in those terms immediately reveals an
oversight in the authors’ reasoning: Why should we assume that those are
the proper counterfactuals? Ignored scenarios include the possibility that
the leading firm is dominant precisely because of its ability to identify
promising startups and incorporate their technology in its products and
services—superior management, in a nutshell.186 The counterfactual to a
dominant firm acquisition might thus be that the startup goes unnoticed
and that its product never makes it to market. Along similar lines, there is

180
Id. at 616 (“There is no assumption that the startup would enter the product
market absent an acquisition; the theory of harm assumes only that the relevant
technology may influence competition and consumer welfare based on how its
diffusion influences product quality levels.” (footnote omitted)).
181
Id. at 617 (“Under a laissez-faire regime, the leading incumbent continues
to buy startups partially to keep the laggard from reducing differentiation.”).
182
Id. (“To that end, we focus mainly on intervention in the form of a
compulsory licensing requirement, although we also consider a policy that would
preemptively block the dominant firm from acquiring a startup. In all cases, the
resulting equilibrium involves both incumbents gaining access to the startup
technology, usually because the laggard acquires the startup and then strikes a
licensing deal with the leader. Unsurprisingly, the impact on static consumer welfare
is always positive, since there is greater diffusion.”).
183
Id.
184
Id. at 616–17 (“Through this model, we consider three dimensions of
efficiency in startup acquisitions. First, once a technology exists, is it licensed to the
set of incumbents that maximize either consumer surplus or total welfare? Second, if
technology is endogenous, does the startup work on the right technology component?
Third, if the startup works on the right technology, does it invest an efficient amount
in total R&D? That is, we are concerned with the diffusion, the direction, and the rate
of startup activity. Our results indicate that, under laissez-faire acquisition rules,
startup behavior will be inefficient in all three dimensions.”).
185
Id. at 617.
186
See Henry G. Manne, supra note 15, at 113.
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no reason to believe that licensing agreements or acquisition by a laggard
are always a realistic prospect. Sometimes the startup’s technology will
not lend itself to license agreements—for example, because of weak
appropriability.187 Other times, the laggard might not have the necessary
capital to purchase the startup or conclude a license agreement. It is also
wrong to assume the leading incumbent will necessarily remain a leader
without the acquisition. Indeed, it is at least plausible that a laggard may
develop its own technology in-house, and that absent the leader’s
acquisition, it is the laggard that would dominate the market and benefit
from reduced competition.
Usually this would not be an issue. Models always simplify reality
by assuming away certain factors.188 And our proposed counterfactuals
are themselves mere possibilities. However, because the authors’ model
relies on very narrow assumptions, there is no telling whether the
probability of anticompetitive harm in actual cases is closer to one or to
zero. Yet, as explained below, the authors’ normative proposal would
effectively amount to a blanket ban on acquisitions by large platforms. A
finding that anticompetitive harm is plausible (as opposed to evidence that
big tech acquisitions are on balance detrimental to society) is hardly
sufficient evidence to warrant such a far-reaching reform. Finally, the
authors’ model excludes all merger-specific efficiencies, such as potential
economies of scale, network effects and synergies between the merging
parties. In short, while acquisition by a leading incumbent might indeed
reduce welfare under the authors’ model, it is far from clear to what extent
this result applies in real-world settings.

187

It has long been argued that patent protection might provide insufficient
appropriability in some industries. See, e.g., Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their
Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms
Patent (Or Not) 24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 7552, 2000).
When that is the case, licensing might not be a feasible option for firms (and sharing
proprietary information might ultimately lead to the expropriation of inventions). See,
e.g., id. (“Overall, our findings suggest that patents are still not the major mechanism
for appropriating returns to innovations in most industries. Instead, we find that the
key appropriability mechanisms in most industries are secrecy, lead time and
complementary capabilities (see Figures 1 and 2). In fact, the major change compared
to the “pre-reform” Yale survey is the rise in the reported importance of secrecy. Of
all the appropriability mechanisms, however, secrecy lends itself the least to R&D
spillovers.”).
188
See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in
ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3, 24 (1953) (“We can regard the hypothesis as
consisting of two parts: first, a conceptual world or abstract model simpler than the
‘real world’ and containing only the forces that the hypothesis asserts to be important;
second, a set of rules defining the class of phenomena for which the ‘model’ can be
taken to be an adequate representation of the ‘real world’ and specifying the
correspondence between the variables or entities in the model and observable
phenomena.”).
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This problem is particularly acute when looked at from an error-cost
perspective. Compared to other proposals that would urge authorities to
focus on acquisitions involving (potentially) overlapping products lines,
banning non-competing mergers would entail strict scrutiny of any
acquisition involving a large tech platform, however small or distantly
removed from the incumbent’s business the acquired startup may be.189
As the authors put it:
The best approach intervenes when (a) the acquirer is highly dominant;
and (b) the acquired technology could plausibly have an appreciable
impact on competition if it is used exclusively by the acquirer. An
additional possibility is that intervention could be contingent on an
established pattern of buying promising startups and then declining to
license rivals.190

Leaving aside potential ambiguities in the authors’ proposal – such
as references to “highly” dominant companies and an “appreciable”
impact of competition – the fundamental question is whether banning all
(or most) mergers by “dominant” platforms is preferable to letting most of
them go unchallenged. The authors recognize this much. 191 As things
stand, however, there is simply no evidence to suggest that big tech’s
acquisitions are on balance harmful to society. In short, while Bryan and
Hovenkamp’s paper is important economic research and anticompetitive
harm is certainly plausible, banning almost all big tech acquisitions in
order to hone in on the subset of mergers where incumbents cement their
market positions seems disproportionately expensive.192
This is
compounded by the fact that, as with much of the literature on innovationreducing mergers, the authors’ theory of harm is entirely hypothetical: it
189

Bryan & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions, supra note
41, at 632.
190
Bryan & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Limits on Startup Acquisitions, supra note
41, at 632. The authors somewhat refined this test in a later publication. See Bryan &
Hovenkamp, Startup Acquisitions, Error Costs, and Antitrust Policy, supra note 123,
at 352 (“Here we focus on three relevant criteria: (a) the market power of the acquirer
and the concentration of its product market; (b) the commercial significance of the
startup technology and its potential utility to the acquirer and its rivals; and (c) the
acquirer’s past practices involving similar acquisitions, such as whether previously
acquired technologies were licensed to rival incumbents.”).
191
Bryan & Hovenkamp, Startup Acquisitions, Error Costs, and Antitrust
Policy, supra note 123, at 333 (“To be sure, in most startup acquisitions, it is probably
not possible to precisely predict the transaction’s but-for impact on commerce. . . .
These acquisitions may have significant adverse effects in the aggregate, even if it is
difficult to assess how any particular transaction would influence the marketplace.
Consequently, society may benefit from a policy that permits limited intervention
based on reasonably ascertainable evidence, even if this carries some risk of false
positives.” (footnotes omitted)).
192
Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss4/5

46

Manne et al.: Technology Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control

2021]

TECHNOLOGY MERGERS AND CORPORATE CONTROL

1093

rests on a number of restrictive assumptions that have not (yet) been shown
to play out in real world settings.

V. KILLER ACQUISITIONS AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL
Another theory of harm from nascent competitor mergers centers
primarily on these mergers’ effects on innovation. Such mergers – what
some scholars have dubbed, “killer acquisitions” – are those in which “an
incumbent firm may acquire an innovative target and terminate the
development of the target’s innovations to preempt future competition.”193
Such acquisitions, it is argued, may reduce innovation and thus also
competitiveness, particularly in the pharmaceutical and tech sectors.194
These killer acquisitions are effectively a subset of the potential
competitor mergers discussed in Section III. Indeed, according to Colleen
Cunningham and her co-authors, “[i]mportantly, some degree of acquirertarget overlap is necessary for the killer acquisition motive to exist.”195
It is important to note that, despite frequent claims to the contrary,
competition authorities today are keenly aware of the potential innovation
effects of certain mergers.196 Between 2004 and 2014, for instance, the
FTC alleged harm to innovation in 54 out of the 164 mergers in which it
intervened.197 The question is whether the “killer acquisitions” theory
improves or worsens enforcers’ efficacy in addressing innovation harms
in merger reviews and enforcement actions.
The specificity of killer acquisitions is that an incumbent acquires a
rival in order to discontinue its competing R&D efforts or its own. 198
Economic theory suggests that this may occur because of two contributing
forces.199 The first is that monopoly profits are larger than the joint
duopoly profits that both firms could earn together.200 Accordingly a

193

See Cunningham et al., supra note 8, at 650.
Id. at 696.
195
Id.
196
See Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Provides a More Reasonable Regulatory
Framework than Net Neutrality, Geo. Mason Law and Economics, SSRN, (Aug. 15,
2017)
at
11,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3020068
[https://perma.cc/DD6V-JQ7M] (citing Richard J. Gilbert & Hillary Greene, Merging
Innovation into Antitrust Agency Enforcement of the Clayton Act, 83 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1919, 1931–32 (2015)).
197
Id.
198
Cunningham et al., supra note 8, at 650.
199
Id. at 651.
200
Id.; see also, Salop, supra note 125, at 7 (“The fact that a monopolist’s profits
normally exceed a market’s total duopoly profits explains why a dominant firm has
the incentive to destroy nascent competitors and deter potential competitors. By doing
so, the dominant firm can preserve its monopoly power and monopoly profits. This
194
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competing R&D project is, other things equal, more valuable to an
incumbent monopolist (who could purchase the R&D project to maintain
its monopoly profits) than for a rival seeking to enter the market (who
could at best hope for a share of the duopoly profits, if it cannot hope to
overthrow the incumbent entirely). Absent this, both parties would likely
be unable to reach a mutually advantageous deal as the rival’s R&D
pipeline might be more valuable to itself than to the incumbent.
Second, killer acquisitions theory assumes that incentives to innovate
decrease with the number of firms in the market.201 Otherwise, there
would be no reason to believe the elimination of a competing R&D
pipeline would lower innovative output. Together these two forces
provide both the alleged motive (monopoly maintenance) and effect
(reduced R&D output) of killer acquisitions. Neither of these underlying
intuitions is new, however, and the effect that market structure might exert
on innovation has been subjected to significant theoretical and empirical
scrutiny.202 Despite this, theories of anti-innovation mergers have gained
observation similarly explains the incentive to acquire nascent or potential competitors
or reach agreements with them that reduce or eliminate that competition.”).
201
This is merely a restatement of Arrow’s replacement effect. See, e.g.,
Cunningham et al., supra note 8, at 649 (“This is a general, well-known result, the
monopolist’s disincentive created by his preinvention monopoly profits” (Arrow,
1962). We show that this disincentive to innovate can be so strong that an incumbent
firm may acquire an innovative start-up simply to shut down the start-up’s projects
and thereby stem the “gale of creative destruction” of new inventions (Schumpeter,
1942).”). See also Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources
for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 622 (Univ. Nat’l Bureau Comm. for Econ. Rsch., Comm. on
Econ.
Growth
of
the
Soc.
Sci.
Rsch.
Couns.
ed.,
1962)
https://www.nber.org/system/files/
chapters/c2144/c2144.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YRB4-W75D] (“The only ground for arguing that monopoly may
create superior incentives to invent is that appropriability may be greater under
monopoly than under competition. Whatever differences may exist in this direction
must, of course, still be offset against the monopolist’s disincentive created by his
preinvention monopoly profits.”).
202
Richard Gilbert surveys the econometric literature concerning the effect of
industry structure on innovation. See RICHARD J. GILBERT, INNOVATION MATTERS:
COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE HIGH-TECHNOLOGY ECONOMY 116 (2020). He
concludes that the relationship between both is indeterminate. See id. (“Table 6.1
summarizes the conclusions from these interindustry studies for the effects of
competition and industry structure on innovation. Unfortunately, these studies do not
reach a consensus, other than to note that innovation effects can differ dramatically
for firms that are at different levels of technological sophistication. Although some
studies find a positive relationship between measures of innovation and competition
(alternatively, a negative relationship between innovation and industry concentration),
others find that the relationship exhibits an inverted-U, with the largest effects at
moderate levels of industry concentration or competition, and at least one study reports
a negative relationship between competition (measured by Chinese import
penetration) and innovation (measured by citation-weighted patents and R&D
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increasing prominence over the past couple of years. This is particularly
true in the tech sector, where critics have taken aim at the large number of
acquisitions made by digital platforms.203 But it is also due to the
publication of several empirical papers that purport to confirm Arrow’s
replacement effect theory, and which might thus give antitrust enforcers
stronger reasons to challenge tech acquisitions.204 The empirical results of
these papers are far from unequivocal, however, and enforcers should thus
interpret their findings with an appropriate amount of circumspection.
More importantly, while their empirical rigor is commendable, these
works generally pay insufficient attention to error-cost considerations.
This weakens their relevance for policymaking purposes. As with the
potential competition theories discussed above, it is not that the theories
are impossible or that such killer acquisitions have never reliably been
empirically observed;205 rather, the issue is whether such theories are
operationalizable in a way that can likely improve antitrust enforcement.

investment). One consistent finding is that an increase in competition has less of a
beneficial effect, and may have a negative effect, on innovation incentives for firms
that are far behind the industry technological frontier.”). See also Ronald L. Goettler
& Brett R. Gordon, Does AMD Spur Intel to Innovate More?, 119 J. POL. ECON. 1141,
1141 (2011) (“Consistent with Schumpeter, we find that the rate of innovation in
product quality would be 4.2 percent higher without AMD present, though higher
prices would reduce consumer surplus by $12 billion per year. Comparative statics
illustrate the role of product durability and provide implications of the model for other
industries.”); Mitsuru Igami, Estimating the Innovator’s Dilemma: Structural
Analysis of Creative Destruction in the Hard Disk Drive Industry, 1981–1998, 125 J.
POL. ECON. 798, 798 (2017) (“The results suggest that despite strong preemptive
motives and a substantial cost advantage over entrants, cannibalization makes
incumbents reluctant to innovate, which can explain at least 57 percent of the
incumbent-entrant innovation gap.”); Elena Patel & Nathan Seegert, Does Market
Power Encourage or Discourage Investment? Evidence From the Hospital Market,
63 J.L. ECON. 667, 667 (2020) (“We find a negative relationship between competition
and investment. In particular, hospitals in concentrated markets increased investment
by 5.1 percent ($2.5 million) more than firms in competitive markets in response to
tax incentives. Further, firms’ investment responses monotonically increased with
market concentration.”).
203
See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, supra note 15, at 117.
204
See, e.g., Cunningham et al., supra note 8, at 651.
205
Id. at 649. Notably, one of the most likely observed instances of a true “killer
acquisition” occurred in the pharmaceutical industry: Eli Lilly’s acquisition of
Genentech in 1978. See Cabral, supra note 52, at 4 (“Eli Lilly’s acquisition of
Genentech’s patent provides a good example of a preemptive strategy. Before any
other pharma giant got into the insulin market, the incumbent acquired the patent for
the new, revolutionary product discovered by Genentech. The threat of synthetic
insulin was quite clear.”).
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A. Acquiring Out-Of-Market Innovators
Much of the regained interest in the effect that mergers exert on
innovation can be traced to the publication of a highly influential paper by
Colleen Cunningham, Song Ma, and Florian Ederer.206 The authors
analyzed thousands of pharmaceutical mergers and concluded that
between 5.3% and 7.4% of them were killer acquisitions. 207
From a policy standpoint, the big question is what weight antitrust
authorities, courts and legislators should give these findings. Stated
differently, does the paper provide sufficient evidence to warrant a reform
of existing merger filing thresholds and review standards? Several
important notes of caution are in order, which strongly counsel
decisionmakers to proceed with care. For a start, these findings may not
be relevant outside of the pharmaceutical industry. Second, it is unclear
how these anticompetitive acquisitions could be detected ex ante. Third,
killer acquisitions have uncertain effects on innovation. Fourth, product
discontinuations are far more important than critics assume. Fifth, postmerger performance dips are largely misunderstood. Finally, it is mostly
inappropriate to draw inferences from merger valuations.

1. Relevance Outside of the Pharmaceutical Industry
To start, the study’s industry-specific methodology means that it may
not be a useful guide to understand tech sector acquisitions. One reason is
that drug development is highly regulated.208 As a result, all drugs must
go through several development milestones that include clinical trials and
market authorization procedures.209
These usually take years to
complete.210 Accordingly, incumbent drug companies have a fairly
accurate picture of the competitive landscape within a multi-year
timespan.211 In other words, it is generally straightforward to identify

206

Cunningham et al., supra note 8, at 649.
Id. at 654; see also, id. at 655 (“[W]e find that projects acquired by an
incumbent with an overlapping drug are 23.4% less likely to have continued
development activity compared to drugs acquired by non-overlapping incumbents”).
208
See Abbvie, How Long Do Clinical Trials Take?, CLINICAL TRIALS AND ME
(Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.clinicaltrialsandme.com/resources/how-long-do-clinicaltrials-take/ [https://perma.cc/8SZ8-843N].
209
See, e.g., FDA, Step 3: Clinical Research, U.S. FDA (Apr. 1, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/patients/drug-development-process/step-3-clinical-research
[https://perma.cc/CL4N-2RXN]
210
Id.; see also, Abbvie, supra note 208.
211
See Yun, Potential Competition, Nascent Competitors, and Killer
Acquisitions, supra note 47, at 662 n.35 (“The study of substitutability in the
pharmaceutical industry is relatively straightforward because there are set categories
of pharmaceutical substitutability including the therapeutic class and the mechanism
207
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substitute products.212 This is not the case for digital markets where
products are highly differentiated and where the way consumers use a
given platform can evolve rapidly (unlike the pharmaceutical sector where
drugs go through trials and receive authorizations for a specific
treatment).213 For example, when Facebook acquired Instagram and
WhatsApp, it was not entirely clear whether either of these services might
one day become competitors to the main Facebook platform.214 The
upshot is that, in the tech sector, neither acquirers nor regulators can be as
readily presumed able to identify potential competitors.

2. Detecting Killer Acquisitions
A second important note of caution is that, even if one assumes that
the findings regarding killer acquisitions in the pharmaceutical sector are
correct and that they apply with equal force in the tech sector, as some
official reports have, it is unclear that they warrant a departure from the
status quo.215 Indeed, according to the authors’ findings, “killer
acquisitions” represent only a small fraction – 5.3% to 7.4% – of the
pharmaceutical acquisitions studied. 216 But antitrust enforcers operate
under uncertainty.217 Thus, the critical policy question is whether the
subset of anticompetitive deals can be identified ex-ante. And, if not, is
there a heuristic that would enable enforcers to identify more of these
problematic transactions without producing excessive false positives?
Unfortunately, the main heuristic identified by the authors is arguably
of little use for policy purposes. The authors focus on the effect that
overlapping R&D pipelines have on project discontinuations. 218 In the
case of non-overlapping mergers, acquired projects continue 17.5% of the
time, while this number is 13.4% when there are overlapping pipelines.219
The authors argue that this gap is evidence of killer acquisitions, where
incumbents acquire rivals to discontinue their competing R&D

of action. Thus, we can more reliably use functional substitutability to proxy for
market-based substitutability—that is, how consumers actually behave. For other
differentiated products, including almost all the products from large technology
platforms, this assessment is not as straightforward.”).
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
See, e.g., Case No. COMP/M.7217 Facebook/WhatsApp, 2014 O.J. (L 24)
1; see also Anticipated Acquisition by Facebook Inc. of Instagram Inc., ME/5525/12
(OFT Aug. 22, 2012).
215
DIGITAL COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL, supra note 8, at 49.
216
See Cunningham et al., supra note 8, at 692.
217
Id. at 653.
218
Id. at 656.
219
See id. at 691–92.
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pipelines.220 But this misses the bigger picture: under the author’s
numbers and definition of “killer acquisition,” a vast majority of
overlapping acquisitions are perfectly benign and prohibiting them would
thus have important social costs.
The authors skirt this issue by basing their cost-benefit analysis on
the assumption that prohibiting overlapping acquisitions would lead to the
same project development rate as when no mergers take place (rather than
the non-overlapping acquisitions project development rate, for
example).221 But this assumption is plucked out of thin air. It ignores
potential selection effects: the projects that are acquired in the author’s
sample may be qualitatively different than the ones that continue
independently. In other words, the alternative to a “killer acquisition”
might well be bankruptcy, rather than the baseline project-continuation
rate.222 For instance, even non-overlapping acquisitions have a lower
development rate than the baseline where no acquisition takes place.223 In
short, the authors base their cost-benefit analysis on an unrealistic
counterfactual.224
Using “overlapping acquisitions” as a heuristic for antitrust decisionmaking would be even more problematic in the tech sector. Indeed, as
explained above, it is much harder to determine whether tech products and
R&D projects overlap. For a start, it is easier to quickly redeploy assets
(called “pivoting” in the VC sphere) than it is in the pharmaceutical sector
(drugs need to go through new clinical trials in order to be approved for
different uses).225 Moreover, the way that consumers use a given service
can rapidly evolve.226 This may explain why, when reviewing tech
mergers, antitrust authorities often struggle to determine whether firms are
competitors and whether they are likely to become ones in the near
future.227
Another potential heuristic would be to look at the size of the
payments made by incumbents to acquire their rivals. As is the case with
220

Id. at 696.
Id. at 693 (“Consider first the case in which acquisitions of overlapping
projects are no longer allowed and that all such projects instead have the same
development probability (19.9%) as non-acquired projects (47.5%of all projects.”).
222
Id.
223
Id. at 691–94.
224
Demsetz, supra note 16, at 1 (“The view that now pervades much public
policy economics implicitly presents the relevant choice as between an ideal norm and
an existing “imperfect” institutional arrangement. This nirvana approach differs
considerably from a comparative institution approach in which the relevant choice is
between alternative real institutional arrangements.”).
225
FDA, supra note 209.
226
See Yun, Potential Competition, Nascent Competitors, and Killer
Acquisitions, supra note 47, at 661–62.
227
Id. at 662.
221
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reverse-patent settlements, the underlying intuition is that larger-thanexpected payments may conceal attempts to preserve monopoly rents.228
However, even if authorities could infer whether the acquisition price for
a target’s assets was larger than expected, it would still prove almost
impossible to determine whether these “large” valuations are driven by the
expectation of significant synergies or an incumbent maintaining its
monopoly position.

3. Innovation-related Effects
The challenge goes beyond identifying potential killer acquisitions.
There are several problems with describing this kind of behavior as
harmful. The first is that killer acquisitions (and other mergers) could
increase innovation by boosting the returns to innovation, as
acknowledged by Cunningham et al.229
Consider two possible outcomes for a new product: outcome one is
to compete with the incumbent, reducing the total rents (i.e., profits)
available to the incumbent and the new entrant, as well as the rents
available to the incumbent because of lost sales to the new entrant. The
second is to be acquired and shut down, preserving the total rents available
to the incumbent. In the latter case, the amount the incumbent should be
willing to pay will be approximately equal to the expected lost rents in the
competitive scenario. The more significant the expected price reductions
in the competitive scenario, the larger the premium the incumbent should
be willing to pay. That means that, in many cases the buyout premium
should exceed the expected value of competing for the entrant, raising the
returns to their innovation.
It is widely accepted that the prospect of acquisition is an important
channel for investors in startups to make a return, along with IPOs. 230
Between 2010 and 2018 there were 21,844 acquisitions of tech startups for
a total deal value of $1.193 trillion. 231 By comparison, according to one

228

See, e.g., Aaron Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference: Theory and Practice, 67
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 585, 586 (2015).
229
See Cunningham et al, supra note 8, at 654–655 (“[T]he overall effect on
social welfare is ambiguous because these acquisitions may also increase ex ante
incentives for the creation of new drug projects. . . .”); see also Igor Letina, Armin
Schmutzler & Regina Seibel, Killer Acquisitions and Beyond: Policy Effects on
Innovation Strategies, (Univ. of Zurich Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper 1 2020).
230
See Final Report on the FTC Hearings on Competition & Consumer
Protection in the 21st Century: The Weakness of Interventionist Claims,
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR LAW AND ECONOMICS, 99–100 (2019),
https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Concluding-Comments-TheWeaknesses-of-Interventionist-Claims-FTC-Hearings-ICLE-Comment-11.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JLB4-SNKZ].
231
Tech Startup M&As 2018 Report, supra note 68, at 7.
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comprehensive data analysis, there were 331 tech IPOs for a total market
capitalization of $649.6 billion over the same period.232 Research by
Gordon Phillips & Alexei Zhdanov analyzing venture capital investments
and M&A activity in forty-eight countries found that pro-takeover laws
are associated with t increased VC investment.233 Likewise, empirical
research by Tiago Prado and Johannes Bauer concludes that the prospect
of acquisition by a big tech firm leads to increased VC activity by enabling
founders and VCs to earn a return on their investments.234 Because of
factors like this, the error costs of overenforcement in acquisitions may be
substantial. Thus, regulatory intervention that reduces the likelihood of
reaching a profitable exit could reduce the incentive for venture capitalists
to invest in startups and may inhibit new business formation.
Second, the “killer acquisitions” literature assumes that rivals cannot
expect to overthrow incumbents or that they are risk averse. A business
will not allow itself to be sold for less than the value it expects from
competing. If the rival expects to become a monopolist, then the
incumbent could only acquire it, profitably, if it can deploy the rivals’
assets more efficiently.235 It may be argued that businesses or their owners
are loss-averse, and so will be willing to accept a smaller guaranteed
payoff to risking a larger but uncertain payoff from competing. In this
case, it may be socially optimal for them to take the risk and compete
despite this preference. But this risk aversion runs both ways and should
deter a company from forming and/or attracting investment, as well. The
increased certainty of being able to profit from an investment should
counteract would-be entrepreneurs’ risk aversion, increasing company
formation and investment.
The third reason is that in most cases there is nothing stopping a third
company from copying the acquired company’s product. This may not be
the case in industries where patent protections limit the ability of nonowners to copy specific innovations. An incumbent may buy a company
with patents that replicate the performance of the incumbent’s own
patented products in order to reliably control the market in whatever it is
that product does.236 However, in a market like software where patent
232

Ritter, supra note 71, at Table 4.
Phillips & Zhdanov, supra note 14, at 29.
234
Prado & Bauer, supra note 77, at 5 (“We demonstrate a feasible empirical
strategy to assess the effects of big tech acquisitions on start-up funding. The results
do not provide evidence of a negative short-term effect. They are compatible with
suggestions that big tech acquisitions are one of the mechanisms used by venture
capitalists to realize a return on investment. Making such acquisitions more difficult
may result in less VC investment (e.g., Cabral, 2021).”).
235
See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, supra note 15, at 110.
236
See Cunningham et al., supra note 8, at 681 (“Consistent with our
predictions, we find that if the relevant acquirer patents are near expiration, the
decrease in development associated with acquisition appears to be mitigated.”).
233
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protections range from weak to non-existent, there is little to stop another
company from copying the functions of an acquired product.237 Indeed,
this is precisely the behavior found in Cunningham et al: the likelihood of
a “killer acquisition” is greater the longer the patent term of the acquiring
company.238

4. A Better Understanding of Product Discontinuations
Even if one ignores potential incentives to innovate, product
discontinuations can improve consumer welfare. Ascertaining the welfare
effect of discontinuations ultimately boils down to identifying the
counterfactual to a merger. As John Yun writes:
For instance, an acquisition that results in a discontinued product is not
per se evidence of either consumer harm or benefit. The answer
involves comparing the counterfactual world without the acquisition
with the world with the acquisition. The comparison includes potential
efficiencies that were gained from the acquisition, including
integration of intellectual property, the reduction of transaction costs,
economies of scope, and better allocation of skilled labor.239

One of the reasons why R&D project discontinuation may be
beneficial is simply down to cost savings. R&D is expensive—individual
pharmaceutical (and tech) firms routinely spend literally billions of
dollars, up to 27.8% of their revenue, each year on R&D, and developing
a new drug has an estimated median cost of $985.3 million. 240 Costcutting, notably as it concerns R&D, is thus a critical part of
pharmaceutical and tech companies’ businesses. For instance, several
reports by McKinsey conclude that recent M&A activity in the
pharmaceutical sector is largely driven by firms seeking to improve their

237

Id.
See id.
239
Yun, Potential Competition, Nascent Competitors, and Killer Acquisitions,
supra note 47, at 660–61; see also, Yun, Are We Dropping the Crystal Ball?
Understanding Nascent & Potential Competition in Antitrust, supra note 155, at 636
(“How do we determine ‘good’ from ‘bad’ in the realm of antitrust? We base it on the
consumer welfare standard. More specifically, however, we base it on a comparison
between two counterfactuals: (1) a world with the merger and (2) a world without the
merger. It is the differential between these two unobservable outcomes that ultimately
determines the ‘effect’ of the merger.”).
240
See Edwin Elmhirst & Amy Brown, Roche and Lilly Most Vested in
Research,
EVALUATE
VANTAGE
(Jul.
3,
2020),
https://www.evaluate.com/vantage/articles/data-insights/other-data/roche-and-lillymost-vested-research [https://perma.cc/V4NH-MS89]; Oliver J. Wouters, Martin
McKee & Jeroen Luyten, Estimated Research and Development Investment Needed
to Bring a New Medicine to Market, 2009-2018, 323 [J]AMA 844, 844–53 (2020).
238
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productivity.241 In short, pharmaceutical companies do not just compete
along innovation-related parameters – though these are obviously
important – but also on more traditional grounds such as cost
rationalization.242
Accordingly, as the above reports suggest,
pharmaceutical mergers are often about applying an incumbent’s superior
managerial efficiency to the acquired firm’s assets—through operation of
the market for corporate control.243 This cost-cutting (and superior project
selection) ultimately enables companies to offer lower prices, thereby
benefitting consumers and increasing their incentives to invest in R&D in
the first place (by making successfully developed drugs more profitable).
In that sense, Henry Manne’s seminal work relating to mergers and the
market for corporate control sheds at least as much light on pharmaceutical
and tech mergers as the killer acquisitions literature.244 And yet it is hardly
ever mentioned in modern economic literature on this topic.
Cunningham et al. do not entirely ignore these considerations,
although their arguments for dismissing them are far from airtight.245 For
241

Gayane Gyurjyan et al., Rethinking Pharma Productivity, MCKINSEY &
COMPANY (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/life-sciences/ourinsights/rethinking-pharma-productivity [https://perma.cc/S3LK-U7J5] (“The recent
boom in M&A in the pharma industry is partly the result of attempts to address shortterm productivity challenges. An acquiring or merging company typically designs
organization-wide integration programs to capture synergies, especially in costs. Such
programs usually take up to three years to complete and deliver results.”); see also
Philipp Cremer et al., Maximizing Efficiency in Pharma Operations, MCKINSEY & CO.
(Apr. 1, 2009), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/operations/ourinsights/maximizing-efficiency-in-pharma-operations
[https://perma.cc/ZU475MYK] (“Maximizing the efficiency of production labor and equipment is one
important way top-quartile drugmakers break out of the pack. Their rates of
operational-equipment effectiveness are more than twice those of bottom-quartile
companies (Exhibit 1), and when we looked closely we found that processes account
for two-thirds of the difference.”).
242
Donald Drakeman & Nektarios Oraiopoulos, The Risk of De-Risking
Innovation: Optimal R&D Strategies in Ambiguous Environments, 62 CAL. MGMT.
REV. 42, 58–59 (2020).
243
See, e.g., Donald Drakeman & Nektarios Oraiopoulos, The Risk of DeRisking Innovation: Optimal R&D Strategies in Ambiguous Environments, 62 CAL.
MGMT. REV. 42, 58–59 (2020) (arguing that small biotech firms are more effective
when it comes to pharmaceutical research, suggesting that large players are better at
product development: “Corporate R&D teams in large experienced companies may be
the best in the world at managing product development pathways, but in highly
ambiguous environments they are often inclined to make decisions based on today’s
knowledge, much of which will change in unpredictable ways.”). In turn, this suggests
that pharmaceutical mergers enable specialization within the pharmaceutical industry,
with different types of players brining their comparative advantages to bear on
different parts of the pharma R&D cycle. Id.
244
See Manne, supra note 15, at 252.
245
See Cunningham et al., supra note 8, at 696 (“Alternative interpretations,
such as optimal project selection, delayed development, the redeployment of
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instance, the authors claim that higher discontinuation rates for
overlapping acquisitions are unlikely to be driven by technology
redeployment.246 Their argument is that acquirers’ post-acquisition drugs
are not more similar to the target’s than their pre-acquisition ones—
suggesting that acquirers do not apply the target’s technology to their own
drugs.247 But this assertion assumes that technological redeployment leads
to chemically similar drugs—something that is not self-evident. For
example, process patents (often referred to as “secondary patents” in the
pharmaceutical industry) may be valuable regardless of the underlying
drug to which they are applied, and research suggests that they might be
particularly important for owners of well-established drugs (i.e.,
incumbents in economic terms).248 Acquirers might also be purchasing
know-how and other capabilities that are applicable to both the target and

technological or human capital, and salvage acquisitions, do not explain our results
[i.e., the discrepancy between discontinuations in overlapping and non-overlapping
mergers].”).
246
Cunningham et al., supra note 8, at 696.
247
See Cunningham et al., supra note 8, at 688 (“Contrary to a redeployment
explanation, drugs initiated by acquirer firms after the acquisition of a drug are not
significantly more similar to the acquired overlapping drug than preacquisition
projects.”).
248
See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, Chan Park & Bhaven Sampat, Polymorphs and
Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): An Empirical Analysis of “Secondary” Pharmaceutical
Patents, 7 PLOS ONE 1, 1–2 (2012) (“We distinguish between patents with any
secondary claims, and those with only secondary claims and no chemical compound
claims (‘‘independent’’ secondary patents).”). For instance, incumbent
pharmaceutical companies might seek acquire “secondary” patents, thus relying on
non-chemical compound features to extend the patent protection of their drugs—and
this, in turn, might increase incentives to innovate for pharmaceutical companies. Id.
We find that secondary claims are common in the pharmaceutical industry. Id. We
also show that independent secondary patents tend to be filed and issued later than
chemical compound patents, and are also more likely to be filed after the drug is
approved. Id. When present, independent formulation patents add an average of 6.5
years of patent life (95% C.I.: 5.9 to 7.3 years), independent method of use patents
add 7.4 years (95% C.I.: 6.4 to 8.4 years), and independent patents on polymorphs,
isomers, prodrug, ester, and/or salt claims add 6.3 years (95% C.I.: 5.3 to 7.3 years).
Id. We also provide evidence that late-filed independent secondary patents are more
common for higher sales drugs.”). Id.; See also Chie Hoon Song & Jeung-Whan Han,
Patent Cliff and Strategic Switch: Exploring Strategic Design Possibilities in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 5 SPRINGER PLUS 5–6 (2016) (“The acquisition of secondary
patents, obtaining features other than the main active drug ingredient (such as
crystalline forms of the original compound, methods of use or formulations), can
create a solid portfolio covering different aspects of the drug. . . . Accordingly,
secondary patents encompass inventions directed to the incremental improvement of
the primary patent and would permit the innovator-company to maintain the market
share, even if the generic producers try to enter the market by contesting the validity
of the primary patent.”).
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acquirer’s otherwise dissimilar molecules.249 In short, while the absence
of chemical similarity is not irrelevant, it is far from dispositive.
The same is true when the authors claim that discontinuations are not
driven by either human capital redeployment or salvage acquisitions (i.e.,
transactions where the purchaser is merely acquiring the assets of an
otherwise defunct company).250 Their assertion is based on to two main
findings. First, many target-firm inventors leave the merged entity after
an acquisition—excluding human capital redeployment according to the
authors.251 Second, overlapping acquisitions do not, on average, involve
lower valuations.252 The authors thus believe they are not “salvage
acquisitions,” which in their opinion should entail lower valuations.253 But
neither of these two points is dispositive either.
For a start, the authors’ focus on “inventors” and their patents is
telling. Many people can be listed on a patent, yet not all of them would
be expected to continue patenting after a merger.254 For example, a
startup’s top management is often listed on patents,255 but if they
subsequently oversee commercialization within the merged entity, one
would expect their patent filing rate to drop. In other words, when a startup
is acquired, its managers may subsequently move to management
249

See, e.g., Christopher Hulme & Vijay Gore, Multi-component Reactions:
Emerging Chemistry in Drug Discovery from Xylocain to Crixivan, 10 CURRENT
MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY 51 (2003) (“Easily automated one-pot reactions, such as the
Ugi and Passerini reactions, are powerful tools for producing diverse arrays of
compounds, often in one step and high yield. Despite this synthetic potential, the Ugi
reaction is limited by producing products that are flexible and peptide-like, often being
classified as ‘nondrug-like’. This review details developments of new, highly atomeconomic MCR derived chemical methods, which enable the fast and efficient
production of chemical libraries comprised of a variety of biologically relevant
templates.”).
250
See Cunningham et al., supra note 8, at 654.
251
Id. at 690.
252
Id. at 654.
253
Id. at 691.
254
U.S.
PATENT
&
TRADEMARK
OFFICE,
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2109.html [https://perma.cc/G6W5VWBH] (last modified Jul. 25, 2020, 6:21:41 PM).
255
See,
e.g.,
Leadership
Team,
PALLEON
PHARMS.,
https://palleonpharma.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/AJP9-RYNN] (last visited June 3,
2021); and U.S. Patent No. 20,190,023,786 (filed Jan. 12, 2017) (listing the CEO of
Palleon Pharmaceuticals on a recent patent application). The same is true for other
pharmaceutical
companies.
See,
e.g.,
Leadership,
ATEA
PHARMS.,
https://ateapharma.com/about-us/our-team/ [https://perma.cc/S28S-LR2U] (last
visited June 3, 2021); and U.S. Patent No. 10,946,033 (filed Jan. 12, 2017) (listing the
CEO of Atea Pharmaceuticals on a recent patent application); see also Our People,
FOG PHARMA, https://fogpharma.com/#people [https://perma.cc/4XT5-SJKC] (last
visited June 3, 2021); and U.S. Patent No. 20,200,247,858 (filed Sept. 7, 2018) (listing
the CEO of Fog Pharma on a recent patent application).
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positions,256 cease to work on actual R&D, or move to smaller firms where
they remain productive in terms of R&D.257
More broadly, there appears to be a significant degree of
specialization within the pharmaceutical industry, driven by the
comparative advantages of these different entities. For instance, small
biotech companies are often responsible for most of the early research,
while larger pharmaceutical companies focus on later stage development,
commercialization, and regulatory approval.258
Against this backdrop, there are important reasons for certain
observed merger activity in innovative industries other than those related
to the development process itself. Mergers are often an efficient way for
innovative firms to increase research and production capacity and to obtain
the specific resources necessary for commercialization and distribution of
their innovations.259 And mergers among innovative firms can also enable
them to combine their R&D resources, learn from each other, and
coordinate their investment decisions.260 But particularly in mature,
256

See, e.g., Lars Schweizer, Organizational Integration of Acquired
Biotechnology Companies Into Pharmaceutical Companies: The Need for a Hybrid
Approach, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1065, 1066 (2005) (“Of course, being part of the
structure of a large pharmaceutical company also changed firm culture in the other
cases and led to perceived destruction of the entrepreneurial spirit. This experience
made most of the top managers at Sugen, SyStemix, and GTI leave the companies.”).
257
Cunningham et al., supra note 8, at 669 (“More than half of the companies
originate only one drug over this period, and 70% originate two or fewer . . . , which
aligns with common perceptions of drug development: small firms initiate innovative
drug projects, some of which are subsequently developed by large, commercialization
focused incumbent firms (Cockburn 2004).”).
258
See, e.g., Richman, et al., supra note 14, at 801 (empirical research
suggesting that biotech firms, as opposed to larger pharmaceutical companies, are
receiving a growing share of new FDA drug approvals) (“The locus of innovation is
shifting from inside large firms to smaller start-ups and to firms operating in
nontraditional geographic markets and complementary product markets. As a result,
the pharmaceutical industry appears to be in significant structural transition, and the
surge of acquisitions reflects that transition.”); see also, Richard Murphy, Are Startups
5x
Better
at
R&D
Than
Big
Pharma?,
BAY BRIDGE BIO,
https://www.baybridgebio.com/blog/rd_bigpharma_startup.html
[https://perma.cc/Q7AY-NG5S] (last visited Jun. 9, 2021) (“We see that a smaller and
smaller share of new drugs come from big pharma. Big pharma and large biotech
companies have discovered 10-12 new approved drugs a year for the past decade.
Small companies developed 10-15 new approved drugs a year until the last few years,
where they have rapidly increased the number of approved drugs coming from their
labs.”).
259
Joanna Shepherd, Consolidation and Innovation in the Pharmaceutical
Industry: The Role of Mergers and Acquisitions in the Current Innovation Ecosystem,
21 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 1, 12–13 (2018) [hereinafter Shepherd, Consolidation
and Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry].
260
Joanna Shepherd, Understanding Innovation Markets in Antitrust Analysis,
TRUTH
ON
THE
MKT.
(Mar.
30,
2017),
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innovative industries – where the next step in increasing productivity may
entail both significant investment as well as the complex coordination of
diversified and specialized firms engaged in interrelated R&D – a broad
range of firm sizes and specialized functions may be important to the
industry’s continued advancement.261
The limited increase in consolidation that comes from a merger, in
other words, may be important not only for optimizing innovation within
the merging firms, but it may also be key to facilitating innovation
throughout an industry. “In industries in which most innovation originates
externally . . . analyses should be less concerned with mergers’ impacts on
internal innovation, and more focused on whether consolidation will
increase demand for externally-sourced innovation and, ultimately,
increase aggregate drug innovation.”262 For similar reasons, these firms
sometimes even have long-term contractual relationships that formalize
this allocation of tasks.263 A large share of pharmaceutical projects result
from long-term alliance agreements between incumbents (“clients”), and
smaller firms (“R&D partners”).264 Generally, the partner conducts most
of the research (such as screening compounds), while the client is
responsible for later-stage development (such as clinical trials) and
manufacturing.265
This also adds an additional layer of complexity. Not only do
pharmaceutical alliance agreements formalize the specialization that
might otherwise spontaneously take place in these markets, but they often
https://truthonthemarket.com/2017/03/30/understanding-innovation-markets-inantitrust-analysis-ag-biotech-symposium/
[https://perma.cc/6QC8-3QLX]
[hereinafter Shepherd, Understanding Innovation Markets in Antitrust Analysis].
261
See generally Shepherd, Consolidation and Innovation in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, supra note 259, at 1.
262
See Shepherd, Understanding Innovation Markets in Antitrust Analysis,
supra note 260.
263
David T. Robinson & Toby E. Stuart, Financial Contracting in Biotech
Strategic Alliances, 50 J. L. & ECON. 559, 578 (2007).
264
Id. at 560.
265
Id. at 564 (“In the alliances we examine, the R&D partner identifies and/or
validates drug targets, which are then further developed in collaboration with the
client. In some of the partnerships, the biotech partner will also screen compounds
against targets and thus transfer lead development compounds to the client. Although
biotech firms continue to expand downstream in the drug development chain, the
client in the partnerships we examine typically conducts animal testing, clinical trials,
large-scale manufacturing, and sales and marketing. One can view this relationship as
one in which the pharmaceutical client and the biotech firm engage in joint production:
most alliances in biotechnology are vertical transactions in which there is an upstreamdownstream division of effort between the biotech firm and the client in the deal.
Alternatively, another way to view this relationship is that the pharmaceutical firm
acts in a dual role as investor and consumer: as an investor it uses equity participation
and payments for sponsored research to finance drug discovery. As a consumer, it
takes the R&D firm’s output and uses it in the further development of a drug.”).
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involve project-termination rights that avoid opportunistic behavior by
R&D partners, and thus boost ex-ante investments.266 Out of the 125
pharmaceutical alliances studied by David Robinson and Toby Stuart,
thirty-eight include client termination clauses in case of a change in control
over the partner.267 This is mainly done to prevent spillovers from the
client to one of its rivals—and thus provides a potential efficiency
explanation for higher discontinuation rates in the case of overlapping
mergers, one that Cunningham et al. ignore.268 In other words, the
possibility of project terminations and subsequent asset reallocations is
sometimes a necessary a condition for R&D projects to be financed in the
first place because they reduce the scope for opportunistic behavior.269

5. Post-Merger Performance Dips
Along similar lines, several scholars have pointed out that
pharmaceutical mergers may lead to dips in the R&D performance of
acquired inventors that may struggle to successfully integrate themselves
into the merged entity.270 One extensive empirical study concludes that
integration is particularly disruptive for those scientists that lose the most
social status within the newly combined entity.271

266
Id. at 581 (“The right to terminate a project is a key strategic consideration
in many theories of financial contracting. Termination rights are central in Bolton and
Scharfstein (1990) and Hart and Moore (1998), in which the outside financier’s ability
to shut down the entrepreneur’s project at some intermediate stage (before
unobservable cash flows arrive) reduces the entrepreneur’s incentive to consume
private benefits. In addition, Noldeke and Schmidt (1995, 1998) study how the
allocation of option rights can alleviate holdup problems when contracts are
incomplete.”).
267
Id. at 583.
268
Id. (“The example provided in Table 9 clarifies the motivation for such
termination rights: if one of the client’s competitors acquires the alliance partner, the
client’s competitive position could be jeopardized. The competitive position of a
partner firm is less threatened by a change in control.”).
269
See generally Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian,
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process,
21 J .L. & ECON. 297 (1978).
270
Cunningham et al., supra note 8, at 656.
271
Srikanth Paruchuri, Atul Nerkar & Donald C. Hambrick, Acquisition
Integration and Productivity Losses in the Technical Core: Disruption of Inventors in
Acquired Companies, 17 ORGANIZATION SCIENCE 545 (2006) (“We hypothesize that
the productivity of corporate scientists of acquired companies is generally impaired
by integration, but that some scientists experience more disruption than others. In
particular, acquisition integration will be most disruptive, leading to the most severe
productivity drops, for those inventors who have lost the most social status and
centrality in the combined entity. . . . Results are strongly in line with our theorized
expectations.”).
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If these findings are accurate, then post-merger dips in R&D
performance may be consistent with long-term human capital
redeployment, starting with a short-term output dip immediately after an
acquisition, or simply with reduced R&D output being an unfortunate byproduct of a merger’s other goals.272 In both cases, Paruchuri and his coauthors speculate that inventor disruption is more likely when the merging
firms are more closely related:
Specifically, the only way to recoup the premium paid for an
acquisition is to do something with the company that it could not or
would not do on its own. This will most likely entail integrating some
or all of the acquired firm’s activities with those of the acquirer in a
quest for synergies. Unfortunately, however, integration is highly
disruptive for the acquired entity and creates organizational trauma,
resulting in capability damage or even destruction.273

More generally, all of the empirical papers cited above convey a
sense that the pharmaceutical industry is highly cyclical. Small firms
innovate – potentially with large firm backing – and projects then move to
either a commercialization stage (where firms cease innovating) or a
termination stage (for, example because the project is late or not promising
enough). As explained above, these evolutions may coincide with M&A
activity (with potential consequences for the R&D productivity of
employees).274 That such an outcome might be more common for
overlapping mergers is also not particularly surprising. Who better to
handle the distribution of a new drug or to use the target’s assets for other
purposes than a firm that operates in the same segment of the industry?

6. What Can We Infer from Merger Valuations
Returning to Cunningham et al., the authors’ valuation point is also
misleading and, taken literally, could undermine their broader “killer
acquisitions” findings. The fact that overlapping mergers do not entail
lower valuations does not automatically imply they are not “salvage
acquisitions.” Bargaining always takes place within a range.275 While it
is true that the maximum valuation should be lower in the case of salvage
acquisitions, it is equally plausible that targets hold out for higher offers
when overlapping acquirers are involved (as they might, presumably, be
willing to pay more for the target’s assets). The point is that there is no
272

Id.
Id. at 557.
274
See Robinson & Stuart, supra note 263, at 583.
275
See, e.g., Abhinay Muthoo, A Non-Technical Introduction to Bargaining
Theory, 1 WORLD ECONOMICS-HENLEY ON THAMES 145, 148, 161 (2000) (discussing
the various factors that might affect the strength of bargaining positions).
273
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reason to believe that any one of these, or a multitude of other factors,
should ultimately dominate. Furthermore, the fact that there is no
statistically significant difference between overlapping and nonoverlapping valuations also undermines the “killer acquisitions” argument
(if one adheres to the authors’ logic). If, other things equal, killer
acquisitions involve higher valuations,276 then what should we infer from
the fact there is on average no difference between valuations in
overlapping and non-overlapping mergers?277
The answer, of course, is that reality is complex, and mergers involve
a plethora of variables. Constructing a narrative around a web of
arbitrarily selected correlations is inherently prone to missing this bigger
picture. When all is said and done, the authors thus provide compelling
evidence that R&D project discontinuations are more frequent for
overlapping transactions than non-overlapping ones,278 and that they are
also more frequent for non-overlapping transactions than in the absence of
mergers.279 Killer acquisition is one possible explanation for these
conclusions, but far from the only one and it notably fails to explain the
discrepancy between discontinuations in non-overlapping mergers (where
killers acquisitions are, by definition, impossible) and in the absence of
mergers.280
Put together, acquisitions that bear the hallmarks of “killers” are
therefore not clearly anticompetitive even in their own right because they
increase the total amount and reliability of returns to entry and because
they cannot effectively prevent any firm from competing. At best they can
buy incumbents time to improve their own product (another procompetitive effect).

B. Killer Acquisitions in the Tech Sector
A natural extension of Cunningham et al.’s killer acquisitions work
is to question whether mergers of this sort also take place in the tech
industry. Interest in this question is driven by the prominent place that
digital markets currently occupy in competition policy discussion, but also
by the significant number of startup acquisitions that take place in the tech
276
Salop, supra note 125, at 14 (“[A] higher bid by the dominant firm could
well reflect a market power premium, that is, the value of the dominant firm of using
the acquisition to maintain its market power by keeping the potential entrant out of the
hands of other bidders that would use the acquisition to increase competition.”).
277
Taken at face value, this finding would also undermine plans to use the value
of a merger as a proxy for likely anticompetitive harm. See, e.g., Hemphill & Wu,
supra note 121, at 1882 (“Alternatively, intent might be revealed through conduct,
such as paying too much for a rival. . . .”).
278
See Cunningham et al. supra note 8, at 692.
279
Id.
280
Id.
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industry.281 Existing studies provide scant evidence that killer acquisitions
are a common occurrence in these markets, however. This is not
surprising. Unlike the pharmaceutical industry, where drugs must go
through a lengthy and visible regulatory pipeline before they can be
sold,282 incumbents in digital industries will likely struggle to identify their
closest rivals and prevent firms from rapidly pivoting to seize new
commercial opportunities. As a result, the basic conditions for killer
acquisitions to take place (i.e., firms being in a position to share monopoly
profits) are less likely to be present—and it is also harder to design
research methods that detect these mergers. The empirical literature on
killer acquisitions in the tech sector is still in its infancy. In fact, as things
stand, no study directly examines whether killer acquisitions actually take
place in digital industries (i.e., whether post-merger project
discontinuations are more common in overlapping than non-overlapping
tech mergers).
In one of the only empirical papers on this topic, Axel Gautier and
Joe Lamesch look at 175 acquisitions by Amazon, Apple, Facebook,
Google, and Microsoft.283 The authors observe that acquired firms’
products were discontinued in 60% of these mergers.284 On this basis the
authors conclude that “the possibility of killing acquisitions cannot be
leaved [sic] aside and it is important that competition authorities take into
account the competitive potential of these young startups.”285
As the authors themselves concede, however, their study sheds no
light on the occurrence of killer acquisitions, as opposed to mere product
discontinuations.286 Indeed, the paper does not show that incumbents’
acquisitions are discontinued at a higher rate than the competitive baseline,
or even that the discontinued mergers disproportionately concerned
281
According to data published by the FTC, the GAFAM firms collectively
acquire between 40 and 60 firms per, with most of the acquisitions falling below
existing merger filing thresholds. See F.T.C, Non-HSR Reported Acquisitions by
Select Technology Platforms, 2010-2019: An FTC Study, 14 (20201).
282
See, e.g., How We Develop New Medicines, GSK, https://www.gsk.com/engb/research-and-development/development/how-we-develop-new-medicines/
[https://perma.cc/G6EA-QPPT] (last visited June 3, 2021); see also
Biopharmaceutical Research & Development: The Process Behind New Medicines,
PHRMA
(2015),
http://phrmadocs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/rd_brochure_022307.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TK4J-GDGG].
283
Axel Gautier & Joe Lamesch, Mergers in the Digital Economy, 54 INFO.
ECON. POL’Y 1 (2020)
284
Id. at 8 (“On the basis of these criteria, we identify that 60% of the target
firms were discontinued, most of them within a year after the acquisition.”).
285
Id. at 11.
286
Id. at 3 (“However, from our data, we cannot screen between the two
explanations for product discontinuation: technology acquisition or the elimination of
a potential rival.”).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss4/5

64

Manne et al.: Technology Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control

2021]

TECHNOLOGY MERGERS AND CORPORATE CONTROL

1111

overlapping products that may threaten the acquirer’s market position. 287
Accordingly, the authors’ conclusion that authorities should pay closer
attention to mergers that take place below existing notification thresholds
appears premature.288 This is all the more true given that the paper says
nothing about the relative benefits and costs of this policy change.289
Similar issues also affect other empirical research on this topic. A
recent paper by Elena Argentesi and her co-authors, for example, surmises
that “merger control enforcement has not proved able so far to cope with
several of the new challenges posed by digital markets,” and concludes
that “[m]ore can and should be done. It might be that this will require a
change in the legislation or the establishment of a new regulator.”290
This conclusion rests mainly on two cases studies, and a more
superficial analysis of almost 299 acquisitions by Google, Amazon, and
Facebook.291 The authors collect several descriptive statistics about these
transactions and group these mergers by the target firm’s main business
segment. However, as the authors observe, this is not a good proxy for
actual overlaps between the acquirer and target firms’ businesses.292
While this study sheds a fascinating light on the M&A activities of
large tech firms, it says little about the potential occurrence of killer
acquisitions. The authors find that a majority of the 299 scrutinized Big
Tech acquisitions are spread between communication apps and tools (50),
developer tools (40), physical goods and services (51) and AI & analytics
(43).293 Moreover, the study shows that all three of Google, Amazon, and
Facebook have, to varying degrees, invested in these sectors.294 This
suggests these acquisitions might be better framed as “moligopoly”

287
Id. at 10 (“Additional data on the product development and on the relative
im- portance of the competitive threat exerted by the startup are needed, but they are
not easy to find.”).
288
Id. at 11.
289
Id. at 1–11.
290
Elena Argentesi et al., Merger Policy in Digital Markets: An Ex-post
Assessment, 17 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 95, 131 (2021).
291
Id. at 95–96 (“Finally, we retrospectively examine two important merger
cases, Facebook/Instagram and Google/Waze, providing a systematic assessment of
the theories of harm considered by the UK competition authorities as well as evidence
on the evolution of the market after the transactions were approved.”); see also id. at
98 (“Over this period, Google has acquired 168 companies, Facebook has acquired 71
companies, and Amazon has acquired 60 companies. . . .”).
292
Id. at 99 (“It is not straightforward to assess the nature of these transactions
(horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate) on the basis of the available evidence, because
the area of economic activity is at most a proxy for actual or potential substitutability.
Products may for instance lie in different steps of the value chain or perform different
functions.”).
293
Id. at 100.
294
Id. at 100–01.
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competition – where large platforms compete for control of markets
outside of their core business areas – rather than killer acquisitions.295
Crucially, there is no sense that these acquisitions face higher
termination rates than those made by other acquirers (such as venture
capital firms), or that the activities of targets systematically overlap with
those of incumbents. There is thus little reason to believe that they were
“killer acquisitions,” and even less that they ultimately harmed consumers.
In fact, the authors even observe that many of the target companies were
likely complements, rather than substitutes:
However, most transactions do not have a clear horizontal element for
each of Amazon, Facebook, and Google. Acquisitions target
companies spanning a wide range of economic sectors and whose
products and services are often complementary to those supplied by
Amazon, Facebook, and Google. . . . Transactions that can be
characterized as more horizontal in nature would seem to be the
minority. 296

This tends to exclude the killer acquisition theory of harm. The
authors supplement this empirical work with two case studies: one
concerning Facebook’s purchase of Instagram; the other about Google’s
acquisition of Waze.297 Crucially, in both cases, the authors fail to reach
a conclusion as to whether the underlying merger ultimately harmed
consumers,298 and in the case of the Facebook/Instagram acquisition, the
authors concede anecdotal evidence may even cut in the opposite
direction.299
The bigger picture is that it is extremely difficult, even with
hindsight, to determine whether these mergers might have been
detrimental to competition and consumers. Perhaps more problematically,

295

See generally NICHOLAS PETIT, BIG TECH AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: THE
MOLIGOPOLY SCENARIO (2020).
296
Argentesi et al., supra note 290, at 99–100.
297
Id. at 116–30.
298
See id. at 126 (discussing the Facebook/Instagram merger) (“In conclusion,
the effect of the Authorities’ decision to clear the merger on consumer welfare depend
on the balance between likely anticompetitive effects and efficiencies, which in turn
heavily depend on the selected counterfactual. There are no elements to identify which
counterfactual would have been more likely.”); and see id. at 130 (discussing the
Google/Waze merger) (“Again, understanding whether the merger has ultimately led
to welfare loss requires (i) identifying the counterfactual scenario, and (ii) balancing
the harmful effects of potential lower competition and the benefits of efficiencies
realized thanks to the merger.”).
299
Id. at 126 (“However, data suggests that Snapchat has not been able to
monetize engagement to the extent that Instagram did, which is perhaps the signal that
Facebook’s role in the development of Instagram with respect to advertising was
significant.”).
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there are no obvious heuristics to identify mergers that are, on balance,
more likely to harm competition.
There have attempts to elucidate some of the unanswered questions.
For instance, a paper by Pauline Affeldt and Reinhold Kesler looks at the
outcomes of apps after their acquisition by big tech platforms.300 They
find that half of the services are discontinued, while those that remain
largely move to a free model, but with more privacy-intrusive permissions
required from users.301 As the authors concede, this does not tell us
whether the acquisitions ultimately reduced consumer welfare, as the
paper do not identify the counterfactual acquisitions, and it is not clear
whether the post-merger outcome leaves consumers better or worse off.
Scholars have also published several theoretical papers concerning
potential killer acquisitions in the tech sector. Mark Lemley and Andrew
McCreary, for instance, argue that the acquisition of startup companies by
large platforms leads to concentration in the tech industry and averts the
Schumpeterian competition that would otherwise enable the acquired
startups to compete with, and ultimately displace, incumbents.302 The
authors substantiate this claim by citing evidence that acquisitions have
gradually gained in importance, relative to IPOs.303 In other words, in a
world without startup acquisitions, the authors believe that far more
companies would opt for IPOs and ultimately compete head-on with
incumbents.304
But the authors gloss over several critical counterarguments. For a
start, it is not clear that VC funding would remain at its current levels if
exit by acquisition were taken off the table.305 Put simply, acquisitions
300

Pauline Affeldt & Reinhold Kesler, Big Tech Acquisitions—Towards
Empirical Evidence, 12 J. EUROPEAN COMPETITION L. & PRAC., 472 (2021) (“We find
that half of the acquired apps are discontinued, which tend to be smaller, less
frequently updated, and less privacy-intrusive than acquired apps that are continued.
Following the acquisition by GAFAM, the monetization strategy seems to change as
apps become free of charge but request more privacy-sensitive permissions.
Compared with the whole Play Store, GAFAM seems to target more attractive apps,
e.g., with respect to updating, data collection, and demand.”).
301
Id.
302
See Lemley & McCreary, supra note 41, at 1 (“In this paper, we argue that
this focus on exit, particularly exit by acquisition, is pathological. It leads to
concentration in the tech industry, reinforcing the power of dominant firms. It shortcircuits the development of truly disruptive new technologies that have historically
displaced incumbents in innovative industries. And because incumbents often buy
startups only to shut them down, intentionally or not, it means that the public loses
access to many of the most promising new technologies Silicon Valley has
developed.”).
303
Id. at 15–18.
304
Id.
305
Id. at 9. The authors dismiss this out of hand, citing Zingales et al., supra
note 8.
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may offer an exit to early investors in cases where IPOs are not a realistic
prospect, thus increasing the incentive to invest in startups in the first
place; barriers to market exit have been known to slow investments.306
Likewise, it is far from clear that market concentration is a problem
in and of itself. For example, economic analysis of the relationship
between market structure and innovation suggests there is an ambiguous
relationship between both variables, or at the very least one that is not
monotonic.307
Finally, the authors are dismissive of potential efficiency
justifications that may underpin startup acquisitions. The fact that startups
routinely opt for acquisition instead of IPOs suggests the former is often
more lucrative.308 While, in some cases, this could be due to market power
reinforcing effects, in other cases superior efficiency of acquirers (or the
inefficiency of targets) may play a larger role. This is almost by definition
the case when the acquiring and target firms are not competitors or
potential competitors.309 The managerial efficiency of incumbents310,
economies of scale311, and complementary dynamic capabilities312 are but
a few potential explanations for these purchases. In short, the authors thus
fail to adequately substantiate their claim that startup acquisitions reduce
consumer welfare.
To summarize, while studies of this sort may indeed suggest that the
clearance of certain mergers may not have been optimal, it is hardly a
sufficient basis on which to argue that enforcement should be tightened.
The reason for this is simple: as explained above, the fact that some

306

See, e.g., Philipps & Zhdanov, supra note 14; see also Prado & Bauer, supra

note 77.
307

See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
See Lemley & McCreary, supra note 41, at 32–33.
309
See Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Scale economies and synergies in
horizontal merger analysis, 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 685, 686–87 (2000) (“While we
cannot speak for the drafters of the Guidelines, a sensible way to understand this
practice is that the agencies presume that where the loss of direct competition is slight,
the transaction is likely motivated by efficiencies that outweigh that loss, and is thus
on balance “beneficial or neutral.” Thus a real sympathy to efficiencies is built into
the Guidelines from the start.”).
310
Manne, supra note 15, at 112.
311
See, e.g., Bart M Lambrecht, The timing and terms of mergers motivated by
economies of scale, 72 J. FIN. ECON. 41 (2004) (“This paper analyzes the timing of
mergers motivated by economies of scale. We show that firms have an incentive to
merge in periods of economic expansion.”).
312
See, e.g., David J Teece, Profiting from technological innovation:
Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy, 15 RES. POL’Y
285 (1986) (“This paper attempts to explain why innovating firms often fail to obtain
significant economic returns from an innovation, while customers, imitators and other
industry participants benefit Business strategy – particularly as it relates to the firm's
decision to integrate and collaborate – is shown to be an important factor.”).
308
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anticompetitive mergers may have escaped scrutiny and/or condemnation
is never a sufficient basis to tighten rules. In order to justify increased
enforcement, consideration must be given to increased administrative
costs and the number of false convictions likely to arise. As things stand
economic research on killer acquisitions in the tech sector does not warrant
tougher antitrust enforcement, though it does show the need for further
empirical research on the topic.

VI. CASE STUDIES
The doubts expressed in the previous sections are not just theoretical;
they are best evidenced by a close investigation of recent legal complaints
and commentary surrounding several technology acquisitions.
Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram in 2012 (and to a lesser extent of
WhatsApp in 2014) has received the most attention of all the major
acquisitions by today’s leading technology companies, including in the
House Committee on the Judiciary’s investigation of competition in digital
markets and the antitrust complaints lodged by the FTC and forty-six state
attorneys general.313
Other tech acquisitions have been important in current debates, as
well. Among these are Google’s acquisitions of Android in 2005,
YouTube in 2006, DoubleClick in 2009 and Waze in 2013, all of which
were cleared by competition authorities at the time but may, under a
mergers regime that was more concerned with preventing the elimination
of nascent competition, be challenged if they were attempted today.314
In this Section we examine both the Facebook/Instagram deal and the
Google/Android deal, highlighting two problems they raise for proposals
for a more “killer”-focused merger policy.
The first is that contemporary attempts to identify mergers that appear
to be “killer acquisitions” have often focused exclusively on customerfacing product characteristics and ignored the effects of the merger on the
acquired product’s business model, including ability to monetize and

313

See STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG.,
INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS (2020), available at
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/competition_in_digital_markets.pdf?utm_c
ampaign=4493-519 [https://perma.cc/8FSL-Q63B]; see also, Complaint for
Injunctive and other Equitable Relief, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, No 1:20-cv03590,
2021
WL
2643627.
(Dec.
9,
2020),
available
at
https://appliedantitrust.com/16_foreclosure/cases_ftc/facebook_ftc2020/1_ddc/faceb
ook_ftc_ddc_complaint2020_12_09.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJW5-S9JY]; see also,
Complaint, State of New York, et al. v. Facebook (1:20-CV-03589) (Dec. 3, 2020),
available
at
https://appliedantitrust.com/16_foreclosure/cases_states/facebook_states2020/facebo
ok_states_ddc_complaint2020_12_09.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PC8-5QQW].
314
Gautier & Lamesch, supra note 283, at 5.
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ability to access capital. But these may be critical to a product’s success,
and these kinds of products are only possible at all because of the
possibility of an acquisition that creates a route to profitability.
The second is that, even if one of these mergers was determined ex
post to have been detrimental to competition, separating it ex ante from
similar mergers that were procompetitive is a difficult task, and it is far
from clear that the net benefits of prohibiting both are greater than the net
benefits of allowing both.
Indeed, even with the benefit of hindsight, it is extremely difficult to
accurately determine whether a merger ultimately harmed consumers,
since the counterfactual may be of Instagram and Android failing to
succeed without Facebook and Google’s investment, management, and
product integrations.
Along similar lines, at the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, several
commentators alleged that a mechanical ventilator merger dating back to
2012 was in fact a killer acquisition that might ultimately lead to ventilator
shortages, almost ten years down the road. But as our study of the
controversy in this Section reveals, the killer acquisition accusations were
manifestly inapposite. Yet this did not stop the Justice Department from
opening a probe into the transaction in order to verify these claims.315

A. Facebook / Instagram and Google / Android
Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram in 2012 has become totemic in
some people’s minds as an example of the failure of the current approach
to merger review.316 Conversely, Google’s acquisition of Android in 2005
was one of the most consequential mergers of the early 21st century, but
despite bearing many superficial trappings of a killer acquisition, it is
rarely considered to be anticompetitive. The following section studies
both mergers, and argues that they neatly illustrate the pitfalls of trying to
ascertain whether deals involving small companies will harm innovation.
While there is certainly reason to believe that both mergers ultimately
benefited consumers, the bigger picture is that such an assessment involves
tremendous uncertainty, even when the analysis takes place ex-post.
Accordingly, attempts to catch innovation-harming mergers will likely
raise significant enforcement costs.

315

See, e.g., Brent Kendall, Justice Department Opens Ventilator Antitrust
Probe Focused on Medtronic, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-opens-ventilator-antitrust-probefocused-on-medtronic-11601497943 [https://perma.cc/5ATC-GDL3].
316
See Yun, Potential Competition, Nascent Competitors, and Killer
Acquisitions, supra note 47.
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1. Was Facebook / Instagram Anticompetitive?
It is often said that Instagram’s success as a social network has little,
if anything, to do with the fact that Facebook owns it. 317 For example,
there is very little product integration between the two services.318 This
leads some observers to conclude that, had the deal been blocked,
Facebook would face a strong competitor in social media and social media
advertising.319 In turn, this would allegedly have led to better services for
users, cheaper advertising on both platforms, and facilitated market entry
for new challengers.320
These fears were confirmed in some people’s minds with the leak of
emails from 2012 between Mark Zuckerberg and Facebook’s then-Chief
Financial Officer, David Ebersman, in which Zuckerberg lays out his
rationale for buying Instagram.321 In the emails, Zuckerberg describes
Instagram as a nascent competitor and potential threat to Facebook:
These businesses are nascent but the networks established, the brands
are already meaningful, and if they grow to a large scale they could be
very disruptive to us. Given that we think our own valuation is fairly
aggressive and that we’re vulnerable in mobile, I’m curious if we
should consider going after one or two of them.322

Ebersman objects that a new rival would just enter the market if
Facebook bought Instagram.323 In response, Zuckerberg argued that, by
then, Facebook would have accumulated enough lead-time to ward off
these threats.324
At the time of the leaks, Randy Picker argued that these emails hinted
that the acquisition was essentially about taking out a nascent competitor:
“Buying Instagram really was about controlling the window in which the
Instagram social mechanic invention posed a risk to Facebook. . . .

317

Id.
Id.
319
See Salop, supra note 125, at 7.
320
Id.
321
Casey Newton & Nilay Patel, ‘Instagram Can Hurt Us’: Mark Zuckerberg
Emails Outline Plan to Neutralize Competitors, THE VERGE (Jul. 29, 2020),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/7/29/21345723/facebookinstagram-documentsemails-mark-zuckerberg-kevin-systrom-hearing [https://perma.cc/Q63P-65C9].
322
Id.
323
Id.
324
Id. (“There are network effects around social products and a finite number
of different social mechanics to invent. Once someone wins at a specific mechanic,
it’s difficult for others to supplant them without doing something different.”).
318
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Facebook well understood the competitive risk posed by Instagram and
how purchasing it would control that risk.”325
This is a reasonable interpretation of the internal emails, but it is not
without limits. The most important one is that Instagram was not the only
company Facebook considered buying.326 The internal emails cited by
Facebook’s detractors reveal that the company was also thinking about
acquiring Path and Foursquare.327 If the goal was to neutralize potential
competition, why only acquire one of these rivals? And what does it say
that the two firms that Facebook did not acquire ultimately faltered?328
At the very least, this raises the prospect of an alternative story in
which Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram was mostly about improving
both firms’ products. This story is consistent with the tremendous growth
of both Facebook and Instagram since the acquisition.329 As John Yun
writes:
At the time of the purchase, Instagram had zero revenue and a handful
of employees. Since Facebook’s acquisition, Instagram has grown
from 30 million users to well over one billion. During the same period,
Facebook grew from approximately 900 million users to over two
billion users. This substantial expansion in users and output is the
complete opposite of what we typically consider an anticompetitive
outcome.330

In that regard, Mark Zuckerberg’s email could be construed as saying
that buying Instagram would improve Facebook, and make it good enough
to fend off other entrants (and this interpretation is much more consistent
with the notion that Facebook chose to acquire one of many promising
firms). Indeed, Zuckerberg suggests that new rivals would struggle to steal

325
Randy Picker, The House’s Big Tech Hearing: Break Ups Large and Small?,
PROMARKET (Aug. 4, 2020), https://promarket.org/2020/08/04/the-houses-big-techhearing-break-ups-large-and-small/ [https://perma.cc/T44K-LAZJ].
326
Newton & Patel, supra note 321.
327
Id.
328
The Path app was shut down in October 2018. See, e.g., John Russel, Mobile
Social Network Path, Once a Challenger to Facebook, Is Closing Down,
TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 17, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/09/17/rip-path/
[https://perma.cc/RAJ7-6S8J]. The Foursquare app is still active, but its growth has
stalled. See, e.g., Basma AlBanna, Mahmoud Sakr, Sherin Moussa & Ibrahim
Moawad, Interest Aware Location-Based Recommender System Using Geo-Tagged
Social Media, ISPRS INT’L J. GEO-INFO (Dec. 2016).
329
Yun, Potential Competition, Nascent Competitors, and Killer Acquisitions,
supra note 47.
330
Id.
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users from Facebook because the platform would already have
incorporated new social mechanics.331
If this was the rationale – rather than simply trying to kill a nascent
competitor – it would be pro-competitive. It is good for consumers if a
product makes itself better to beat its rivals by acquiring undervalued
assets to deploy them at greater scale and with superior managerial
efficiency, even if the acquirer hopes that in doing so it will prevent rivals
from ever gaining significant market share.332 Further, despite popular
characterization, on its face the acquisition was not about trying to destroy
a consumer option, but only to ensure that Facebook was competitively
viable in providing that option. Another reasonable interpretation of the
emails is that Facebook was wrestling with the age-old make-or-buy
dilemma faced by every firm at some point or another.
But suppose eliminating competition from Instagram was indeed the
merger’s sole rationale. Would that necessarily make it anticompetitive?
Chief among the objections is that both Facebook and Instagram are
networked goods.333 Their value to each user depends, to a significant
extent, on the number (and quality) of other people using the same
platform.334 Many scholars have argued that this can create selfreinforcing dynamics where the strong grow stronger.335 Such an outcome
is certainly not a given, since other factors about the service also matter
and networks can suffer from diseconomies of scale, where new users
reduce the quality of the network.336
This network effects point is central to the reasoning of those who
oppose the merger: Facebook purportedly acquired Instagram because
Instagram’s network had grown large enough to be a threat.337 With
Instagram out of the picture, Facebook could thus take on the remaining
smaller rivals with the advantage of its own much larger installed base of
users.
However, the network tipping argument could cut both ways. It is
plausible that the proper counterfactual was not duopoly competition
between Facebook and Instagram, but either Facebook or Instagram
offering the other firm’s features—only later. In other words, a possible
framing of the merger is that it merely accelerated the cross-pollination of
social mechanics between Facebook and Instagram—something that

331
Newton & Patel, supra note 321 (“[I]f we incorporate the social mechanics
they were using, those new products won’t get much traction since we’ll already have
their mechanics deployed at scale.”).
332
See Manne, supra note 15, at 112.
333
See Lemley & McCreary, supra note 41, at 11.
334
See id.
335
See id.
336
Id. at 9, 11.
337
Newton & Patel, supra note 321.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2022

73

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 4 [2022], Art. 5

1120

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

would likely prove beneficial to consumers. This finds some support in
Mark Zuckerberg’s reply to David Ebersman: “Buying them would give
us the people and time to integrate their innovations into our core
products.”338
The exchange between Zuckerberg and Ebersman also suggests
another pro-competitive justification: bringing Instagram’s “social
mechanics” to Facebook’s much larger network of users. We can only
speculate about what “social mechanics” Zuckerberg actually had in mind,
but at the time Facebook’s photo-sharing functionality was largely based
around albums of unedited photos, whereas Instagram’s core product was
a stream of filtered, cropped single images.339 Zuckerberg’s plan to
gradually bring these features to Facebook’s users – as opposed to them
having to familiarize themselves with an entirely different platform –
would likely cut in favor of the deal being cleared by enforcers.
Another possibility is that it was Instagram’s network of
“influencers” who were the valuable asset. Bringing them onto the
Facebook platform would undoubtedly increase its value to regular users.
For example, Kim Kardashian, one of Instagram’s most popular users,
joined the service in February 2012,340 two months before the deal went
through. We can see the importance of a service’s most creative users
today, as Facebook tries to pay TikTok creators to move to its TikTok
clone, Reels.341 But if this was indeed the rationale, it is a sign of a
company confronting fierce competition, rather than one on the cusp of
acquiring an unassailable monopoly position. More fundamentally, it
suggests that Facebook was always going to come out on top—or, at least,
that it thought it would.
At the time, Om Malik, writing for GigaOm, argued that Instagram
was a nascent competitor of Facebook’s: “Facebook was scared shitless
and knew that for first time in its life it arguably had a competitor that
could not only eat its lunch, but also destroy its future prospects.”342 But
he believed that Instagram’s value to Facebook was not simply its user
base or in stamping out the competitor per se, but in its success on mobile,
which Facebook singularly lacked:
338

Id.
See FACEBOOK.COM [https://perma.cc/D4FF-JZWW] (last visited Jan. 29,
2021); see also INSTAGRAM.COM [https://perma.cc/H77Q-94D5] (last visited Jan. 29,
2021).
340
See INSTAGRAM.COM, supra note 339.
341
See Euirim Choi, Facebook Offers Money to Reel In TikTok Creators, WALL
ST. J. (Jul. 28, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-seeks-to-reel-in-tiktokcreators-raising-stakes-in-social-media-rivalry-11595928600
[https://perma.cc/ZTL4-4ACR].
342
Om Malik, Here Is Why Facebook Bought Instagram, GIGAOM (Apr. 9,
2012), https://gigaom.com/2012/04/09/here-is-why-did-facebook-bought-instagram/
[https://perma.cc/45C2-KUSZ].
339
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Facebook is essentially about photos, and Instagram had found and
attacked Facebook’s achilles [sic] heel—mobile photo sharing. . . .
They [Instagram] are growing like mad on mobile, and Facebook’s
mobile platform (including its app) is mediocre at best. Why?
Facebook is not a mobile-first company and they don’t think from the
mobile-first perspective.343

This interpretation leads to a view that seems parsimonious with the
available evidence: that the appeal of Instagram was that it employed a
promising technology and business model that could help Facebook to
overcome crucial weaknesses in its own product.
Instagram may also have benefitted from business model integrations
like these. Although its consumer-facing product appears largely
unaffected by being owned by Facebook, except for the ability to log in
with a Facebook account, on the advertiser side the product is deeply
integrated with Facebook’s advertising platform, Ads Manager.344 As well
as making it easier for advertisers to run campaigns on both Facebook and
Instagram, it allows adverts on Instagram to be targeted according to
tracking information collected by Facebook across the wider web and
other Facebook products.345
Apart from just making more money, this may have improved
Instagram’s service in the eyes of users, if this personalization has meant
that its ads feel useful and unobtrusive. These benefits are not trivial: other
services, like Twitter, that offer a superficially similar product have
struggled with monetization and offering effective ads.346
At the time of the Instagram acquisition, some commentators made
this point explicitly:
Instagram had no monetisation strategy—other than a lottery-like exit.
This says applying any kind of cost per user ($33 for the theory in
vogue) is bogus. Being unable to project any sustainable revenue
mechanism makes such a valuation process completely pointless. In
Instagram’s case, the only way to come up with a price tag was
guessing the amount of money a small group of suitors—Facebook,
Google and Twitter—might be willing to cough up for Instagram’s
eyeballs.347

343

Id.
See Facebook and Instagram Advertising Go Together Like..., FACEBOOK
FOR BUS. (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.facebook.com/business/news/facebook-andinstagram-ads [https://perma.cc/UZ5G-RTNE].
345
Id.
346
Argentesi et al., supra note 290, at 123.
347
Frédéric Filloux, Facebook’s Instagram takeover highlights its insecurity,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
16,
2012),
344
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Clearly, hindsight has demonstrated that Instagram, which has one of
the highest average revenues per user of any social media site, could in
fact monetize its userbase. But it is noteworthy that this seemed
improbable prior to the acquisition
It is also plausible that the deals are understandable within the
“market for corporate control” model. Management by Facebook or
Google may simply have been superior to alternative management the
firms would have had otherwise. One noteworthy illustration of this was
Instagram’s rapid adoption of a “Stories” feature, copied from Snapchat
as it began to win users away from Instagram, the speed of which was
reportedly driven by Mark Zuckerberg himself and described by some
outlets as a move that “saved” the service.348
One former Facebook executive, Mike Hoefflinger, even argued that
this demonstration of superior management was itself of value to
Facebook, because it would make other firms more willing to be acquired:
And therein lies the priceless value of the Instagram story: proof of
existence that Zuckerberg can turn visions of growth and impact into
reality without undue meddling … A clear message to the best builders
in the world that if you want to play truly big, come work with
Facebook… [The Instagram acquisition] has created an ever-growing
gravity for the single most important thing Zuckerberg needs for the
success of Facebook in the long term: The desire of the world’s best
people and their creations to join with him.349

Hoefflinger claimed that this made WhatsApp and Oculus more
willing to be acquired and allowed Facebook to recruit star executives
from other firms.350
The upshot is that Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram is not the
epitome of anticompetitive behavior that critics routinely make it out to
be. To the contrary, it is at least plausible that the merger turned Instagram
into the highly successful platform that it is today and improved Facebook
with new social mechanics.

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/blog/2012/apr/16/facebook-instagramtakeover [https://perma.cc/4BB6-UHQZ].
348
See, e.g., Kurt Wagner, ‘Stories’ Was Instagram’s Smartest Move Yet, VOX
(Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/8/8/17641256/instagram-stories-kevinsystrom-facebook-snapchat; see also Alex Kantrowitz, Snapchat Was ‘An Existential
Threat’ to Facebook – Until an 18-year-old Developer Convinced Mark Zuckerberg
to Invest in Instagram Stories, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-developer-mark-zuckerberg-inventedinstagram-stories-copied-snapchat-2020-4 [https://perma.cc/RAM5-K8ET].
349
MIKE HOEFFLINGER, BECOMING FACEBOOK: THE 10 CHALLENGES THAT
DEFINED THE COMPANY DISRUPTING THE WORLD 119 (2017).
350
Id.
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2. Was Google / Android Anticompetitive?
Although it receives far less attention in the debate about Big Tech
acquisitions than Facebook / Instagram or other acquisitions made by
Google, Google’s acquisition of Android in 2005 deserves to be thought
of as one of the most consequential and important acquisitions in recent
history. The deal today would bear many of the superficial hallmarks of a
tech killer acquisition: a large, powerful incumbent buying a smaller
would-be rival in a market that has the potential to significantly challenge
its current business model.351 Many of the proposals made to curb
“killers,” discussed below, may have made the deal more difficult or even
impossible.
Despite these ambiguities, with hindsight the deal looks remarkably
successful. It led to the development of what became one of two leading
smartphone operating systems (OSes) in the world, running on roughly
72% of smartphone devices worldwide,352 and created a viable competitor
to Apple’s iPhone soon after that product entered – and revolutionized –
the market.353
Android Inc. was founded in October 2003 and purchased for a
reported $50 million by Google in July 2005, eighteen months before the
announcement of the iPhone.354 Unlike Apple’s iPhone OS (later renamed
iOS), which was designed only to run on Apple iPhones, Android was
designed to work on a wide variety of smartphone devices by different
manufacturers.355 Indeed, it was backed during its launch phase by a
number of powerful device and component manufacturers (OEMs, for
“Original Equipment Manufacturers”) and wireless operators that called
itself the “Open Handset Alliance,” including Motorola, HTC, Qualcomm,
Samsung, T-Mobile, and Telefónica.356

351

See Section IV for a discussion of the general features of killer acquisitions.
See Mobile Operating System Market Share Worldwide, May 2020—May
2021,
STATCOUNTER,
https://gs.statcounter.com/os-marketshare/mobile/worldwide/#monthly-202005-202105 [https://perma.cc/FYV6-4K53]
(last visited June 4, 2021).
353
Owen Thomas, Google Exec: Android was “Best Deal Ever,”
VENTUREBEAT (Oct. 27, 2010), https://venturebeat.com/2010/10/27/google-execandroid-was-best-deal-ever/ [https://perma.cc/CRT8-7ZM2].
354
See Callaham, supra note 157.
355
John Callaham, The History of Android: The Evolution of the Biggest OS in
the
World,
ANDROID
AUTHORITY
(May
1,
2021),
https://www.androidauthority.com/history-android-os-name-789433/
[https://perma.cc/LA5Y-4CEW].
356
Philip Trauring, What Ever Happened to the Open Handset Alliance?, OFF
ON A TANGENT (Mar. 6, 2014), https://trauring.org/what-ever-happened-openhandset-alliance/ [https://perma.cc/S73J-9635].
352
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Unlike Apple’s vertically integrated approach, Android was designed
to be customizable by handset manufacturers and wireless operators, in
order to encourage adoption by firms otherwise worried about becoming
commoditized.357
This customization allowed Android device
manufacturers to differentiate their phones from their competitors with
different branding (e.g. Motorola’s Droid range of phones) and software
features (for example, Samsung’s Kies software, which enabled file
transfer between desktop computers and the smartphones).358
The base OS is open source and available for free to OEMs, and the
software development kit (“SDK”) was made available for free download
in November 2007.359 However, some important software elements – such
as Google’s Play Store, Gmail, Google Maps, the camera software, and
other services – require a license to install, which Google charges for or in
exchange of which it imposes other contractual terms (such as a
requirement to make Chrome the default browser on the device, or to
provide a certain number of OS updates over the lifespan of the device).360
357
See
OPEN
HANDSET
ALLIANCE
(June
4,
2021),
https://www.openhandsetalliance.com/oha_overview.html [https://perma.cc/9MEYRKZ9] (“Each member of the Open Handset Alliance is strongly committed to greater
openness in the mobile ecosystem. Increased openness will enable everyone in our
industry to innovate more rapidly and respond better to consumers’ demands.”).
358
See Joshua Topolsky, Motorola DROID Review, ENGADGET (Oct. 30, 2009),
https://www.engadget.com/2009-10-30-motorola-droid-review.html
[https://perma.cc/X9FB-R33D];
SAMSUNG,
https://www.samsung.com/africa_en/support/kies/ [https://perma.cc/3DJM-ZPNZ]
(Last visited Sept. 2, 2021).
359
Juan Carlos Perez, Google Releases Android SDK, MACWORLD, (NOV. 11,
2007),
https://www.macworld.com/article/188112/androidsdk.html
[https://perma.cc/SF4D-WEES].
360
See, e.g., Dirk Auer, Appropriability and the European Commission’s
Android Investigation, 23 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 649-50 (2017) (“Noting that Android is
mostly distributed as open source software is important in order to draw a distinction
between Android and some of its key applications. On the one hand, the source code
for Android is distributed freely. . . . In contrast, Google’s marquee applications are
proprietary. In practice, this means that original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)
must obtain Google’s consent if they want to preload these applications on the phones
they sell.”) [hereinafter Appropriability and the European Commission’s Android
Investigation]; see also, Jacob Kastrenakes & Russell Brandom, Google App Suite
Costs as Much as $40 Per Phone Under New EU Android Deal, THE VERGE (Oct. 19,
2018),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/19/17999366/google-eu-androidlicensing-terms [https://perma.cc/2UWE-3MFT] (“A confidential fee schedule shows
costs as high as $40 per device to install the ‘Google Mobile Services’ suite of apps,
which includes the Google Play Store. The new fees vary depending on country and
device type, and it would apply to devices activated on or after February 1st, 2019.
But phone manufacturers may not actually have to shoulder that cost: Google is also
offering separate agreements to cover some or all of the licensing costs for companies
that choose to install Chrome and Google search on their devices as well, according
to a person familiar with the terms.”).
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Since Android’s launch, Google has released its own line of phones
(manufactured on license by other OEMs) and some of the original Open
Handset Alliance manufacturers have left the smartphone market. Others,
most notably Chinese firms like Huawei and Xiaomi, have entered it.361
The Android acquisition led to radical business model innovation in
the smartphone space. Unlike rival mobile OSes such as iOS, Symbian
and Windows Mobile, Android was not primarily based on licensing
fees.362 Instead, Android and the software needed to develop for it was
made available for free, albeit with contractual obligations and (later)
payments needed for certain Google software.363
This model was unique among OSes that eventually gained
widespread adoption.364
Apple does not license iOS to other
manufacturers, and its smartphone business model is built around the
profitability of the iPhone device and charging for software services
provided to iPhone users.365 Google largely profits from Android users’
use of its other services included on the device.366 The ability to deeply
embed Google services within Android – such as making Chrome the
default browser and putting a Google Search bar on the home screen by

See Chris Velazco, How Google’s Smartphones Have Evolved Since 2007,
ENGADGET (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.engadget.com/2017-10-03-a-look-back-atgoogles-smartphones.html
[https://perma.cc/AVA9-YWUQ];
see
Team
Counterpoint, Global Smartphone Market Share: By Quarter, COUNTERPOINT
(Apr. 30, 2021), https://www.counterpointresearch.com/global-smartphone-share/
[https://perma.cc/9ALX-8KPL].
362
See Auer, supra note 360, Appropriability and the European Commission’s
Android Investigation, at 659–60 (“To summarize, there is a sense that due to low
appropriability, there is little scope for substantial investments in apps and mobile Oss
as standalone products. Google bypasses this problem because it believes that its
investments in apps and the Android OS will translate into greater search engine
profits. But Google must ensure that Android users actually opt for Google’s profitable
services, rather than those of its competitors. The solution is to lock-down its Android
platform, thereby nudging users toward its own services.”).
363
See id. at 650 (“[O]EMs notably have to agree to Google’s Mobile
Application Distribution Agreement (or MADA). Importantly, these agreements do
not include any royalty obligations on the part of OEMs – Google’s proprietary
applications are given away free of charge.”).
364
See Dirk Auer, Making Sense of the Google Android Decision, ICLE
Antitrust & Consumer Protection Research Program White Paper 1, 22 (2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3709767
[https://perma.cc/8Q9K-BF8H] [hereinafter Making Sense of the Google Android
Decision].
365
Id. at 5, 25.
366
Such as Google Search where users will view and click on Google’s
embedded search ads, as it does from iPhone users’ use of Google’s services. Id. at
23.
361
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default – and the fact that Google has to pay Apple for default status on
iPhones are factors that drive the value of Android to Google.367
It is of course possible that Android could have sustained its business
model without being integrated with Google’s services. But it’s clear that
the combination in practice did enable Android to maintain a distinctive
business model to its competitors, and ultimately helped it eclipse them.368
It may also have helped it compete with Apple’s offering by allowing for
more differentiation among devices and pricing, growing the size of the
Android userbase for app developers.
Further, one of Android’s biggest failings was OS fragmentation
resulting from its open source nature, where carriers and OEMs that
customized Android for the sake of differentiation did not provide updates
to users after Google had released them, because of the cost of customizing
updated Android builds for devices that were no longer being sold.369 This
meant that Android devices were frequently left without updates that fixed
security flaws or provided new features.370 Not only did this worsen users’
experience, it worsened the position of Android as a whole, as users
blamed the whole OS for problems they experienced on a customized
device.371
But as bad as these problems became, they were probably smaller
than the problems that a Google-less Android would have faced. Google
367
See id. at 25; see also Auer, Appropriability and the European Commission’s
Android Investigation, supra note 360, at 654.
368
Auer, Appropriability and the European Commission’s Android
Investigation, supra note 360, at 667 (“On the theoretical side, the story of
appropriability that was outlined above suggests that Google benefited from a unique
advantage that its competitors did not have: its capacity to internalize a higher share
of investments in its smartphone OS and apps. Accordingly, it is unlikely that they
would have invested to the same extent as Google. On the practical side, Google’s
significant penetration in the browser, online maps, and mobile operating system
markets could be seen as support for the theory that it enjoys some advantage over its
competitors-because it can invest more thanks to its higher internalization of benefits.
Of course, this intuition would need to be confirmed by comparing investments made
by Google to those made by its rivals.”).
369
See, e.g., Auer, Appropriability and the European Commission’s Android
Investigation, supra note 360, at 34, (“More fundamentally, the Commission’s claim
that fragmentation was not a significant threat is at odds with an almost unanimous
agreement among industry insiders. For example, while it is not dispositive, a rapid
search for the terms “Google Android fragmentation”, using the DuckDuckGo search
engine, leads to far more nuanced results than those cited in the Commission’s
decision. Of the ten first results, only one could remotely be construed as claiming that
fragmentation was not an issue. The other results paint a very different picture. . . .”).
370
Id. at 36.
371
See, e.g., Jeremy Horwitz, As iOS 13 Hits 50% Adoption, Android
Fragmentation Keeps Getting Worse, VENTUREBEAT (Oct. 17, 2019),
https://venturebeat.com/2019/10/17/as-ios-13-hits-50-adoption-androidfragmentation-keeps-getting-worse/ [https://perma.cc/GGL2-QXQ6].
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had significant advantages that helped it to make demands from carriers
and OEMs that Android would not have been able to make.372 In other
words, Google was uniquely situated to solve the collective action problem
stemming from OEMs’ desire to modify Android according to their own
idiosyncratic preferences.373 It used the appeal of its app bundle as
leverage to get OEMs and carriers to commit to support Android devices
for longer with OS updates.374 The popularity of its apps meant that OEMs
and carriers would have great difficulty in going it alone without them,
and so had to engage in some contractual arrangements with Google to sell
Android phones that customers wanted.375 Google was better resourced
than Android likely would have been and may have been able to hold out
for better terms with a more recognizable and desirable brand name than
a hypothetical Google-less Android. In short, though it is of course
possible that Android could have succeeded despite the deal having been
blocked, it is also plausible that Android became so successful only
because of its combination with Google. Competition enforcers tasked
with identifying and preventing killer acquisitions thus face serious errorcost risk.

3. Can Enforcers Separate the Good from the Bad?
This, of course, raises the question: Can enforcers reliably separate
the “good” tech platform acquisitions from the problematic ones?
Instagram grew from roughly 24 million users at the time of the
acquisition to over 1 billion users in 2018.376 Likewise, it earned zero

372

Auer, Making Sense of the Google Android Decision, supra note 364 at 23,

26.
See id. at 26 (“[G]oogle withholds the Google Play and Google Search apps
from OEMs that distribute “incompatible devices” (i.e. devices that significantly
depart from the “standard version” of Android”)).
374
Auer, Making Sense of the Google Android Decision, supra note 364 at 26.
Despite this, fragmentation remains a problem for Android, which has a much higher
share of users on old versions of the OS than iPhone users. Id. at 25 (“Finally, both
firms attempt to limit the number of software versions with which developers must
work (i.e. fragmentation). Apple routinely (and sometimes annoyingly) prompts users
to update their devices. It also stops supporting older handsets or older versions of
iOS. Meanwhile, Google steers the development of Android so as to ensure that a large
number of devices run the “standard” version of Android (notably via
antifragmentation agreements with OEMs). However, unlike Apple, it cannot
unilaterally coerce users of its ecosystem into adopting its own preferred version of
Android.”).
375
Id. at 13, 26.
376
See Anticipated Acquisition by Facebook Inc. of Instagram Inc., supra note
214, at 8; see also Josh Constine, Instagram Hits 1 Billion Monthly Users, Up From
800M
in
September,
TECHCRUNCH
(June
20,
2018),
373
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revenue at the time of the merger.377 This might explain why the
acquisition was derided at the time as evidence of a tech “bubble,”
although others did consider it to involve the purchase of a nascent
competitor even then, albeit a misguided one.378
One round up of commentary about the deal at the time provides an
insight into how the deal looked then. Of those commentators who did not
dismiss the deal out of hand as a frivolous purchase made during a tech
“bubble,” many believed that Instagram had the potential to add value to
Facebook beyond simply eliminating a competitor.379 For example, the
then-managing editor of the New Yorker wrote:
[Instagram] combines the sharing of a social app with the emotion of
a photo album, and sharing plus feelings equals sharing feelings—an
activity neither Mark Zuckerberg nor his company are known for. . . .
If anything, Facebook made a very emotionally mature move by
acknowledging something important that it lacks; whether paying for
it in cash and stock is ignoble is beside the point. Sometimes we want
to talk about things we see outside ourselves. Camera phones have
helped refocus our gaze from our navels back onto the world, at least
until the next e-mail arrives. And that’s a big but important pill for
Facebook to swallow.380

While many viewed Instagram as a nascent competitor, they also saw
procompetitive effects from the deal, and many argued that Facebook’s
need to adapt to mobile was the most significant driver of the deal, citing
Instagram’s cleaner mobile user interface for sharing photos, and arguing
that users had “flocked” to Facebook’s competitors “including Path,

https://techcrunch.com/2018/06/20/instagram-1-billion-users/
[https://perma.cc/5J9R-LGUW].
377
Anticipated Acquisition by Facebook Inc. of Instagram Inc., supra note 214,
at 2.
378
See, e.g., Charles Arthur, Instagram and Facebook: The Next Tech Bubble,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
10,
2012),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/apr/10/instagram-and-facebookanother-tech-bubble [https://perma.cc/AET4-4QV2]; John Gapper, Facebook Is
Scared
of
the
Internet,
FIN.
TIMES
(Apr.
11,
2012),
https://www.ft.com/content/b9783142-82fe-11e1-ab78-00144feab49a
[https://perma.cc/J9L4-L6UN].
379
Amanda Michel & Amanda Holpuch, Why Did Facebook Buy Instagram for
a
Whopping
$1bn?,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
9,
2012),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/apr/09/facebookinstagram-1bn-storify [https://perma.cc/T2J2-AL6J].
380
Silvia Killingsworth, Visual Candy: The Rise of Instagram, NEW YORKER
(Apr. 10, 2012), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/visual-candy-therise-of-instagram [https://perma.cc/8Y52-MJDT].
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PicPlz, and Instagram.”381 In other words, Facebook needed to
successfully shift to mobile before it was too late.382
Android, similarly, has experienced phenomenal growth under
Google that would have been impossible to predict at the time—indeed, it
was far from clear that smartphones would become as significant as they
are today in 2005, let alone that Android would be the leading operating
system within that market.383
The unknowability inherent in these judgements is critical from an
antitrust perspective. Antitrust enforcers adjudicate merger proceedings
in the face of extreme uncertainty.384 All possible outcomes have certain
probabilities of being true that enforcers and courts have to make educated
guesses about, assigning probabilities to potential anticompetitive harms,
merger efficiencies, and so on.385 The uncertainty is magnified in the case
of nascent competitor transactions:
One key consideration with acquisitions of nascent competitors is how
to address the uncertainty of both the procompetitive and the
anticompetitive effects that Microsoft requires us to balance.
Uncertainty is present in all merger analysis, because we cannot
observe the post-merger world, or the but-for world, or both. But that
uncertainty is compounded when one of the merging parties has not
yet entered or reached its full potential. Under these circumstances,

381
Nicholas Carlson, Well-Played Zuckerberg: Buying Instagram For $1
Billion Is A Brilliant Move, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 9, 2012),
https://www.businessinsider.com/well-played-zuckerberg-buying-instagram-for-1billion-is-a-brilliant-move-2012-4 [https://perma.cc/CV6R-ATZC].
382
Id.
383
S. O’Dea, Market Share of Mobile Operating Systems Worldwide 20122021, STATISTA (June 29, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/272698/globalmarket-share-held-by-mobile-operating-systems-since-2009/
[https://perma.cc/3E9W-X3G2].
384
See Thomas A. Piraino Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the
Antitrust Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 9, 40–41 (2004) (“[A]ntitrust cases have become
more complicated and less predictable. Proving economic issues requires extensive
documentary evidence and endless testimony from economists and other experts.
Most judges, and nearly all juries, lack the training necessary to make economic
determinations.”).
385
See Geoffrey A. Manne & E. Marcellus Williamson, Hot Docs vs. Cold
Economics: The Use and Misuse of Business Documents in Antitrust Enforcement and
Adjudication, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 609, 611 (2005) (“Because the same economic activity
can have desirable or undesirable consequences depending on the economic
circumstances, by its nature antitrust analysis is constrained to outlaw not specific
conduct, but rather conduct that has specific economic characteristics. Identifying
conduct that has or is likely to have an anticompetitive effect is difficult.”).
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we cannot even use the state of competition just before the merger as
a starting approximation of the world absent the merger.386

What was the likelihood that a company with a fraction of
Facebook’s users (24 million to Facebook’s 1 billion), and worth $1
billion, could grow to threaten Facebook’s market position? How could
authorities know that Google+ (Facebook’s strongest competitor at the
time) would fail?387 Or could authorities have known that an independent
Android, worth $50 million in 2005, would in a few years end up being
many people’s main way of accessing the Internet? It is possible, for
instance, that Windows Phone – released to much fanfare, with significant
investment by Microsoft behind it, and with an existing base of Windows
Mobile users to build on – could have succeeded instead, or alongside
Android and the iPhone. But it is equally possible that, without Android’s
competitive threat, Microsoft could have taken longer to roll out its more
modern smartphone OS and may have put less effort into doing so. It
seems just as likely that, if the iPhone had remained priced highly in this
counterfactual scenario, the pressure on Microsoft, Nokia, and other
OEMs to innovate would have been less without Android, and outcomes
for consumers worse.
At the time of these acquisitions, it simply appeared to be very
unlikely that the counterfactuals were of scenarios with greater
competition from the acquired firms growing into serious competitors
themselves. And it is unclear in hindsight whether this assessment would
have been wrong; they really may have been unlikely to succeed without
the control and integration that the mergers involved. These outcomes
were not just hard to ascertain, they were simply unknowable. And, of
course, it is a mistake to assume that competitors truly know enough about
their markets, their competitors, future technology, future consumer
demand, and the like to have anything approaching certainty about the
assumptions they make about prospective mergers. Nor does it make
sense to assume that just because an incumbent hopes to earn or maintain
monopoly profits, corporate decisionmakers will accurately and
effectively take the proper steps to do so. Rather, economic actors are
hampered by “imperfect foresight and human inability to solve complex
problems containing a host of variables even when an optimum is

386
Prepared Remarks of Commissioner Noah Joshua Phillips, supra note 12, at
8–9; see also Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, supra note
135.
387
See, e.g., Arjunb Kharpal, Look Who’s Admitting That Google+ Is
‘Confusing’, CNBC (Jul 28, 2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/28/google-plusconfusing-facebook-rival.html [https://perma.cc/3A6Y-Q6Q7] (“Google has halted
its pursuit of making Google+ a rival to Facebook with the search giant even admitting
that the social service was a little ‘confusing’ for users.”).
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definable.”388 As noted above, it is far from clear in the moment whether
or not any given company has an appreciable chance of becoming a
potential competitor. It is even less clear that corporate actors – including
incumbent, dominant firms – are able to recognize them.389
This stands in stark contrast to the recommendation of some that
intent evidence be used precisely to distinguish procompetitive from
anticompetitive nascent competitor acquisitions.390 For instance, Scott
Hemphill and Tim Wu argue that “[e]vidence of an anticompetitive plan
is a particularly important guide in this area.”391 They cite Facebook’s
internal memos regarding Instagram as evidence supporting the assertion
that such an approach is sensible392 and dismiss arguments that, whatever
its intent, Facebook’s purchase of Instagram may have enabled Facebook
to “incubate” Instagram or become itself a more effective competitor.393
But intent evidence is not, in fact, generally useful to distinguish such
cases, and the risk of false positives is arguably no smaller (and the risk of
prejudicial evidence outweighing its probative value is much higher) in
the face of such evidence.394
[T]he problem is the fundamental and inextricable disconnect between
intent and effect in complex economic systems. And even were it true
that courts are capable, generally, of discerning economic effect from
an actor’s motives, it does not follow that a court would do so
consistently or successfully enough to outweigh the extreme prejudice
that such an inquiry would entail.395

The risk of error may, in fact, be heightened in the case of potential
competitor acquisitions precisely because of the importance of such
acquisitions for facilitating new entry in the first place.396 “Indeed, it may
388
Armen Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL.
ECON. 211, 212 (1950).
389
See Manne & Williamson, supra note 385, at 651, 654; see also Prepared
Remarks of Commissioner Noah Joshua Phillips, supra note 12, at 11 (“Faced with
evidence of real and significant consumer gains from the merger, conjecture by
executives that competition might have arisen in its absence is simply too speculative
to find, in the words of Microsoft, ‘the requisite anticompetitive effect’ for a Section
2 violation.”).
390
See, e.g., Hemphill & Wu, supra note 121, at 1882. (“Such intent might be
subjectively expressed through testimony or internal writings. The enforcer or factfinder essentially borrows a party’s expertise to help form a judgment about
competitive effects”).
391
Id.
392
See id. at 1904.
393
See id. at 1902–03.
394
See Manne & Williamson, supra note 385, at 649–50.
395
Id.
396
See supra Section II.A.
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well be that nascent or potential competitors engage in strategic behavior
to make themselves look like actual or potential competitors in order to
make themselves attractive as acquisition targets. But when their
intentions and incentives are tested, it may become clear that they lacked
the ability to mature into truly viable competitors.”397
One reason we know that business actors’ ability to predict outcomes
or bring them about is questionable derives from our knowledge of
acquisitions not taken, and the consequences.398 Consider, for example,
that Yahoo – the dominant online search provider before Google – twice
had the opportunity to buy Google and once had the opportunity to buy
Facebook at bargain-basement prices: Google’s founders offered their
search algorithm to Yahoo in 1998 for “the derisory amount (today) of $1
million” and again in 2002 for $3 billion; Mark Zuckerberg offered up
Facebook for $1 billion in 2006.399 In each instance Yahoo deemed the
price too high and opted instead to pursue smaller acquisitions of services
like Flickr and Delicious.400
At the same time, the history of corporate M&A activity is littered
with the carcasses of failed acquisitions that did not bring about the
acquirers’ hoped-for outcomes.401 Among the most notorious examples of
these are the mergers of Mattel and the Learning Company in 1998,
America Online and Time Warner in 2001, eBay and Skype in 2005,
NewsCorp and Myspace in 2005, Microsoft and aQuantive in 2007,
Google and Motorola in 2012, and Microsoft and Nokia in 2013. 402
Several of these deals could be described as efforts by an incumbent firm
to extend its dominance, and indeed in some cases that may well have been
the intent. But in none of these instances was it the actual outcome.
Indeed, there is a real irony in the rush to condemn successful
mergers, coupled with the convenient amnesia regarding the plethora of
failed counterparts:

397

Douglas H. Ginsburg & Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Challenging Consummated
Mergers Under Section 2, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L (May 3, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID3611077_code2061252.pdf?abs
tractid=3590703&mirid=1 [https://perma.cc/UYJ6-QNVQ].
398
See Sylvain Saurel, 6 Reasons Why Yahoo! Failed, MEDIUM (Aug. 17, 2019),
https://medium.com/swlh/6- reasons-why-yahoo-failed-6004d67e86ff.
399
Id.
400
Id.
401
See, e.g., Ben Shepherd, Anti-competitive, or excellent M&A execution?,
LINKEDIN (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/anti-competitiveexcellent-ma-execution-ben-shepherd/ [https://perma.cc/XBV3-SS4W].
402
Fools Rush In: 37 of the Worst Corporate M&A Flops, CB INSIGHTS (Oct.
30, 2018), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/merger-acquisition-corporate-fails/
[https://perma.cc/29F5-UQH8].
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The difference between Google buying Doubleclick/Admeld/Invite
and Yahoo and Microsoft and their aggressive actions in the area isn’t
due to anti-competitive concerns, it came down to execution.
Microsoft botched Aquantive and sold it for cents on the dollar years
later. Yahoo did the same with its acquisitions, it failed to use
Overture’s advantage and head start over Google in search, and it
couldn’t integrate its ad technology acquisitions into its core business.
. . . So why did Instagram and WhatsApp deliver for Facebook but
egroups, Flickr, Tumblr not for Yahoo? Execution. When Google
gets execution and integration right it’s deemed anti-competitive. See
YouTube. When it gets it wrong—no questions are asked by
regulators. See Wildfire, Slide, Meebo—a collective $1b of social
acquisitions that hit a brick wall almost as soon as the ink dried on the
contracts.403

It should be noted that, in each of the successful cases, the acquisition
may have been important to the acquirer’s competitive success. The fact
that one can identify an advantage to the acquirer from an acquisition does
not necessarily mean that the merger granted anticompetitive advantage.
This is a crucial and systematically overlooked aspect of the evaluation of
the benefits and costs of such acquisitions. And understanding the effects
of these sorts of deals on the business models of the companies involved,
and not just on the feature set, is vital. It is quite possible, for example,
that Android simply could not have made sufficient return or ensured
sufficient longevity in its then form without the extra layer of Google’s
services tied into it. If it had had to go without Google’s apps, it may have
had to pursue a much less successful business model, and perhaps
worsened market outcomes overall. Yet the deal could well have been
blocked under many proposals designed to prevent “killer acquisitions.”
As we note above, the corporate control aspect of this debate is
regularly overlooked, but important. This is relevant not only in the case
where the acquirer’s superior governance may be able to draw greater
value out of an acquired company than it would exhibit on its own, but
also where the acquired company is important to the acquirer’s business
model. Imagine a situation where Google would not be able to exist absent
the Android acquisition because it became eclipsed by more mobile-adept
competitors and lost out on reliable access to mobile devices. In such a
case the cost of prohibiting the merger may not be the loss of Android, but
the loss of Google.
Nor is the limit case nearly as far-fetched as it may seem. Indeed, it
is surmised by some that Yahoo ultimately failed in significant part
because it did not continue to ensure its accessibility by consumers as the

403

Shepherd, supra note 401.
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world moved to mobile.404 Interestingly, it is precisely Yahoo’s early
foresight in developing a branded portal to its services that is often
identified as the primary determinant of its early success.405 So it should
not be in any way surprising that its apparent failure to ensure continued
consumer access was a likely cause of its demise. And yet that seems to
have been the case. As one commentator writing about Yahoo’s rise and
fall put it:
[Yahoo’s] mobile troubles stemmed largely from one problem: unlike
Google and Apple, Yahoo had neither a mobile operating system nor
a widely used browser of its own. . . . Yahoo lacked a “front door”
through which smartphone users might access—and, more to the point,
be led to—the company’s own services and apps. Google, by contrast,
had its Android operating system, which it had begun work on in the
mid-two-thousands.406

Others echo this analysis.407 Even in the midst of the great transition
to mobile, industry observers noted Yahoo’s failure to keep pace. “[T]he

404

See, e.g., Matt Ablott, Has Yahoo Missed the Mobile Bandwagon?, MOBILE
WORLD LIVE (Sep. 7, 2011), https://www.mobileworldlive.com/blog/has-yahoomissed-the-mobile-bandwagon-1 [https://perma.cc/TB7D-36D8] (“But the key area
where Yahoo comes up short is in mobile. While Google has Android and Facebook
boasts the world’s most downloaded mobile app, Yahoo has never really had a mobile
strategy beyond simply repackaging content for the smaller screen.”).
405
See, e.g., Yahoo! still first portal call, BBC ONLINE NETWORK (Jun. 5, 1998,
8:54 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/107667.stm [https://perma.cc/VWL3SDYQ] (“[T]he four-year-old pioneer of portal sites, Yahoo!, is close to hitting 100
million page views a day. . . . [T]he concept of developing one-stop shops of sites
where Internet users will want to hang around, portals to everything you need on the
Web, is the big idea of 1998.”); Dan Tynan, The History of Yahoo, and How it Went
from
Phenom
to
Has-been,
FASTCOMPANY
(Mar.
21,
2018),
https://www.fastcompany.com/40544277/the-glory-that-was-yahoo
[https://perma.cc/C42Y-B5CH] (“At the time, it was competing with search portals
like Excite, InfoSeek, and Lycos to provide everything on the net in one place. ‘We
didn’t want to call it a portal, because a portal is a door to somewhere else, and we
wanted people to stay there,’ says . . . a senior manager in Yahoo’s corporate
communications department from 1998 to 2001.”).
406
Vauhini Vara, Why Yahoo Couldn’t Adapt to the Smartphone Era, THE NEW
YORKER (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/why-yahoocouldnt-adapt-to-the-iphoneera#:~:text=Mayer%20identified%20a%20few%20reasons,small%20number%20of
%20apps%20excellent [https://perma.cc/K5AB-MZG2].
407
See, e.g., Walter Frick, The Decline of Yahoo in Its Own Words, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Jun. 2, 2016) (“It would be a mistake to treat the frequency with which mobile
is mentioned on earnings calls as definitive proof of anything, but the data supports
the narrative that Yahoo was late to mobile.”), https://hbr.org/2016/06/the-decline-ofyahoo-in-its-own-words [https://perma.cc/6BMC-C2NL]; Denise Lee Yohn, A Tale
of
Two
Brands:
Yahoo’s
Mistakes
vs.
Google’s
Mastery,
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key area where Yahoo comes up short is in mobile. While Google has
Android, and Facebook boasts the world’s most downloaded mobile app,
Yahoo has never really had a mobile strategy beyond simply repackaging
content for the smaller screen.”408
This was not the only failure by Yahoo to acquire (or build) a crucial
element of the company’s business. As one history of Yahoo’s rise and
fall recounts, when Yahoo was “faced with the decision of whether to stick
to their existing strategy of providing a platform for the content and media
of other outlets, or acquire a big media company. . . , [it] picked the former,
and the mistake had dire consequences . . . .”409
The point is that firms themselves, and enforcers even more so, are
plagued with uncertainty. Yahoo was obviously capable of making
mistakes on its own, but efforts to condemn virtually all platform
acquisitions would inevitably amplify such errors. It takes no great effort
to imagine critics condemning Yahoo had it taken its missed opportunities
with Google and Facebook, nor of cries of the sky is falling before the
errors of AOL, Microsoft, et al.’s misguided deals were revealed.410 To
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Feb.
23,
2016),
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/a-tale-of-two-brands-yahoos-mistakesvs-googles-mastery/ [https://perma.cc/BE6F-VCZL] (“While many credit Mayer with
leading the company’s transition to mobile, the shift was born out of necessity to catch
up with the world, not out of opportunity to change it. In fact, Yahoo has been
operating in reactive mode for the last decade.”).
408
Ablott, supra note 404.
409
Elizabeth Matsangou, The Tragic Demise of Yahoo, the Internet’s First
Great
Brand,
THE
NEW
ECON.
(Jun.
23,
2016),
https://www.theneweconomy.com/business/the-tragic-demise-of-yahoo-theinternets-first-great-brand [https://perma.cc/5W2M-5GBW].
410
Indeed, in the case of the latter deals, which actually happened, the
anticompetitive predictions are on the record. See, e.g., David Balto, Nokia and
Microsoft Alliance Raise Significant Competition Concerns, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct.
23, 2012, 6:24 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/nokia-microsoft_b_1582227
[https://perma.cc/H32W-A8YM] (“If regulators do not stop Microsoft and Nokia from
following this strategy, the immediate impact will likely be higher prices and reduced
innovation in mobile platforms. The long-term consequences are also dire—if
regulators sanction this type of predatory conduct, monopolists in all high-tech
industries will have a blueprint for excluding competitors.”); Robert H. Lande,
Venable Professor of Law, Univ. of Balt., Statement on Behalf of the American
Antitrust Institute at the Hearing on the America Online/Time Warner Merger Before
the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate (Feb.
3, 2020) (transcript available at https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/work-product/aaisenate-testimony-questions-aol-time-warner-merger/ [https://perma.cc/8R2C-GLFS])
(“We should distrust a media oligopoly because it is an undue concentration of control
in the hands of a few individuals. It should be stressed that this control need not
manifest itself as a price rise for the daily newspaper or in AOL’s monthly fee. Rather,
it could consist of a change in editorial viewpoints, a shift in the relative prominence
of links to certain websites, a bias against certain forms of entertainment, or a decision
not to cover certain topics because they are not ‘newsworthy.’ In each of these ways
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characterize such mergers as mere efforts to maintain or extend monopoly,
or engage in anticompetitive efforts to preclude competitors from
obtaining similar firms that might be necessary for their success, neglects
an enormous amount of the sort of behavior that causes businesses to fail
or succeed.
At the same time, it cannot be said that such a merger would have
been a “killer acquisition.” And it is important to note that many of the
transactions commonly criticized as having this character are more
accurately simple vertical mergers.411 But a great deal of the arguments
for preemptively condemning these mergers is rooted in concern over the
prospect of entry by a vertical competitor. Ignoring other possibilities, and
assuming away the possibility that mergers can lead to significant value
creation, would inevitably lead to an incomplete picture.

B. The Medtronic / Covidien “Killer Acquisition”
Medtronic’s acquisition of Covidien provides another salient
example of the pitfalls associated with pursuing “killer acquisition”
theories of harm. The main problem is simple: it is nearly impossible to
know what the future will look like (in the case of ex-ante reviews) and
what the present would look like absent some event (in the case of ex-post
reviews). And because, by definition, corporate mergers entail the
elimination of another firm, people will always be tempted to construe
small mergers as “killer acquisitions,” especially if doing so fits within
their broader agendas.412 Unfortunately, the subsequent interventions can
have significant consequences for the firms involved. This is precisely
what happened to Medtronic’s acquisition of Covidien.413 Scholars
seeking real-world confirmation of their theories pounced upon the
merger, despite an apparent lack of basis for their claims, ultimately
causing the Justice Department to open a probe into the transaction.414
In 2012, Covidien, a large health care products company and medical
device manufacturer, purchased Newport Medical Instruments,415 a small

mergers could significantly undermine diversity of offerings and, ultimately,
consumer choice.”).
411
See, e.g., Mathew Emmanuel Pineda, Vertical Integration vs. Horizontal
Integration:
Difference,
PROFOLUS
(Jan.
19,
2019),
https://www.profolus.com/topics/difference-between-vertical-integration-andhorizontal-integration/#google_vignette [https://perma.cc/G6E8-TUHE].
412
Marshall Hargrave, Merger, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 22, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/merger.asp [https://perma.cc/BJ5Y-3H7G].
413
See Kendall, supra note 315.
414
Id.
415
See Jaimy Lee, Covidien Agrees to Buy Newport Medical Instruments, MOD.
HEALTHCARE
(Mar.
22,
2012,
1:00
AM),
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ventilator developer and manufacturer. (Covidien itself was subsequently
purchased by Medtronic in 2015).416 Eight years later, in the midst of the
coronavirus pandemic, the New York Times published an article revisiting
the Covidien/Newport transaction and questioning whether it might have
contributed to the shortage of ventilators.417 The article speculated that
Covidien’s purchase of Newport, and the subsequent discontinuation of
Newport’s “Aura” ventilator, delayed U.S. government efforts to procure
mechanical ventilators until the second half of 2020—too late to treat the
first wave of COVID-19 patients.418
The article generated considerable interest from various antitrust
scholars, who quickly framed the deal as a so-called “killer acquisition.”419
For instance, Cunningham et al. cites the merger as a potential killer
acquisition.420 Unsurprisingly, politicians were also quick to jump on the
bandwagon. David Cicilline, the powerful chairman of the House
Antitrust Subcommittee, opined that “based on the reporting on this deal,
all signs point to the conclusion that this was a killer acquisition.” 421 And

https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20120322/NEWS/303229950/covidienagrees-to-buy-newport-medical-instruments [https://perma.cc/B8Z3-XYLF].
416
See Kendall, supra note 315.
417
See Nicholas Kulish et al., The U.S. Tried to Build a New Fleet of Ventilators.
The
Mission
Failed,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
20,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/29/business/coronavirus-us-ventilatorshortage.html [https://perma.cc/X8VS-BTXC].
418
Id. (“And then things suddenly veered off course. A multibillion-dollar
maker of medical devices bought the small California company that had been hired to
design the new machines. The project ultimately produced zero ventilators. That
failure delayed the development of an affordable ventilator by at least half a
decade, depriving hospitals, states and the federal government of the ability to stock
up . . . . Today, with the coronavirus ravaging America’s health care system, the
nation’s emergency-response stockpile is still waiting on its first shipment.”).
419
See, e.g., Florian Ederer (@florianederer), TWITTER (Mar. 29, 2020, 8:14
AM),
https://twitter.com/florianederer/status/1244251464521957378
[https://perma.cc/H2EN-S3KW] (“THE ULTIMATE KILLER ACQUISITION.
Officials and executives at rival ventilator companies suspected that Covidien had
acquired Newport to prevent it from building a cheaper product that would undermine
Covidien’s profits from its existing ventilator business.”); see also Einer Elhauge
(@elhauge),
TWITTER
(Mar.
29,
2020,
7:39
AM),
https://twitter.com/elhauge/status/1244242674913366018 [https://perma.cc/TQ5K92SE] (“This might be the ultimate killer acquisition.”).
420
Cunningham et al., supra note 8, at 696 (“For example, following recent
reports about an alleged killer acquisition in the medical ventilator industry, some FTC
officials have called for a retrospective antitrust investigation.”).
421
David Cicilline (@davidcicilline), TWITTER (Mar. 31, 2020, 11:51 AM),
https://twitter.com/davidcicilline/status/1245030914062770177
[https://perma.cc/U6XR-45BA].
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FTC Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter quickly called for
a retrospective review of the deal.422
These interventions raise a crucial issue. The New York Times story
opened the door to a welter of hasty conclusions offered to support the
ongoing narrative that antitrust enforcement has failed us—in this case
quite literally at the cost of human lives. But are any of these claims
actually supported? Unfortunately, the competitive realities of the
mechanical ventilator industry, as well as a more clear-eyed view of what
was likely going on with the failed government contract at the heart of the
story, simply do not support the “killer acquisition” story.
There is thus nothing to suggest that the merger materially impaired
competition in the mechanical ventilator market, or that it measurably
affected the United States’ efforts to fight COVID-19.

1. The Mechanical Ventilator Market is Highly Competitive
As explained above, “killer acquisitions” are less likely to occur in
competitive markets. A number of reports conclude that there is
significant competition in the mechanical ventilator industry.423 One
source cites at least seven large producers.424 Another report cites eleven
large players.425 The conclusion is further supported by the fact that the
five largest producers combined reportedly hold only 50% of the
market.426 In other words, available evidence suggests that none of these
firms has anything close to a monopoly position. This intense competition,
along with the small market shares of the merging firms, likely explains

See Ben Remaly, Ventilator Merger Scrutinized as Potential “Killer
Acquisition”,
GLOB.
COMPETITION
REV.
(Mar.
31,
2020),
https://globalcompetitionreview.com/ventilator-merger-scrutinised-potential-killeracquisition [https://perma.cc/FB8W-4DG5] (“The public reporting on this acquisition
raises important questions about the review of this deal. We should absolutely be
looking back to figure out what happened.”).
423
See, e.g., Jamie Bell, The Seven Biggest Medical Ventilator Manufacturers
Across the World by Market Share, NS MED. DEVICES (Mar. 24, 2020),
https://www.nsmedicaldevices.com/analysis/seven-ventilator-manufacturers/
[https://perma.cc/9L4A-H5CW]; see also DATAM INTELLIGENCE, MECHANICAL
VENTILATOR MARKET, SIZE, SHARE, OPPORTUNITIES AND FORECAST, 2020-2028
(2021)
(report
available
at
https://www.datamintelligence.com/researchreport/mechanical-ventilator-market [https://perma.cc/G9JU-9MNK]).
424
Id.
425
DATAM INTELLIGENCE, supra note 423.
426
RnR Mkt. Rsch., Global Ventilators Market—50% Market Share Held by 5
Top Companies, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Aug. 21, 2016, 12:45 PM),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/global-ventilators-market---50-marketshare-held-by-5-top-companies-591894561.html [https://perma.cc/LJE6-S7FY].
422
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why the FTC declined to open an in-depth investigation into Covidien’s
acquisition of Newport.427
Similarly, following preliminary investigations, neither the FTC nor
the European Commission saw the need for an in-depth look at the
ventilator market when they reviewed Medtronic’s subsequent acquisition
of Covidien (which closed in 2015).428 Although Medtronic did not
produce any mechanical ventilators before the acquisition, authorities
(particularly the European Commission) could nevertheless have analyzed
that market if Covidien’s presumptive market share was particularly
high.429 The fact that they declined to do so tends to suggest that the
ventilator market was relatively unconcentrated.

2. The Value of the Merger was Too Small
A second strong reason to believe that Covidien’s purchase of
Newport was not a killer acquisition is the acquisition’s value of $103
million.430 Indeed, if it was clear that Newport was about to revolutionize
the ventilator market, then Covidien would likely have been forced to pay
significantly more to acquire it (although, as explained above, multiple
factors ultimately affect such valuations).
The crux of the “killer acquisition” theory is that incumbents can
induce welfare-reducing acquisitions by offering to acquire their rivals for
significantly more than the present value of their rivals’ expected
profits.431 Because an incumbent undertaking a “killer” takeover expects
to earn monopoly profits as a result of the transaction, it can offer a
substantial premium and still profit from its investment.432 It is this basic

427

FTC, Early Termination Notice 20120682: Covidien plc; Yasuhiko Sata, FTC
(Apr.
24,
2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/premerger-notificationprogram/early-termination-notices/20120682 [https://perma.cc/4SHD-S9JW].
428
See id.; see also, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, MEDTRONIC/COVIDIEN
COMPETITION
POLICY
FORM
M.7326
(2014)
(available
at
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_732
6 [https://perma.cc/7UUC-XQWV]).
429
Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council
Regulation on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings 2004 O.J. (C 31)
5
(available
at
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52004XC0205(02)&from=EN
[https://perma.cc/6UBB-JK9R]).
430
Covidien Pub. Ltd. Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Sept. 27, 2013).
431
Geoffrey Manne & Dirk Auer, The Covidien/Newport Merger: Killer
Acquisition or Just a Killer Story?, TRUTH ON THE MKT. (Apr. 3, 2020),
https://truthonthemarket.com/2020/04/03/the-covidien-newport-merger-killeracquisition-or-just-a-killer-story/ [https://perma.cc/4YC4-WWND].
432
Id.
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asymmetry that drives the theory.433 Indeed, as Bryan and Hovenkamp
note:
[Where] a court may lack the expertise to [assess the commercial
significance of acquired technology]…, the transaction value… may
provide a reasonable proxy. Intuitively, if the startup is a relatively
small company with relatively few sales to its name, then a very high
acquisition price may reasonably suggest that the startup technology
has significant promise.434

The strategy only works, however, if the target firm’s shareholders
agree that share value properly reflects only “normal” expected profits,
and not that the target is poised to revolutionize its market with a uniquely
low-cost or high-quality product. Relatively low acquisition prices
relative to market size, therefore, tend to reflect low (or normal) expected
profits, and a low perceived likelihood of radical innovations occurring.
We can apply this reasoning to Covidien’s acquisition of Newport. For a
start, although precise and publicly available figures are hard to come by,
one estimate finds that the global ventilator market was worth $2.715
billion in 2012.435 Another report suggests that the global market was
worth $4.30 billion in 2018;436 still another that it was worth $4.58 billion
in 2019.437 Second, as noted above, Covidien reported to the SEC that it
paid $103
million to
purchase
Newport
(a
firm
that
produced only ventilators and apparently had no plans to branch
out).438 Finally, for context, at the time of the acquisition Covidien had
annual sales of $11.8 billion overall, and $743 million in sales of its
existing “Airways and Ventilation Products.”439

433

See Salop, supra note 125.
Bryan & Hovenkamp, Startup Acquisitions, Error Costs, and Antitrust
Policy, supra note 123, at 331.
435
Rising Global Geriatric Population and Technological Advancements
Propel Global Market for Mechanical Ventilators, TRANSPARENCY MKT. RSCH. (Nov.
27,
2015),
https://www.transparencymarketresearch.com/article/mechanicalventilators-market.htm [https://perma.cc/Z77W-XLFG].
436
GRAND VIEW RESEARCH, MECHANICAL VENTILATOR MARKET SIZE, SHARE
& TRENDS ANALYSIS REPORT, 2021 - 2028 (2021) (report available at
https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/mechanical-ventilatorsmarket [https://perma.cc/MT7A-XHD7]).
437
NEXT MOVE STRATEGY CONSULTING, MECHANICAL VENTILATORS MARKET
GLOBAL OPPORTUNITY ANALYSIS AND INDUSTRY FORECAST, 2020–2030 (2021)
(report available at https://www.nextmsc.com/report/mechanicalventilators-Market
[https://perma.cc/S7PN-HEBA]).
438
Covidien Pub. Ltd. Co., supra note 430; see also Kulish et al., supra note
417.
439
Covidien Pub. Ltd. Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Sept. 28, 2012).
434
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If the ventilator market was indeed worth billions of dollars per year,
then the comparatively small $108 million paid by Covidien – small even
relative to Covidien’s own share of the market – suggests that, at the time
of the acquisition, it was unlikely that Newport was poised to revolutionize
the market for mechanical ventilators (for instance, by successfully
bringing its Aura ventilator to market).
The New York Times article claimed that Newport’s ventilators
would be sold (at least to the U.S. government) for $3,000—a substantial
discount from the reportedly then-going rate of $10,000.440 If selling
ventilators at this price seemed credible at the time, then Covidien – as
well as Newport’s shareholders – knew that Newport was about to achieve
tremendous cost savings, enabling it to offer ventilators not only to the
U.S. government, but to purchasers around the world, at an irresistibly
attractive and profitable price.441 If achievable, Newport thus stood to earn
a substantial share of the profits in a multi-billion-dollar industry.
Of course, it is necessary to apply a probability to these numbers:
Newport’s ventilator was not yet on the market and had not yet received
FDA approval.442 Nevertheless, if the Times’ numbers seemed credible at
the time, then Covidien would surely have had to offer significantly more
than $108 million in order to induce Newport’s shareholders to part with
their shares. Given the low valuation, however, as well as the fact that
Newport produced other ventilators (and continues to do so to this day),443
there is no escaping the fact that everyone involved seemed to view
Newport’s Aura ventilator as nothing more than a moonshot with, at best,
a low likelihood of success.444 Crucially, this same reasoning explains
why it shouldn’t surprise anyone that the project was ultimately
discontinued; recourse to a “killer acquisition” theory is hardly
necessary.445

440

See Kulish et al., supra note 417.
Id. (“Ventilators at the time typically went for about $10,000 each, and
getting the price down to $3,000 would be tough. But Newport’s executives bet they
would be able to make up for any losses by selling the ventilators around the world.”).
442
NEWPORT MED. INSTRUMENTS, INC., 510K FORM K121891 (2012) (available
at
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfPMN/pmn.cfm?ID=K121891
[https://perma.cc/2TSR-LCN7]).
443
Mechanical
Ventilation,
MEDTRONIC,
https://www.medtronic.com/covidien/en-us/products/mechanical-ventilation.html
[https://perma.cc/E5EE-99BD] (last visited Sep. 3, 2021).
444
See Kulish et al., supra note 417.
445
Id. (“In 2014, with no ventilators having been delivered to the government .
. .. The government agreed to cancel the contract.”).
441
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3. Lessons from Covidien’s Ventilator Product Decisions
The killer acquisition claims are further weakened by at least four
other important pieces of information:
1.

Covidien initially continued to develop Newport’s Aura
ventilator,
and
continued
to
develop
and
sell
Newport’s other ventilators;446

2.

There was little overlap between Covidien and Newport’s
ventilators—or, at the very least, they were highly
differentiated;447

3.

Covidien appears to have discontinued production of its own
portable ventilator in 2014; 448 and

4.

The Newport purchase was part of a billion-dollar series of
acquisitions seemingly aimed at expanding Covidien’s in-hospital
(i.e., not-portable) device portfolio. 449

For a start, while the Aura line was indeed discontinued by Covidien,
the timeline is important. The acquisition of Newport by Covidien
was announced in March 2012, approved by the FTC in April of the same
year, and closed on May 1, 2012.450 However, as the FDA’s 510(k)
database makes clear, Newport submitted documents for FDA clearance
of the Aura ventilator months after its acquisition by Covidien (June 29,
2012, to be precise).451 And the Aura received FDA 510(k) clearance
on November 9, 2012—many months after the merger.452 It would have
made little sense for Covidien to invest significant sums in order to obtain
FDA clearance for a project that it planned to discontinue (the FDA
routinely requires parties to actively cooperate with it, even after 510(k)
applications are submitted). Moreover, if Covidien really did plan to

446

See Mechanical Ventilation, supra note 443.
Manne & Auer, supra note 431.
448
Id.
449
Id.
450
Covidien to Buy Ventilator Maker Newport for $108 Million, REUTERS (Mar.
22,
2012,
4:10
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-covidienidUSBRE82L16N20120322 [https://perma.cc/YH7Q-Z3QP]; Mark Hollmer,
Covidien Closes $108M Bid for Newport Medical, FIERCEBIOTECH (May 1, 2012),
https://www.fiercebiotech.com/medical-devices/covidien-closes-108m-bid-fornewport-medical [https://perma.cc/3NC7-KS3R]; Federal Trade Commission, supra
note 42727.
451
NEWPORT MED. INSTRUMENTS, INC., supra note 442.
451
Id.
452
Id.
447
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discreetly kill off the Aura ventilator, bungling the FDA clearance
procedure would have been the perfect cover under which to do so. Yet
that is not what it did.
Second, and just as importantly, Covidien (and subsequently
Medtronic) continued to sell Newport’s other ventilators.453 The
Newport e360 and HT70 are still sold today.454 Covidien also continued
to improve these products: it appears to have introduced an improved
version of the Newport HT70 Plus ventilator in 2013.455 If eliminating its
competitor’s superior ventilators was the only goal of the merger, then
why didn’t Covidien also eliminate these two products from its lineup,
rather than continue to improve and sell them?
Third, and perhaps the biggest flaw in the killer acquisition story, is
that there appears to have been very little overlap between Covidien and
Newport’s ventilators.456 This decreases the likelihood that the merger
was a killer acquisition.457 When two products are highly differentiated
(or not substitutes at all), sales of the first one are less likely to cannibalize
sales of the other.458 As Cunningham et al. put it:
Importantly, without any product market overlap, the acquirer never
has a strictly positive incentive to acquire the entrepreneur, neither to
“Acquire to Kill” nor to “Acquire to Continue.” This is because
without overlap, acquiring the project does not give the acquirer any
gains resulting from reduced competition, and the two bargaining
entities have exactly the same value for the project.459

A quick search of the FDA’s 510(k) database reveals that Covidien
has three approved lines of ventilators: the Puritan Bennett 980, 840, and
540 (apparently essentially the same as the Puritan Bennett 560, the plans
to which Medtronic recently made freely available in order to facilitate

453

Kendall, supra note 315.
NEWPORT MED. INSTRUMENTS, INC., 510K FORM K101803 (2010) (available
at https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpmn/pmn.cfm?ID=K101803
[https://perma.cc/CK2D-J346]); NEWPORT MED. INSTRUMENTS, INC., 510K FORM
K111146
(2011)
(available
at
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpmn/pmn.cfm?ID=K111146
[https://perma.cc/4NLQ-FRHH]); NEWPORT MED. INSTRUMENTS, INC., supra note
442.
455
Dan White, Full Featured Transport Ventilator in a Very Small Package,
EMS1
(Mar.
14,
2013),
https://www.ems1.com/ems-products/medicalequipment/airway-management/articles/full-featured-transport-ventilator-in-a-verysmall-package-xiWhuFBbJfNIOgOZ/ https://perma.cc/4PNK-HNVM[].
456
Manne & Auer, supra note 431.
457
Id.
458
Id.
459
Cunningham et al., supra note 8.
454
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production during the current crisis).460 The same database shows that
these ventilators differ markedly from Newport’s ventilators (particularly
the Aura).461 In particular, Covidien manufactured primarily traditional,
invasive ICU ventilators (except for the Puritan Bennett 540, which is
potentially a substitute for the Newport HT70), while Newport made
much-more-portable ventilators, suitable for home use (notably the Aura,
HT50 and HT70 lines).462 Under normal circumstances, critical care and
portable ventilators are not substitutes.463 As the WHO website explains,
portable ventilators are “designed to provide support to patients who do
not require complex critical care ventilators.”464 The conclusion that
Covidien and Newport’s ventilator were not substitutes finds further
support in documents and statements released at the time of the merger.465
For instance, Covidien’s CEO explained that, “This acquisition
is consistent with Covidien’s strategy to expand into adjacencies and
invest in product categories where it can develop a global competitive
advantage.”466
And that, “Newport’s products and technology
complement our current portfolio of respiratory solutions and will broaden
our ventilation platform for patients around the world, particularly in
emerging markets.”467 In short, the fact that almost all of Covidien and

460

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 510(k) Premarket Notification,
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpmn/pmn.cfm
[https://perma.cc/RW6J-HXMP] (last visited Aug. 31, 2021) (once the site has been
reached, put in the search word “Covidien” in the “Applicant Name” field to return
Covidien’s 501(k) submissions); see also Medtronic Shares Ventilation Design
Specifications to Accelerate Efforts to Increase Global Ventilator Production, MED.
ALLEY (Mar. 30, 2020), https://medicalalley.org/2020/03/medtronic-sharesventilation-design-specifications-to-accelerate-efforts-to-increase-global-ventilatorproduction/ [https://perma.cc/E3Q8-4HCY].
461
Id.
462
GARY WHITE, EQUIPMENT THEORY FOR RESPIRATORY CARE 460 (5th ed.
2014).
463
Ventilator,
Portable,
WHO
(2011),
https://www.who.int/medical_devices/innovation/ventilator_portable.pdf?ua=1
[https://perma.cc/5SRW-CJDV].
464
Id.
465
Covidien Announces Definitive Agreement to Acquire Newport Medical
Instruments,
Inc.,
BUS.
WIRE
(Mar.
22,
2012,
4:00
PM),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120322005909/en/CovidienAnnounces-Definitive-Agreement-to-Acquire-Newport-Medical-Instruments-Inc
[https://perma.cc/37JS-RQUF].
466
Covidien Grabs Newport Medical Instruments for $108 Million, MASS
DEVICE (Mar. 22, 2012), https://www.massdevice.com/covidien-grabs-newportmedical-instruments-108-million/ [https://perma.cc/N9WT-YEPZ].
467
Covidien Completes Acquisition of Newport Medical Instruments, Inc.,
BUSINESSWIRE
(May
1,
2012),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120501006724/en/Covidien-
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Newport’s products were not substitutes further undermines the killer
acquisition story. It also tends to vindicate the FTC’s decision to rapidly
terminate its investigation of the merger.468
Fourth, it appears that Covidien discontinued production of
its own competing, portable ventilator (the Puritan Bennett 560) in
2014.469
The
product
is
reported
on
the
company’s 2011, 2012 and 2013 annual reports.470 Surely if Covidien had
intended to capture the portable ventilator market by killing off its
competition it would have continued to actually sell its own, competing
device. The fact that the only portable ventilators produced by Covidien
in 2014 were those it acquired in the Newport deal strongly suggests that
its objective in that deal was the acquisition and deployment of Newport’s
viable and profitable technologies—not the abandonment of them. This,
in turn, suggests that the Aura was not a viable and profitable
technology.471

Completes-Acquisition-Newport-Medical-Instruments
[https://perma.cc/E6HLKPMB].
468
FTC Early Termination Notice, supra note 427.
469
Covidien Pub. Ltd. Co., (Form 10-K), supra note 430.
470
Covidien Pub. Ltd. Co., (Form 10-K), supra note 430. The PB540 was
launched in 2009; the updated PB560 in 2010. Puritan Bennett 540, a New Covidien
Ventilator With Smart Battery Technology, MEDGADGET (Mar. 31 2009),
https://www.medgadget.com/2009/03/puritan_bennett_540_a_new_covidien_ventila
tor_with_smart_battery_technology.html
[https://perma.cc/FM8Z-KYCL].
The PB520 was the EU version of the device, launched in 2011. New Mobile Puritan
Bennett
Ventilator
for
EU,
MEDGADGET
(Jan.
24,
2011),
https://www.medgadget.com/2011/01/new_mobile_puritan_bennett_ventilator_for_e
u.html [https://perma.cc/8FMN-CD5P]. But in 2014, the PB560 was no longer listed
among the company’s ventilator products (“Airway & Ventilation, which primarily
includes sales of airway, ventilator and inhalation therapy products and breathing
systems. Key airway & ventilation products include: the Puritan Bennett™ 840 and
980 ventilators, the Newport™ e360 and HT70 ventilators. . . .”). Covidien Pub. Ltd.
Co., (Form 10-K), supra note 430. Nor, despite its March 31 and April 1 “open
sourcing” of the specifications and software necessary to enable others to produce the
PB560, did Medtronic appear to have restarted production, and the company did not
mention the device in its March 18 press release announcing its own, stepped-up
ventilator production plans. Correction: Medtronic Continuing to Increase Ventilator
Production to Address COVID-19 Pandemic, MEDTRONIC (Mar. 18, 2020)
https://news.medtronic.com/2020-03-18-Correction-Medtronic-Continuing-toIncrease-Ventilator-Production-to-Address-COVID-19-Pandemic
[https://perma.cc/J4XN-AG2Z]; Our Ventilator Specifications. Your Ingenuity,
MEDTRONIC (last visited Jun. 3, 2021), https://www.medtronic.com/us-en/e/openfiles.html?cmpid=vanity_url_medtronic_com_openventilator_Corp_US_Covid19_F
Y20 [https://perma.cc/KMY6-5J9A].
471
Admittedly we are unable to determine conclusively that either Covidien or
Medtronic stopped producing the PB520/540/560 series of ventilators. But our
research seems to indicate strongly that this is indeed the case.
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Finally, although not dispositive, it seems important to put the
Newport purchase into context. In the same year as it purchased Newport,
Covidien paid more than a billion dollars to acquire five other companies,
all of them primarily producing in-hospital medical devices.472 That 2012
spending spree came on the heels of a series of previous medical device
company acquisitions, apparently totaling approximately four billion
dollars.473
Although not exclusively so, the acquisitions undertaken by Covidien
seem to have been primarily targeted at operating room and in-hospital
monitoring and treatment, making the putative focus on cornering the
portable (home and emergency) ventilator market an extremely unlikely
one. By the time Covidien was purchased by Medtronic the deal easily
cleared antitrust review because of the lack of overlap between the
company’s products, with Covidien’s focusing predominantly on inhospital, “diagnostic, surgical, and critical care” and Medtronic’s on postacute care.474
So why was the Aura ventilator discontinued? Although it is almost
impossible to know what motivated Covidien’s executives, the Aura
ventilator project clearly suffered from many problems.475 The Aura
project was intended to meet the requirements of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services’ Biomedical Research and Development
Authority.476 In short, the program sought to create a stockpile of next
generation ventilators for emergency situations—including, notably,
pandemics.477 The ventilator would thus have to be designed for
events where “mass casualties may be expected, and when shortages of
experienced health care providers with respiratory support training, and
shortages of ventilators and accessory components may be expected.”478

472

Covidien (Form 10-K), supra note 430.
Covidien Acquisitions Keeps Buying Spree Alive, IN VIVO (Apr. 23, 2012),
https://invivo.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/IV003839/Covidien-AcquisitionsKeeps-Buying-Spree-Alive [https://perma.cc/HUF3-BG6F].
474
Manne & Auer, supra note 431.
475
Medtronic Statement Regarding New York Times Article on March 29, 2020,
MEDTRONIC (Mar. 29, 2020), https://news.medtronic.com/2020-03-29-MedtronicStatement-Regarding-New-York-Times-Article-on-March-29-2020
[https://perma.cc/T2YW-NUK6].
476
Advanced Development of Next Generation Portable Ventilators, SAM.GOV
(Sep.
2,
2009),
https://sam.gov/opp/20a5c00362b44291906bb5d5644c9276/view#general
[https://perma.cc/C6MJ-Z9NU].
477
Brendon Nafziger, BARDA Funds Cheap Ventilators for Horror Scenarios,
DOTMED
(Sept.
30,
2010),
https://de.dotmed.com/news/story/14387
[https://perma.cc/U7H5-HWRZ].
478
Advanced Development of Next Generation Portable Ventilators, supra note
476.
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The Aura ventilator would thus sit somewhere between Newport’s
two other ventilators: the e360 (which could be used in pediatric care but
not intended for home care use) and the more portable HT70 (which could
be used for home care, but not pediatric care).479 Unfortunately, the Aura
failed to achieve this goal.480
The FDA’s 510(k) clearance
decision implies that the Aura was not intended for newborns.481 A press
release issued by Medtronic confirms that “the company was unable to
secure FDA approval for use in neonatal populations—a contract
requirement.”482 And the U.S. Government RFP confirms that this was
indeed an important requirement.483 Newport also seems to have been
unable to deliver the ventilator at the low price it had initially forecasted—
a common problem for small companies and/or companies that undertake
large R&D programs.484 It also struggled to complete the project within
the agreed-upon deadlines.485 This is supported by a Medtronic press
release which explains that it was unable to achieve the production cost
and performance requirements specified in the government contract.486 As
Jason Crawford, an engineer and tech industry commentator, put it:
“Projects fail all the time. ‘Supplier risk’ should be a standard checkbox
on anyone’s contingency planning efforts. This is even more so when you
deliberately push the price down to 30% of the market rate. Newport did
not even necessarily expect to be profitable on the contract.”487

479

Id.; NEWPORT MED. INSTRUMENTS, INC., 510K FORM K101803, supra note
454; NEWPORT MED. INSTRUMENTS, INC., 510K FORM K111146 supra note 454.
480
Medtronic, supra note 475.
481
NEWPORT MED. INSTRUMENTS, INC., 510K FORM K121891 (2012) (available
at
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf12/K121891.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BW8G-AJ3K]) (The AURA family of ventilators is applicable for
infant, pediatric and adult patients greater than or equal to 5 kg (11 lbs.)).
482
Medtronic, supra note 475.
483
Advanced Development of Next Generation Portable Ventilators, supra note
476 (“The device must be able to provide the same standard of performance as current
FDA pre-market cleared portable ventilators and shall have the following additional
characteristics or features: . . . Flexibility to accommodate a wide patient population
range from neonate to adult.”).
484
Medtronic, supra note 475.
485
Id.
486
Id. (“Covidien learned that Newport’s work on the ventilator design for the
Government had significant gaps between what it had promised the Government and
what it could deliver—both in terms of being able to achieve the cost of production
specified in the contract and product features and performance. Covidien management
questioned whether Newport’s ability to complete the project as agreed to in the
contract was realistic.”).
487
Jason Crawford, What Went Wrong With the Ventilator Stockpile?, JASON
CRAWFORD (Apr. 1, 2020), https://jasoncrawford.org/what-went-wrong-with-theventilator-stockpile [https://perma.cc/RD3U-NGC6].
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The above is mostly Covidien’s “side” of the story, of course. But
other pieces of evidence lend credibility to these claims:
1.

Newport agreed to deliver its Aura ventilator at a per unit cost of
less than $3000. But, even today, this seems extremely ambitious.
For instance, the WHO has estimated that portable ventilators cost
between $3,300 and $13,500.488 If Newport could profitably sell
the Aura at such a low price, then there was little reason to
discontinue it.

2.

Covidien/Newport is not the only firm to have struggled to offer
suitable ventilators at such a low price. Philips (which took
Newport’s place after the government contract fell through)
also failed to achieve this low price.489 Rather than the $2,000
price sought in the initial RFP, Philips ultimately agreed to
produce the ventilators for $3,280.490 But it has not yet been able
to produce a single ventilator under the government contract at
that price.491

3.

Covidien has repeatedly been forced to recall some of its other
ventilators492—including the Newport HT70.
And rival
manufacturers have also faced these types of issues.493

488

WHO, supra note 463.
Patricia Callahan, Sebastian Rotella & Tim Golden, Taxpayers Paid Millions
to Design a Low-Cost Ventilator for a Pandemic. Instead, the Company Is Selling
Versions
of
It
Overseas,
PROPUBLICA
(Mar.
30,
2020),
https://www.propublica.org/article/taxpayers-paid-millions-to-design-a-low-costventilator-for-a-pandemic-instead-the-company-is-selling-versions-of-it-overseas[https://perma.cc/64NR-4KFS].
490
Id.
491
Id.
492
Class 1 Device Recall Newport Medical” HT70 and HT70 Plus Ventilators,
FDA
(Apr.
10,
2017),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfres/res.cfm?id=154521
[https://perma.cc/SU7D-964N]; Class 2 Device Recall Newport HT50 Ventilator,
FDA
(May
27,
2011),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfres/res.cfm?id=99743
[https://perma.cc/3WYH-LE3S]; see also Covidien Ventilator Woes Continue, MED.
EXPO, https://trends.medicalexpo.com/project-44943.html [https://perma.cc/DA9U3GFT ] (last visited June 3, 2021); and F.A. Kelley, Newport Medical Instruments’
Ventilators Recalled Due to Problems with Battery Backup, PUB. HEALTH WATCHDOG
(May 2, 2013), http://www.publichealthwatchdog.com/newport-medical-instrumentsventilators-recalled-due-to-problems-with-battery-backup/ [https://perma.cc/HE6R6C2Q].
493
Dräger, Dräger issues voluntary nationwide recall of optional PS500 power
supply for Evita V500 and Babylog VN500 ventilators, PRNEWSWIRE (Apr. 2, 2014),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/draeger-issues-voluntary-nationwide489

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss4/5

102

Manne et al.: Technology Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control

2021]

TECHNOLOGY MERGERS AND CORPORATE CONTROL

1149

Accordingly, Covidien may well have preferred to cut its losses on
the already problem-prone Aura project before similar issues rendered it
even more costly.
In short, while it is impossible to prove that these development issues
caused Covidien to pull the plug on the Aura project, it is certainly
plausible that they did. This further supports the hypothesis that
Covidien’s acquisition of Newport was not a killer acquisition.

4. Ending the Aura Project Might have been an Efficient Outcome
As suggested above, it is entirely possible that Covidien was better
able to realize the poor prospects of Newport’s Aura project and better
organized to enable it to make the requisite decision to abandon the
project. A small company like Newport faces greater difficulties
abandoning entrepreneurial projects because doing so can impair a
privately held firm’s ability to raise funds for subsequent projects.494
Moreover, the relatively large share of revue and reputation that Newport
– worth $103 million in 2012, versus Covidien’s $11.8 billion – would
have realized from fulfilling a substantial U.S. government project could
well have induced it to overestimate the project’s viability and to
undertake excessive risk in the (vain) hope of bringing the project to
fruition.495
While there is a tendency among antitrust scholars, enforcers, and
practitioners to look for (and find) antitrust-related rationales for mergers
and other corporate conduct, it remains the case that most corporate
control transactions (such as mergers) are driven by the acquiring firm’s
expectation that it can manage more efficiently.496 As Henry G. Manne
put it in Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control:
Since, in a world of uncertainty, profitable transactions will be entered
into more often by those whose information is relatively more reliable,
it should not surprise us that mergers within the same industry have
been a principal form of changing corporate control. Reliable
information is often available to suppliers and customers as well. Thus
many vertical mergers may be of the control takeover variety rather
than of the “foreclosure of competitors” or scale-economies type.497

recall-of-optional-ps500-power-supply-for-evita-v500-and-babylog-vn500ventilators-253574251.html [https://perma.cc/5WZF-6SQY].
494
Augustin Landier, Entrepreneurship and the Stigma of Failure (2006),
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/alandier/pdfs/stigma9.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZB3GMK3U].
495
Covidien Pub. Ltd. Co., (Form 10-K), supra note 430.
496
Manne, supra note 15, at 113.
497
Id. at 118–19.
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Of course, the same information that renders an acquiring firm in the
same line of business knowledgeable enough to operate a target more
efficiently could also enable it to affect a “killer acquisition” strategy.
But the important point is that a takeover by a firm with a competing
product line, after which the purchased company’s product line is
abandoned, is at least as consistent with a “market for corporate
control” story as with a “killer acquisition” story. The story also falls
prey to what Ronald Coase derisively called “blackboard economics”,
that is a tendency to shoehorn policy issues into theoretical models
detached from reality.498

Numerous commentators rushed to fit the story to their preconceived
narratives, failing to undertake even a rudimentary examination of the
underlying market conditions before they voiced their recriminations.499
But the only thing that Covidien and Newport’s merger ostensibly had in
common with the killer acquisition theory was the fact that a large firm
purchased a small rival, and that the one of the small firm’s products was
discontinued.500 But this does not even begin to meet the stringent
conditions that must be fulfilled for the theory to hold water.
Unfortunately, critics appear to have completely ignored all contradicting
evidence.

VII. THE PROBLEM WITH PROPOSED POLICY RESPONSES
The previous sections have argued that there is little evidence to
suggest that there are currently significant innovation-related gaps in
merger enforcement. This is not to say that some innovation-reducing
transactions do not slip through the cracks under existing regimes. If
plugging these blind spots was costless – both in terms of administrative
costs and false positives – then the antitrust reforms proposed by
proponents of tougher enforcement would be unobjectionable. But, of
course, this is not the case. We have already argued above that the relevant
economic research does not offer reliable proxies that might enable
authorities to sort harmful from procompetitive conduct in an error-cost
minimizing manner. But that is only part of the problem. Indeed, as we
explain below, the antitrust reforms that have been suggested to plug
perceived enforcement gaps would generate significant costs that further
weigh against their implementation.
498
Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, UNIV. OF CHI.
L. SCH. OCCASIONAL PAPERS NO. 28 (1992). (“What is studied is a system which lives
in the minds of economists but not on earth. I have called the result “blackboard
economics.” The firm and the market appear by name but they lack any substance.
The firm in mainstream economic theory has often been described as a “black box.”
And so it is.”).
499
See supra notes 419 and 421 and accompanying text.
500
Kulish, supra note 417.
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A. Ex-Post Merger Reviews
Conducting ex-post merger reviews is one of the most obvious ways
for antitrust authorities and plaintiffs to challenge potential killer
acquisitions (as well as other transactions that might have reduced
innovation).501 Indeed, procedures of this sort are likely permitted under
existing law.502 However, these retroactive reviews present significant
social costs and entail important practical difficulties that undermine their
value as an antitrust policy tool.503
The complaints filed by the Federal Trade Commission and forty-six
state attorneys general (along with the District of Columbia and the
Territory of Guam) against Facebook offered an interesting insight into
the perils of ex-post merger reviews: The DC Circuit dismissed both
complaints, and the FTC has re-filed a modified complaint.504 In both
cases, the crux of the argument was that Facebook pursued a series of
acquisitions over the past decade that aimed to cement its prominent
position in the “personal social media networking” market.505 If
successfully prosecuted these cases would represent one of the most
fundamental shifts in antitrust law since passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act in 1976.506 That law required antitrust authorities to be notified of
proposed mergers and acquisitions that exceed certain value thresholds,
essentially shifting the paradigm for merger enforcement from expost to ex-ante review.507 While the prevailing paradigm does not
explicitly preclude antitrust enforcers from taking a second bite of the
apple via ex-post enforcement, it has created an assumption among that

See, e.g., Hemphill & Wu, supra note 121, at 1909 (“Enforcement agencies
must be ready to intervene ex post when a pattern of anticompetitive conduct becomes
clearer. As we have explained, ex post enforcement is sometimes inevitable and has
some desirable features. The distinctive setting of nascent competition tends to lend
support to later evaluation and to longstanding remedial proposals that incorporate ex
post scrutiny, such as conditional clearance that effectively places a merger on
parole.”).
502
See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Facebook, Inc., No. CV 20-3590 (JEB), 2021 WL
2643627, at *18 (D.D.C. June 28, 2021).
503
Id.
504
Dismissed Complaint, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv03590 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 13, 2021); see also New York v. Facebook, Inc., No. CV 203589 (JEB), 2021 WL 2643724, at *28–29 (D.D.C. June 28, 2021).
505
See Facebook, Inc., 2021 WL 2643724, at *1; Dismissed Complaint, Fed.
Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03590 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 13, 2021).
506
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, Pub.L. 94–435, 90 Stat.
1383 (1976).
507
15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (2000).
501
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regulatory clearance of a merger makes subsequent antitrust proceedings
extremely unlikely.508
Indeed, the very point of ex-ante merger regulations is that expost enforcement, particularly in the form of breakups, has tremendous
social costs.509 It can scupper economies of scale and network effects on
which both consumers and firms have come to rely.510 Moreover, the
threat of costly subsequent legal proceedings will hang over firms’ preand post-merger investment decisions and may thus reduce incentives to
invest.511 With their complaints, the FTC and state AGs threatened to undo
this status quo.512 Even if current antitrust law allows it, pursuing this
course of action threatens to quash the implicit assumption that regulatory
clearance generally shields a merger from future antitrust scrutiny.513 Expost review of mergers and acquisitions does also entail some positive
features,514 but the Facebook complaints failed to consider these
508
Dirk Auer, Facebook and the Pros and Cons of Ex Post Merger Reviews,
INT’L CTR. L. & ECON. (Dec. 11, 2020), https://laweconcenter.org/resource/facebookand-the-pros-and-cons-of-ex-post-merger-reviews/?pdf=10377
[https://perma.cc/UV2F-KKLM] [hereinafter Pros and Cons of Ex Post Merger
Reviews].
509
Id.
510
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 113 (2d ed. 2009) (“Nor can
the problem of reducing concentration without sacrificing possible efficiencies, scale
and otherwise, with which concentration might be associated be swept under the rug
by positing that efficiency is not an important factor in concentration. It is undoubtedly
important in explaining persistently high concentration. . . .”). This might be
particularly relevant in digital industries where network effects provide significant
benefits to consumers, as evidenced by recent empirical research. See, e.g., Chiara
Farronato, Jessica Fong & Andrey Fradkin, Dog Eat Dog: Measuring Network Effects
Using a Digital Platform Merger 33 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper
No. 28047, 2020) (“To maximize user surplus, should we increase competition or
allow monopolies? On one hand, competition among platforms may keep commission
fees down so that the share of total surplus going to platform users—buyers and
sellers—is maximized. On the other hand, if network effects are large enough such
that it is more efficient to have all users participating on a single platform rather than
having users spread across multiple platforms, efficiency may counterbalance the
costs of a monopolistic position.”).
511
See Pros and Cons of Ex Post Merger Reviews, supra note 508.
512
Dismissed Complaint, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv03590 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 13, 2021); see also New York v. Facebook, Inc., No. CV 203589 (JEB), 2021 WL 2643724, at *28–29 (D.D.C. June 28, 2021).
513
See Pros and Cons of Ex Post Merger Reviews, supra note 508.
514
See, e.g., Prepared Remarks of Commissioner Noah Joshua Phillips, supra
note 12, at 9 (“In these cases, we have evidence of what happened after the merger.
We cannot ignore evidence of reality; and I think we need to weight it above
speculation, especially where that speculation is not itself supported by evidence.
Depending on what that evidence shows, comparing harms and benefits may now be
more straightforward. If, after the merger, prices go up or output goes down relative
to some reliable proxy for the but-for world, that should give us confidence that the
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complicated trade-offs. And failure by the courts to correct this oversight
could have hampered tech and other U.S. industries.

1. Mergers and Uncertainty
Merger decisions are probabilistic. Of the thousands of corporate
acquisitions each year, only a fraction can be deemed “successful.”515
These relatively few success stories must pay for the duds in order to
preserve the incentive to invest. Switching from ex-ante to ex-post review
enables authorities to focus their attention on the most lucrative deals. It
stands to reason that they will not want to launch ex-post antitrust
proceedings against bankrupt firms whose assets have already been
stripped. Instead, as with the Facebook complaint, authorities are far more
likely to pursue high-profile cases that boost their political capital.
This would not be a large concern if: (i) authorities could commit to
ex-post prosecution only of anticompetitive mergers; and (ii) parties could
reasonably anticipate whether their deals would be deemed
anticompetitive in the future. If those were the conditions, ex-post
enforcement would merely reduce the incentive to partake in problematic
mergers; it would leave welfare-enhancing deals unscathed. But where
firms could not have ex-ante knowledge that a given deal would be
deemed anticompetitive, the associated error-costs should weigh against
prosecuting such mergers ex-post, even if such enforcement might appear
desirable. The deterrent effect that would arise from such prosecutions
would be applied by the market to all mergers, including efficient ones.
Put differently, authorities might get the ex-post assessment right in one
case, but the bigger picture remains that they could be wrong in many other
cases. Firms will perceive this threat and it may hinder their investments.
There is also reason to doubt that either of the ideal conditions for expost enforcement could realistically be met in practice. Ex-ante merger
proceedings involve significant uncertainty. Indeed, antitrust-merger
clearance decisions routinely have an impact on the merging parties’ stock

monopolist’s acquisition violated Section 2. Correlatively, if prices actually go down
or output actually goes up, and we lack a good reason to believe that would have
happened otherwise, those facts ought to weigh heavily against speculation about a
better world that might have been.”).
515
See, e.g., Richard Schoenberg, Measuring the performance of corporate
acquisitions: An empirical comparison of alternative metrics, 17 BRIT J. MGMT. 361
(2006) (“The choice of performance measure has long been a difficult issue facing
researchers. This article investigates the comparability of four common measures of
acquisition performance: cumulative abnormal returns, managers’ assessments,
divestment data and expert informants’ assessments. Independently each of these
measures indicated a mean acquisition success rate of between 44–56%, within a
sample of British crossborder acquisitions.”).
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prices.516 If management and investors knew whether their transactions
would be cleared, those effects would be priced-in when a deal is
announced, not when it is cleared or blocked. Indeed, if firms knew a
given merger would be blocked, they would not waste their resources
pursuing it. This demonstrates that ex-ante merger proceedings involve
uncertainty for the merging parties.
Unless the answer is markedly different for ex-post reviews,
authorities should proceed with caution. If parties cannot properly selfassess their deals, the threat of ex-post proceedings will weigh on pre- and
post-merger investments.517 Furthermore, because authorities will likely
focus ex-post reviews on the most lucrative deals, the incentive effects are
particularly pronounced. Parties may fear that the most successful mergers
will be broken up. This could have wide-reaching effects for all merging
firms that do not know whether they might become “the next Facebook.”
Accordingly, for ex-post merger reviews to be justified, it is essential
that their outcomes be predictable for the parties, and that analyzing the
deals after the fact leads to better decision-making (fewer false acquittals
and convictions) than ex-ante reviews would yield. If these conditions are
not in place, ex-post assessments will needlessly weigh down innovation,
investment, and procompetitive merger activity in the economy.

2. Hindsight Does Not Disentangle Efficiency from Market Power
So, could ex-post merger reviews be so predictable and effective as
to alleviate the uncertainties described above, along with the costs they
entail? Based on the recently filed Facebook complaints, the answer
appears to be no. We simply do not know what the counterfactual to
Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp would look like.
Hindsight does not dispositively tell us whether Facebook’s acquisitions
led to efficiencies that allowed it to thrive (a pro-competitive scenario), or
whether Facebook merely used these deals to kill off competitors and

516

Though it is difficult to draw normative inferences from these price
movements. See, e.g., Oliver Budzinski, Impact Evaluation of Merger Control
Decisions, 9 EUR. COMPETITION J. 199, 212–16 (2013) (“There is no indication that
financial market reactions represent an accurate prediction of the competitive effects;
however, there is ample indication to the contrary.”). For a discussion of the impact
of antitrust case filings on stock prices, see George Bittlingmayer, Stock Returns, Real
Activity, and the Trust Question, 47 J. FIN. 1701, 1727 (1992) (“Using quarterly returns
for 1904–1944, I find that each case filed is associated with a decline of the Dow of
one-half percentage point, after adjusting for changes in the level of production and
inflation. These results also hold up for three major subperiods, although the per case
effects are higher in 1904-1914 and in 1915-1928.”).
517
A breakup effectively amounts to expropriating investments that are
dependent upon the divested assets.
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maintain its monopoly (an anticompetitive scenario).518 In fact, contrary
to what some have argued, hindsight might even complicate matters, as it
inherently biases contemporary takes on the Facebook/Instagram merger.
For instance, it seems almost self-evident with hindsight that Facebook
would succeed and that entry in the social media space would occur only
at the fringes of existing platforms (the combined Facebook/Instagram
platform)—which the emergence of TikTok, offering a distinct form of
media, reflects. At the time of the merger, however, such an outcome was
anything but a foregone conclusion.519
In other words, ex-post reviews will, by definition, focus on mergers
where today’s outcomes seem preordained, when, in fact, they were
probabilistic. This will skew decisions toward finding anticompetitive
conduct. If authorities think that Instagram was destined to become great,
they are more likely to find that Facebook’s acquisition was
anticompetitive because they implicitly dismiss the idea that it was the
merger itself that made Instagram great.
Authorities might also confuse correlation for causation. For
instance, the state AGs’ complaint tied Facebook’s acquisitions of
Instagram and WhatsApp to the degradation of these services, particularly
in terms of privacy and advertising loads. As the complaint explained:
127. Following

the acquisition, Facebook also degraded
Instagram users’ privacy by matching Instagram and
Facebook Blue accounts so that Facebook could use
information that users had shared with Facebook Blue to
serve ads to those users on Instagram.

180. Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp thus substantially

lessened competition…. Moreover, Facebook’s subsequent
degradation of the acquired firm’s privacy features reduced
consumer choice by eliminating a viable, competitive,
privacy-focused option.520
But these changes may have nothing to do with Facebook’s
acquisition of these services. At the time, nearly all tech startups focused
on growth over profits in their formative years.521 It should be no surprise
that the platforms imposed higher “prices” to users after their acquisition
518

See discussion, supra Section V.A.
See Section V.A.1 for a more detailed discussion.
520
Complaint, State of New York, et al. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03589JEB (D.C. Cir. filed Jun. 28, 2021).
521
See, e.g., Erin Griffith, Silicon Valley Is Trying Out a New Mantra: Make a
Profit,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
8,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/technology/silicon-valley-startup-profit.html
[https://perma.cc/SAY7-2MQN].
519
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by Facebook; they were maturing.522 Further monetizing their platform
would have been the logical next step, even absent the mergers.
It is just as hard to determine whether post-merger developments
actually harmed consumers. For example, the FTC complaint argued that
Facebook stopped developing its own photo-sharing capabilities after the
Instagram acquisition, which the Commission cited as evidence that the
deal neutralized a competitor:
98. Less than two weeks after the acquisition was announced,

Mr. Zuckerberg suggested canceling or scaling back
investment in Facebook’s own mobile photo app as a direct
result of the Instagram deal.523
But it is not obvious that Facebook or consumers would have gained
anything from the duplication of R&D efforts if Facebook continued to
develop its own photo-sharing app.
More importantly, this
discontinuation is not evidence that Instagram could have overthrown
Facebook. In other words, the fact that Instagram provided better photosharing capabilities does necessarily imply that it could also provide a
versatile platform that posed a threat to Facebook.
Finally, if Instagram’s stellar growth and photo-sharing capabilities
were certain to overthrow Facebook’s monopoly, why do the plaintiffs
ignore the competitive threat posed by the likes of TikTok today? Neither
of the complaints made any mention of TikTok and its more than 1 billion
monthly active users.524 Instead, the FTC and state AGs would have us
believe that Instagram posed an existential threat to Facebook in 2012 but
that Facebook faces no such threat from TikTok (or other similar platforms
like SnapChat) today.525 It is exceedingly unlikely that both these
statements could be true, yet both are essential to the plaintiffs’ case. That
is, if we do not believe that TikTok could overthrow Facebook today, then
there is little reason to believe that Instagram could have done so in 2012
given the similarities between these platforms. At the same time, if
TikTok and similar platforms were acknowledged as actual or potential
competitors today, it would be much more difficult for the plaintiffs to
maintain that Facebook enjoys monopoly power in the relevant market.
522

See Pros and Cons of Ex Post Merger Reviews, supra note 508.
Complaint, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03590 (D.C.
Cir. filed Jan. 13, 2021).
524
See, e.g., Sarah Perez, New Forecast Pegs TikTok to Top 1.2B Monthly Active
Users
in
2021,
TECHCRUNCH
(Nov.
10,
2020),
https://techcrunch.com/2020/11/10/new-forecast-pegs-tiktok-to-top-1-2b-monthlyactive-users-in-2021/ [https://perma.cc/N5GH-QG6M].
525
Dismissed Complaint, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv03590 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 13, 2021). See also New York v. Facebook, Inc., No. CV 203589 (JEB), 2021 WL 2643724, at *28–29 (D.D.C. June 28, 2021).
523
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3. Appropriate Responses
None of this is to say that ex-post review of mergers and acquisitions
should be categorically out of the question. Indeed, relative to prospective
nascent or potential competitor reviews, consummated merger reviews
may be relatively better informed.526 Rather, such proceedings should be
initiated only with appropriate caution and consideration for their broader
consequences.
When undertaking reviews of past mergers, authorities do not
necessarily need to impose remedies every time they find a merger was
wrongly cleared. The findings of these ex-post reviews could simply be
used to adjust existing merger thresholds and presumptions. This would
effectively create a feedback loop where false acquittals lead to
meaningful policy reforms in the future. At the very least, it may be
appropriate for policymakers to set a higher bar for findings of
anticompetitive harm and imposition of remedies in such cases. This
could, for example, be done by requiring authorities to intervene within
predetermined deadlines, imposing higher evidentiary thresholds, limiting
ex-post cases to certain predetermined fact patterns, or even requiring
authorities to announce on what grounds they might subsequently
intervene. This would reduce the undesirable deterrent effects that such
reviews may otherwise entail, while reserving ex-post remedies for the
most problematic cases. If these conditions were met, a tougher system
of ex-post review could enable authorities to take more risks during exante proceedings. Indeed, when in doubt, they could effectively
experiment by allowing marginal mergers to proceed, with the
understanding that bad decisions could be clawed back afterwards. In that
regard, it might also be useful to set precise deadlines for such reviews and
to outline the types of concerns that might prompt scrutiny or warrant
divestitures.
In short, some form of ex-post review may well be desirable. It could
help antitrust authorities to learn what works and subsequently to make
useful changes to ex-ante merger-review systems. But this would
necessitate deep reflection on the many ramifications of expost reassessments. Legislative reform or, at the least, publication of
guidance documents by authorities, seem like essential first
steps. Unfortunately, this is the exact opposite of what the Facebook
proceedings would achieve. Plaintiffs have chosen to ignore these
526
See, e.g., Hemphill & Wu, supra note 121, at 1905 (“Due to this forwardlooking posture, the enforcement agency and the court, considering an acquisition of
a nascent competitor before the fact, are in the unusual position where delay may be
expected, in some respects, to increase the accuracy of decision. Facts that the enforcer
has trouble seeing today often become clearer later. There may be costs to waiting—
notably, the difficulty and disruptiveness of after-the-fact divestiture, if that is the
chosen remedy—but accuracy considerations tend to favor delay.”).
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complex trade-offs in pursuit of a case with extremely dubious underlying
merits. Success for the plaintiffs would thus prove a pyrrhic victory,
destroying far more than it intends to achieve.

B. Lowering Merger Filing Thresholds
Another proposed reform is to lower current transaction filing
thresholds.527 Authorities could thus review much smaller transactions
than is currently the case and, perhaps more importantly, they could look
at acquisitions where one of the merging parties earns little to no revenue
at the time of the transaction, despite arguably having a much larger
competitive significance.
In many ways, lowering these filing thresholds appears to be the most
sensible reform. To a first approximation, doing so would merely give
authorities the option of looking into deals that might otherwise fly under
the radar—or, more precisely, that might show up on the radar but would
evade authorities’ oversight.528 But the devil lies in the details. Lowering
transaction thresholds raises practical challenges that might ultimately
undermine its usefulness as a policy reform.529 Indeed, scrutinizing more
deals will merely increase administrative costs if authorities do not have
the requisite knowledge to identify the harmful transactions among them,
and if they do not have the right legal tools to prosecute them.530 In other
words, it is necessary to question (i) what would be the administrative
costs of lowering transactions thresholds, (ii) what anticompetitive
transactions could antitrust authorities hope to identify, and (iii) would
prosecuting these cases require a change to substantive merger
enforcement rules?
The administrative cost question is significant for firms and
authorities alike. On the one hand, it seems infeasible to scrutinize every
deal that takes place—even if authorities were to focus only on
527

See, e.g., European Commission Press Release, Mergers: Commission
announces evaluation results and follow-up measures on jurisdictional and
procedural aspects of EU merger control, EUR. COMM’N (Mar. 26, 2021),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_1384
[https://perma.cc/3EN9-7Z8M] (publishing revised guidance about article 22 of the
EU Merger Regulation). The revisions were made in order to enable the Commission
to review mergers that currently fall below EU merger filing thresholds—in an attempt
to catch potentially anticompetitive nascent competitor acquisitions. Id.
528
Id.
529
Mitchell D. Raup Et Al., Lowering the Bar: The FTC Lowers HSR Premerger
Reporting Thresholds for the First Time in a Decade, NAT’L L. REV. (February 3,
2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/lowering-bar-ftc-lowers-hsrpremerger-reporting-thresholds-first-time-decade [https://perma.cc/7NYF-XCJ2].
530
Multijurisdictional Mergers: Rationalizing the Merger Review Process
Through Targeted Reform, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (updated June 25, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/chapter-3 [https://perma.cc/35K4-KBH5].
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acquisitions by large incumbents in concentrated industries. For instance,
it is well documented that big tech firms have made a significant number
of acquisitions over the past few decades.531 Gautier and Lamesch
document at least 175 acquisitions by the GAFAM (i.e. Google, Amazon,
Facebook and Apple) between 2015 and 2017, while Argentesi et al.
document almost 300 by Google, Amazon, and Facebook, between 2008
and 2018.532 In short, given the caseloads that authorities currently
handle,533 it is fanciful to believe that they could examine most deals
involving these, or other, companies without tremendous additional
resources that are potentially better spent elsewhere.
It is thus likely that most deals below existing thresholds would not
be scrutinized under new rules. The question then is how authorities
would select cases without opening the floodgates of arbitrary and/or
politically motivated enforcement. Authorities might indeed be tempted
to use their newfound discretion to target sectors where they want to
appear “tough” on businesses, or as an industrial policy tool—using
repeated investigations to stifle foreign businesses.534 This is not to say
that such an outcome is inevitable, but rather that guidelines need to be put
in place to keep authorities’ discretion in check.
Unfortunately, as things stand, there are simply no widely accepted
methods by which to identify those deals. Focusing on mergers with
overlapping R&D pipelines is unlikely to assuage the demands of critics.
This is because a significant number of the tech mergers that provide the
basis for today’s calls appear to concern acquisitions in “complementary”
markets, and, as explained above, it has even been claimed that startups

531

Saikat Chaudhuri and Behnam Tabrizi, Capturing the Real Value in HighTech Acquisitions, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 1999), https://hbr.org/1999/09/capturingthe-real-value-in-high-tech-acquisitions [https://perma.cc/JH3G-6QGG].
532
Gautier & Lamesch, supra note 283, at 14; Argentesi et al., supra note 290,
at 3.
533
See Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 39.
534
See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Manne, The Rule of Reason as a Discovery Procedure:
A Response to Ramsi Woodcock’s Hidden Rules of a Modest Antitrust, 105 MINN. L.
REV. HEADNOTES 422, 439–40 (2021) (“[E]nforcers do not make their decisions
necessarily on the winnability of the case as determined by a court’s expected
imposition of a filter. Rather, most cases probably . . . turn substantially on
considerations divorced from the merits of any given case . . . [and instead] turn on
political and, of course, budgetary considerations. For instance, it is worth noting that
federal enforcers have recently devoted vast resources to bring cases against
Qualcomm, Facebook, and Google. It is an open question whether antitrust authorities
decided to allocate substantial budgets toward these cases because they were perceived
to be easily winnable – and at least for the Qualcomm proceedings, this has already
turned out not to be the case – or because these cases fitted well within the agencies’
broader political agendas.”).
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are afraid of competing on projects where incumbents have an R&D
pipeline.535
Using the size of transactions as a filtering mechanism is equally
unpromising, as this metric could easily be gamed and does not necessarily
correlate with the competitive significance of a deal.536 In other words,
applying a transaction size filing threshold might merely incentivize
startups to sell before they reach the threshold, and might focus
authorities’ attention on the wrong set of transactions.537
Another potential heuristic would be to look at the so-called “fitness”
of acquiring and acquired firms. According to Robert Mahari, Sandro Lera
and Alex Pentland, fitness can be seen as “how well a given firm translates
size (measured by the number of business relationships it has) into
growth.”538 The intuition is that, in network industries where firm growth
is often exponential, firms’ growth rates carry more predictive value than
their size at a given point in time.539 The authors thus propose to focus on
firms’ ability to raise money, as a proxy for fitness.540 In practice, the
authors believe this might lead authorities to scrutinize acquisitions that
bring together high-fitness companies.541
Such an approach is not without problems. Merger enforcement is
about identifying the competitive relationship that exists between two
firms in order to determine whether their merger will harm competition.
Knowing that two firms are “fit” and likely to grow in the future says little
to nothing about this competitive landscape. At some point in time, Uber
and Airbnb might both have been “high-fitness” startups, yet it is clear that
they are not competitors in the antitrust sense: taxis are not substitutes for
holiday homes.
This is not to say that looking at firms’ “fitness” is entirely without
merit. There is certainly a case to be made for authorities adopting a more
535

Zingales et al., supra note 8, at 29.
See, e.g., Thomas G. Wollmann, Stealth Consolidation: Evidence from an
Amendment to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 1 AM. ECON. REV. INSIGHTS 77, 77–78
(2019).
537
Id. at 78.
538
Robert Zev Mahari et al., Time for a New Antitrust Era: Refocusing Antitrust
Law to Invigorate Competition in the 21st Century, 1 STAN. COMPUTATIONAL
ANTITRUST 52, 57 (2021).
539
Id. at 58.
540
Id. (“We proxy the fitness of a private company by the average amount of
money raised per round of funding (we obtain similar results for other measures of
fitness). As shown below, firms with a high level of fitness are systematically more
likely to be acquired, and approximately half of the transactions that involve a high
fitness firm fall below the HSR reporting threshold.”).
541
Id. at 62 (“It is also our recommendation that FTC and DOJ take into account
the relative fitnesses of two merging entities (proxied as appropriate by revenue
growth, user growth or other relevant metrics) to determine when to issue a second
request in the merger review process.”).
536
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“dynamic” approach to antitrust analysis.542 Focusing more heavily on
firms’ ability to thrive, rather than the competitive situation at an arbitrary
point in time, might certainly be worthwhile. However, it does not follow
that the merger of two “fit” firms is necessarily, or even likely, detrimental
to competition and consumers. In short, just like a focus on transactions
values, “fitness” does not provide a useful heuristic for authorities to
analyze mergers that fall below existing filing thresholds.
The upshot is that lowering existing merger filing thresholds would
lead authorities to an impasse, as there is no cost-effective way to review
mergers that take place below them.543 And, because of this, such a reform
would also require reforms to substantive merger rules (such as those
discussed in the following section). Put simply, the future is uncertain.
Accordingly, innovation harms also entail significant uncertainty that
seems incompatible with existing antitrust standards or review and
burdens of proof.

C. Shifting the Burden of Proof
Shifting the burden of proof in certain merger enforcement
proceedings is one of the most popular reforms that has been suggested to
clamp down on potential killer acquisitions and other allegedly
innovation-reducing mergers.544 It is the cornerstone of several proposed
antitrust reforms, including Senator Amy Klobuchar’s draft Competition
and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act (the “CALERA Bill”), and
the creation of a Digital Markets Unit (“DMU”), in the United Kingdom.545

542
See, e.g., J Gregory Sidak & David J Teece, Dynamic Competition in
Antitrust Law, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 581, 582 (2009) (“A necessary but not
sufficient condition for that effort is a public process by which the Division and the
FTC revisit and restate the Merger Guidelines in a manner that clarifies and defends
the role of dynamic competition in antitrust analysis. We therefore applaud the
announcement of the antitrust agencies in September 2009 to solicit public comment
on the possibility of updating the Merger Guidelines. Assuming that the Division and
the FTC decide to revise the existing Merger Guidelines, those revised guidelines (and
useful complementary undertakings, such as generalized guidelines on market power
and remedies) then will require leadership by the enforcement agencies to persuade
the courts that antitrust doctrine should evolve accordingly. That neo-Schumpeterian
process may take a decade or longer to accomplish, but it is a path that we believe the
Roberts Court is willing to travel.”).
543
See, e.g., Gautier & Lamesch, supra note 283, at 14; and Argentesi et al.,
supra note 290, at 3.
544
James Keyte et al., Buckle Up: The Global Future of Antitrust Enforcement
and Regulation, ANTITRUST MAG., Summer 2021 at 34.
545
Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act of 2021, S. 225,
117th Cong. § 2(b)(4) (as introduced February 4, 2021); Appendix F: The SMS regime:
a distinct merger control regime for firms with SMS, DIGITAL MARKETS TASKFORCE
F1
(2020),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media-
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These proposals would essentially require tech firms that meet certain
thresholds to prove that their acquisitions do not harm competition.
For example, the preamble to Senator Klobuchar’s CALERA bill
explains that the purpose of the Act is, among other things, to “establish
simple, cost-effective decision rules that require the parties to certain
acquisitions that either significantly increase concentration or are
extremely large bear the burden of establishing that the acquisition will
not materially harm competition.”546
Similarly, the UK’s DMU proposal would apply a lower standard of
proof to mergers involving firms that are deemed to have a “strategic
market status.”547 While this is not the same thing as shifting the burden
of proof, the result may be similar. The onus would be on firms to show
that their deals benefit competition, with authorities only needing to clear
a very low bar in order to successfully block a transaction. 548 And while
the European Union has not yet proposed rules that would shift the burden
of proof in merger proceedings, its draft Digital Markets Act would require
so-called “gatekeeper” platforms (i.e., platforms that serve as an important
gateway between consumers and other companies) to notify all of their
acquisitions to competition authorities.549 One reading of this provision is
that information gathered from these notifications may ultimately provide
the basis for tighter rules, such as shifting the burden of proof for
acquisitions involving gatekeeper platforms.550 On the face of it, these
might seem like modest and sensible reforms. Indeed, several scholars
have claimed that firms are ideally situated to explain how their deals will
affect competition.551 According to them, firms’ failure to discharge their

/5fce706ee90e07562d20986f/Appendix_F_-_The_SMS_regime__a_distinct_merger_control_regime_for_firms_with_SMS_-_web_-.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SHZ7-UMG9].
546
Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act § 2(b)(4).
547
DIGITAL MARKETS TASKFORCE, supra note 545, at F30.
548
Id. at F29 (“Our recommendation at this point is to assess whether there is a
‘realistic prospect’ that a merger gives rise to an SLC. This would, critically, enable
the CMA to intervene in mergers that have the potential to cause significant harm to
UK consumers, even where it cannot be established that this outcome is more likely
than not.”).
549
See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
On Contestable and Fair Markets in the Digital Sector (Digital Markets Act), art.
12.1,COM/2020/842 final (Dec. 15, 2020), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52020PC0842&from=en.
550
Id. at art. 10 (detailing a procedure that the Commission can use to introduce
new rules that would apply to gatekeepers).
551
Caffarra et al., supra note 9, at 18 (“[E]nforcers cannot be all-knowing,
especially given their limited resources and the huge asymmetry of information. This
would militate in favor of super-dominant firms being required to proactively show
why they are pursuing the deal, and why consumers would necessarily benefit.”).
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burden of proof would constitute a clear sign of anticompetitiveness.552
But such an assertion is far from self-evident. Critics implicitly assume
that firms know how their deals will affect competition and consumers.
This may be true in those limited cases where a merger merely aims to
eliminate a competitor. But in many other instances firms may struggle to
rationalize how their deals could benefit consumers, a task that is only
made harder by the prospective nature of merger-specific benefits.
One key problem is that business managers might not be well-versed
in the intricacies of antitrust enforcement and might thus struggle to
explain the benefits of their transactions in such terms. Frank Easterbrook
was one of the first scholars to pick-up on this fundamental difficulty:
[E]ntrepreneurs often flounder from one practice to another trying to
find one that works. When they do, they may not know why it works,
whether because of efficiency or exclusion. They know only that it
works. If they know why it works, they may be unable to articulate
the reason to their lawyers-because they are not skilled in the legal and
economic jargon in which such “business justifications” must be
presented in court. . . .
. . . It takes economists years, sometimes decades, to understand why
certain business practices work, to determine whether they work
because of increased efficiency or exclusion. To award victory to the
plaintiff because the defendant has failed to justify the conduct
properly is to turn ignorance, of which we have regrettably much, into
prohibition. That is a hard transmutation to justify.553

Easterbrook’s intuition undoubtedly carries over to the field of
merger enforcement—especially in cases where relatively small
transactions are involved (i.e., deals that fall below existing Hart-ScottRodino and EU Merger Regulation filing thresholds). As a result,
“[i]mposing a burden of proof on entrepreneurs – often to prove a negative
in the face of enforcers’ pessimistic assumptions– when that burden can’t
plausibly be met can serve only to impede innovation.”554
Indeed, despite calls for such burden-shifting, which would often
impose upon business actors the obligation to establish a defined, causal
relationship between market structure and innovation, even economists
know very little about the optimal conditions for innovation.555 And,
552

Id.
Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 972, 975 (1986).
554
Geoffrey A. Manne, supra note 174, at 77.
555
See, e.g., Herbert Simon, Theories of Decision Making in Economics, 49
AM. ECON. REV. 253, 278–79 (1959) (“W]e know very little at present about how the
rate of innovation depends on the amounts of resources allocated to various kinds of
research and development activity. Nor do we understand very well the nature of
553
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despite the lack of evidence clearly connecting structural concerns (i.e.,
the number of competitors or the amount of concentration in a market)
with innovation outcomes, most antitrust economists and enforcers are
singularly focused on these structural conditions.556 As David Teece
writes:
A less important context for innovation, although one which has
received an inordinate amount of attention by economists over the
years, is market structure, particularly the degree of market
concentration. Indeed, it is not uncommon to find debate about
innovation policy among economists collapsing into a rather narrow
discussion of the relative virtues of competition and monopoly. . . .
. . . [Yet] reviews of the extensive literature on innovation and market
structure generally find that the relationship is weak or holds only
when controlling for particular circumstances. The emerging
consensus is that market concentration and innovation activity most
probably either coevolve or are simultaneously determined.557

As a result of shifting the burden of proof to defendants to establish
that mergers or other activities will affirmatively promote consumer
welfare (and/or innovation) is not merely a “neutral” shift aimed simply at
‘know how,’ the costs of transferring technology from one firm or economy to another,
or the effects of various kinds and amounts of education upon national product. These
are difficult questions to answer from aggregative data and gross observation, with the
result that our views have been formed more by arm-chair theorizing than by testing
hypotheses with solid facts.”). Sadly, our understanding of the conditions that
encourage innovation has progressed little since Simon wrote in 1959. See, e.g.,
Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Regulating Innovation: Competition policy
and patent law under uncertainty (Antonin Scalia L. Sch. Fac. Working Paper #0941, 2009) (“[T]he ratio of what is known to unknown with respect to the relationship
between innovation, competition, and regulatory policy is staggeringly low. In
addition to this uncertainty concerning the relationships between regulation,
innovation, and economic growth, the process of innovation itself is not well
understood.”); Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Innovation and the Limits of
Antitrust, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 153, 166 (2010) (“[A]s a general rule,
economists know much less about the relationship between competition and
innovation, and in turn, consumer welfare, than they do about standard price
competition.”); Richard J. Gilbert, Competition and Innovation, in 1 ISSUES IN
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 577, 583 (W. Dale Collins, ed. 2008) (“[E]conomic
theory does not provide unambiguous support either for the view that market power
generally threatens innovation by lowering the return to innovative efforts nor the
Schumpeterian view that concentrated markets generally promote innovation.”).
556
See Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust, id., at 166.
557
David J. Teece, Technological Innovation and the Theory of the Firm: The
Role of Enterprise-Level Knowledge, Complementarities, and (Dynamic)
Capabilities, in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECON. OF INNOVATION 679, 687–88
(Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg, eds. 2010).
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taking better account of defendants’ private information; it is an
effectively insurmountable obstacle that would dramatically deter
procompetitive conduct.
Google’s acquisition of Android provides a salient illustration.558
Google paid $50 million for a tiny startup with only six employees,
reportedly without the knowledge of then-CEO Eric Schmidt.559 As
discussed above, the deal ended up being widely successful and seemingly
benefited consumers.560 The question, however, is whether Google could
have outlined those benefits at the time of the acquisition. While it seems
clear that Google saw the purchase as a way of moving into mobile
operating systems,561 other aspects of the merger would likely have been
less clear. Could Google have successfully vertically integrated absent the
merger? Would an independent Android have succeeded as a standalone
company? Would the benefits of additional smartphone competition
outweigh the potential costs of increased barriers to entry in the search
engine market? The answers to these questions seem somewhat
unknowable. And yet, Google would have been required to elucidate them
all under a reformed merger control regime where the burden of proof is
shifted to merging parties. If the purchase was driven by instinct rather
than a fully-rationalized strategy rooted in structural change, the ensuing
proceedings would merely be a somewhat superficial exercise in ex-post
rationalization (between authorities and Google), largely untethered from
the unknown merits of the case and the underlying acquisition.
It is not clear that this sort of discussion significantly advances the
interests of consumers. What is clear is that these proceedings would have
entailed several non-trivial costs—hiring law firms, diverting computer
scientists from product development to regulatory questions, delaying
work on the Android project (compared to internal expansion), etc. If what
matters for competition and innovation in this space is “moving fast and
breaking things”562 to take the words of Mark Zuckerberg, or

558

See supra Section V.A.
Nicholas Carlson, Larry and Sergey Didn’t Always Tell Eric Schmidt About
Google’s
Acquisitions,
INSIDER
(January
20,
2011),
https://www.businessinsider.com/larry-and-sergey-didnt-always-tell-eric-schmidtabout-googles-acquisitions-2011-1 [https://perma.cc/38E7-UVA4]; Callaham, supra
note 157.
560
See Callaham, supra note 157.
561
Id.
562
Hemant Taneja, The Era of “Move Fast and Break Things” Is Over, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/01/the-era-of-move-fast-and-breakthings-is-over [https://perma.cc/8PWV-8CT9] (“Many of today’s entrepreneurs live
by Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg’s now-famous motto: “Move fast and break
things.” Zuckerberg intended for this to inform internal design and management
processes, but it aptly captures how entrepreneurs regard disruption: more is always
559
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“permissionless innovation”563 in the words of Adam Thierer, then the
proposed reforms might be a step in the wrong direction.
Another way of framing this problem is to draw a distinction between
heuristics and rationalization. Antitrust enforcement, with its complicated
procedures for assessing cases, is largely driven by the latter. Instead,
businesses can arguably rely more heavily on the first. This is possible
because, unlike their regulatory counterparts, firms have “skin in the
game.” Firms bear the costs of faulty deals and thus operate under
conditions where feedback loops enable successful managers to proceed
without detailed rationalizations (think of the email exchange between
Zuckerberg and Ebersman) and consign unsuccessful ones to
bankruptcy.564 Thus Nassim Taleb, for example, has written that business
plans are essentially ex-post rationalizations that are largely irrelevant for
business decisions:
Likewise, the illusion prevails that businesses work via business plans
and science via funding. This is strictly not true . . . . [F]or a real
business (as opposed to a fundraising scheme), something that should
survive on its own, business plans and funding work backward. At the
time of writing, most big recent successes (Microsoft, Apple,
Facebook, Google) were started by people with skin and soul in the
game and grew organically—if they had recourse to funding, it was to
expand or allow the managers to cash out; funding was not the prime
source of creation. You don’t create a firm by creating a firm; nor do
you do science by doing science.565

Matt Ridley offers another spin on this intuition. As he puts it,
“innovation is the mother of science as often as it is the daughter”:
There is a widely held view among politicians, journalists and the
public that science leads to technology, which leads to innovation. . . .
While this can sometimes happen, it is just as often the case that
invention is the parent of science: techniques and processes are
developed that work, but the understanding of them comes later.
Steam engines led to the understanding of thermodynamics, not the

better. We raced to put our products into consumers’ hands as fast as possible, without
regard for the merit of—and rationale for—offline systems of governance.”).
563
ADAM THIERER, PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION: THE CONTINUING CASE FOR
COMPREHENSIVE TECHNOLOGICAL FREEDOM 1 (2016).
564
See generally Armen Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic
Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211 (1950).
565
NASSIM N. TALEB, SKIN IN THE GAME: HIDDEN ASYMMETRIES IN DAILY LIFE
159 (2018).
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other way round. Powered flight preceded almost all aerodynamics.
Animal and plant breeding preceded genetics.566

While Taleb and Ridley’s points are clearly not about the ex-ante
motivations for corporate mergers, they touch upon the same underlying
point: When it comes to business, entrepreneurship, and innovation, it is
wrong to assume that rationalization always precedes action.
In short, antitrust enforcers and innovators arguably rely on very
different processes to generate the information required to guide their
conduct. It is not clear that the type of knowledge on which innovators
rely could easily be transposed to antitrust enforcement. And if that is not
the case, shifting the burden of proof in merger proceedings might
ultimately amount to a de facto ban on transactions—or at the very least
prevent many desirable acquisitions from taking place. As discussed
throughout this paper, there is little evidence to suggest that such an
outcome would be appropriate from an error-cost standpoint. Of course,
our point here is certainly not dispositive. Perhaps firms would overcome
these difficulties; at this point, we simply do not know. Accordingly, our
insight is not that burden shifting should be categorically proscribed—
after all, it is already present in other areas of antitrust enforcement where
anticompetitive harm is deemed likely, such as collusion—but rather that
more evidence is necessary to determine whether such a system would be
beneficial or even workable in practice.

VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that projected merger enforcement reforms risk
throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Mergers are beneficial to
society, anticompetitive ones are rare, and there is little way, at the margin,
to tell good from bad. To put it mildly, there is a precious baby that needs
to be preserved and relatively little bathwater to throw out.
Take the fulcrum of policy debates that is the pharmaceutical
industry. It is not hard to point to pharmaceutical mergers (or long-term
agreements) that have revolutionized patient outcomes. Most recently,
Pfizer and BioNTech’s efforts to successfully market an mRNA vaccine
against COVID-19 offers a case in point.567 The deal struck by both firms
566

MATT RIDLEY, HOW INNOVATION WORKS: AND WHY IT FLOURISHES IN
FREEDOM 282 (2020).
567
BioNTech Signs Collaboration Agreement with Pfizer to Develop mRNAbased Vaccines for Prevention of Influenza, BIONTECH (Aug. 16, 2018),
https://investors.biontech.de/news-releases/news-release-details/biontech-signscollaboration-agreement-pfizer-develop-mrnabased#:~:text=(NYSE%3A%20PFE)%20to%20develop,advance%20mRNA%2Dbas
ed%20flu%20vaccines [https://perma.cc/R5BC-2MYK] (“Under the terms of the
agreement, BioNTech and Pfizer will jointly conduct research and development
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could naïvely be construed as a killer acquisition (or an anticompetitive
agreement; long-term agreements can easily fall into either of these
categories): Pfizer was a powerful incumbent in the vaccine industry;
BioNTech threatened to disrupt the industry with new technology; the deal
likely caused Pfizer to forgo some independent R&D efforts. And yet, it
also led to the first approved COVID-19 vaccine and groundbreaking
advances in vaccine technology.568 Of course, the counterfactual is
unclear, and the market might be more competitive absent the deal, just as
there might be only one approved mRNA vaccine today—we simply do
not know.569 More importantly, this counterfactual was even less
knowable at the time of the deal. And much the same could be said about
countless other pharmaceutical deals.
The key policy question is how authorities should handle this
uncertainty. Critics of the status quo argue that current rules and
thresholds leave certain anticompetitive deals unchallenged. As explained
throughout this paper, however, these calls for tougher enforcement fail to
satisfy the requirements of the error-cost framework. Critics have so far
failed to show that, on balance, mergers harm social welfare – even
overlapping ones or mergers between potential competitors – just as they
are yet to suggest alternative institutional arrangements that would
improve social welfare. In other words, they mistakenly analyze the
occurrence of false negatives in isolation. In doing so, they ignore how
measures that aim to reduce such judicial errors may lead to other errors,
as well as higher enforcement costs. In short, they paint a world where

activities to help advance mRNA-based flu vaccines. Pfizer will assume sole
responsibility for further clinical development and commercialization of mRNAbased flu vaccines, following BioNTech’s completion of a first in human clinical
study. BioNTech will receive $120 million in upfront, equity and near-term research
payments and up to an additional $305 million in potential development, regulatory
and commercial milestone payments. In addition, BioNTech will receive up to doubledigit tiered royalty payments associated with worldwide sales if the program reaches
commercialization.”).
568
See, e.g., Damian Garde & Jonathan Saltzman, The Story of mRNA: How a
Once-Dismissed Idea Became a Leading Technology in the Covid Vaccine Race, STAT
(Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/11/10/the-story-of-mrna-how-aonce-dismissed-idea-became-a-leading-technology-in-the-covid-vaccine-race/
[https://perma.cc/Z2ZV-5WE7]; Laurie McGinley et al., FDA Authorizes the First
Coronavirus Vaccine, a Rare Moment of Hope in the Deadly Pandemic, THE WASH.
POST (Dec. 12, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/12/11/trumpstephen-hahn-fda-covid-vaccine/ [https://perma.cc/X8V6-LACQ].
569
At the time of writing, there are two FDA approved mRNA vaccines against
COVID-19. See COVID- 19 Vaccines, FDA (last visited Jun. 10, 2021),
https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/coronavirus-disease2019-covid-19/covid-19-vaccines#authorized-vaccines
[https://perma.cc/6AQRBBED].
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policy decisions involve facile tradeoffs, and this undermines their policy
recommendations.
Given these significant limitations, this body of academic research
should be met with an appropriate amount of caution. For all the criticism
it has faced, the current merger review system is mostly a resounding
success. It is administrable, predictable, and timely. Yet it also eliminates
a vast majority of judicial errors: even its critics concede that false
negatives make up only a tiny fraction of decisions. Policymakers must
decide whether the benefits from catching the very few arguably
anticompetitive mergers that currently escape prosecution outweigh the
significant costs that are required to achieve this goal. There is currently
little evidence to suggest that this is indeed the case.
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